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Introduction
The use of coercion and restraint in psychiatry is surrounded with moral ambivalence and uncertainties.1 In this thesis, the use of coercion and restraint in psychiatry is studied from a moral perspective. Therefore, this study aims to develop insights in the moral experiences and considerations of various stakeholders involved (patients, nurses, psychiatrists) in psychiatry; and also reflect on the various potentials for moral progress and improvement.
A personal narrative
During my master study in philosophy, I developed an interest in psychiatry. Therefore, I applied for a job as receptionist for the psychiatric crisis team for two days a week. During the first week, a middle-aged man came into the building accompanied by a psychiatric nurse. This middle-aged man looked very scared and psychotic. He was so frightened that he did not want to walk with the psychiatric nurse to the office. Instead, he just stood at the entrance of the care centre and did not dare to move. Other practitioners came for assistance and they tried to talk with him and soothe him, but it was to no avail. It was a tense situation, and nobody knew what to do. Suddenly, the man ran to the exit door, but as he was so fast, the glass doors did not open, and he crashed against the door and fell down. At that moment, the practitioners grabbed him and took him to the closed ward of the institution. This all happened while I was sitting behind my reception desk. While I observed the interactions between the man and the practitioners I could feel the adrenaline rising. It made me wonder about what should be done when people are so confused that they act dangerously or against their best interest. As a philosophy student interested in ethics, I was puzzled about these moral issues in practice. 
1 Elleke GM Landeweer, Tineke A Abma, Guy AM Widdershoven (2011) Moral margins concerning the use of coercion in psychiatry. Nursing Ethics 18(3) 304-316; Cindy Diamond Zolnierek (2007) Coercion and the mentally ill: Ethical perspectives.  
Journal of the American Psychiatric Nurses Association. 13 (2): 101-108 
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In situations, such as the one described above, moral questions come up and decisions are made. Questions and decisions that are about, for example, whether or not to intervene, and if yes, at what moment. Experiencing this practice, I realised that moral questions develop in, and are inherent to, the practice of psychiatry. Also, I realised that moral decisions are made in the course of a dynamic process. And whilst normative assumptions and guidelines inf luence moral decisions, real situations are always new and unpredictable. Hence, decisions are often based on previous experiences and shared ideas about danger, suffering and risks considered acceptable. In the case of the man who was so scared that he ran into the glazed door, involuntary admittance was not considered before. But during the moment of escalation, the practitioners became convinced that the man was in need of help and something had to be done urgently. 
Thus, the experience I had when working as a receptionist aroused my interest in the responsibilities of psychiatry to provide care for patients against their wishes. Psychiatrists are allowed to use coercion and restraint under certain strict circumstances for protection of others and/ or of the patient himself or herself. Yet, professionals in psychiatry also have to provide the best possible care for the patient. As different values play a role and influence the decisions that are made, it is worthwhile to unravel these processes, to look at who’s and which values play a role, and foster reflection. 
Domain of the thesis
The use of coercion has always been part of the practice of psychiatry and subject of debate in the Netherlands. However, in recent years awareness rose that more attention should be given to reduce and prevent the use of coercion. Coercion was not condemned or considered wrongful per se; but it was thought there could and should be found new, and better ways to prevent and reduce it. Ideally, care should be conducted with respect to the autonomy of the patient and, and this should be done without the use of coercion. The patient has to consent to treatment after being well informed and such treatment should be preferably based on a mutually shared 
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agreement with the practitioner on what is best.2 Yet, in psychiatry, coercion can be used to protect patients against themselves or others, to prevent further danger and help them to recover. 
Morality in this thesis is seen as a social construct, which is concerned with various beliefs, attitudes and values about right and wrong in human conduct towards one another. It is learned and developed through social interactions. People learn values that are generally considered important in social contexts. In health care, good care is defined and fine-tuned in concrete situations. Every situation is unique and needs balancing and reflection to determine if and what values apply in the concrete situation, regarding concrete persons. Different individuals will approach and value situations from different angles, based on motives and expectations of those involved. In other words, this implies that morality is an on-going process of fine-tuning between persons. 
In this thesis, coercion is especially seen in the context of the use of seclusion at acute closed wards. Closed wards in mental health care institutions are wards in which patients cannot leave without the permission of the practitioners. The doors are closed. Patients who stay at these acute wards, are involuntarily or voluntarily admitted, and are often in a state of crisis, for example suffering an acute psychosis, severe depression or other psychiatric illness that causes danger or fear. Within these settings, coercive measures can be used to safeguard the patient and other persons, for instance by secluding the patient in a solitary room of which the door cannot be opened from the inside. In this setting, our research group conducted several evaluation studies as part of projects aiming to reduce seclusion. 
The motive for starting projects in mental health care with the aim to reduce the use of seclusions and other restraints was as a result of disputes that arose from the practice of coercion in psychiatry in the Netherlands. The use of coercion and restraint raised 
2 Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Linda L. Emanuel (1992) Four models of the Physician- Patients Relationship. JAMA, vol 267, n. 16, 2221-2226; Tom L. Beauchamp, James F. Childress (2012) Principles of Biomedical Ethics. Seventh Edition. Oxford University Press 
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critique among clients, patient advocacy groups and others.3 The critics emphasized the negative impact of coercion, such as psychological harm for the patient as well as the staff, the absence of therapeutic effects4, aversion from treatment, trauma and distrustful working relationships with care workers.5 They also referred to the negative aspects of coercion, for example, the violation of the person’s freedom and personal autonomy.6 From a scientific point of view, comparative international studies showed that the use of seclusions was more common in the Netherlands than in other countries.7 Seclusion evidently had become a (too) generally accepted and often-used intervention in the Netherlands.8 In response to such criticism, the idea got grounded that seclusion should be reduced in mental health care institutions. Bottom 
3 Welles FE. (2006) Dwang: Separatie Versus Medicatie. De ingrijpendheid van dwangmiddelen in de psychiatrie vanuit patient perspectief. [Coercion: seclusion or medication. The intensiveness of coercion in psychiatry from the perspective of patients] Utrecht NL: Stichting PVP; Hoekstra T, Lendemeijer HH, Jansen MG. (2004) Seclusion: The inside story.J Psychiatr Ment Health Nurs. 11:276-283; Lewis M, Taylor K, Parks J. (2009) Crisis prevention management: a program to reduce the use of seclusion and restraint in an inpatient mental health setting. Issues Ment Health Nurs. 30:159-164; Taxis JC. (2002) Ethics and praxis: alternative strategies to physical restraint and seclusion in a psychiatric setting. Issues Ment Health Nurs. 23:157-170: Carlsson G, Dahlberg K, Ekebergh M, Dahlberg H. (2006) Patients longing for authentic personal care: a phenomenological study of violent encounters in psychiatric settings.  
Issues Ment Health Nurs. 27: 287- 3054 Muralidharan S, Fenton M. Containment strategies for people with serious mental illness. Cochrane Library 2012, Issue 25 Johnson ME, Hauser PM. (2001) The practices of expert psychiatric nurses: accompanying the patient to a calmer personal space. Issues Ment Health Nurs. 22; 651-6686 Radden, J. (2002) Psychiatric ethics. Bioethics 16: 397-411; Welles FE. Dwang: Separatie 
Versus Medicatie. (2006) De ingrijpendheid van dwangmiddelen in de psychiatrie vanuit patient perspectief. [Coercion: seclusion or medication. The intensiveness of coercion in psychiatry from the perspective of patients] Utrecht NL: Stichting PVP7 Janssen WA, Noorthoorn EO, de Vries WJ, Hutschemeakers GJM, Lendemeijer HHGM, Widdershoven GAM. (2008) The use of seclusion in the Netherlands compared to countries in and outside Europe. Int J Law Psychiatry; 31: 463-470; Bowers L, van der Werf B, Vokkolainen A, Muir-Cochrane E, Allen T, Alexander J (2006). International variation in containment measures for disturbed psychiatric inpatients: A comparative questionnaire survey. International Journal of Nursing Studies. 44: 357-3648 Van der Werf B. (2003) De separeer en de prikkelarme omgeving [The seclusion room and stimulus free space] Vakblad Sociale Psychiatrie 69, 33-37; W.A. Janssen (2012). Argus: assessment and use of data in evaluating coercive measures in Dutch psychiatry. Thesis. VU University, Amsterdam
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up as well as top down, a sense of urgency developed regarding the need for change and improvement, although clear answers on how the changes and improvements could be effected were not given up front.
Our research group was invited to support projects in several mental health care institutions and to develop insights on how the practice of coercion could be improved. Through process evaluations, we monitored the projects and reflected with stakeholders (patients, nurses, and others) on the possibility to reduce coercion, the problems they expected, the barriers they experienced, and the ideas and interventions they regarded as successful. 
In this thesis, the results of the evaluation studies are presented in chapters, which were previously published as articles in scientific journals. In the introduction, I will first sketch the background of the use of coercion in psychiatry in the Netherlands and the development of the projects in psychiatry to reduce the use of seclusions. Secondly, I will describe the qualitative research approach that was used as methodology for the evaluation studies of these projects and explain the key assumptions of this methodology. In addition, I will also present the philosophical underpinnings of the moral epistemology used as a framework to analyse and reflect on the data from a moral perspective. Finally, I will end with a description of the central questions of the thesis and an outline of the chapters. 
The Use of Coercion in Dutch Psychiatry
In health care, the use of coercion and restraint is controlled by law. The Psychiatric Hospitals Compulsory Admission Act in the Netherlands regulates the use of coercion and restraint in psychiatry.9 It permits the use of coercion in psychiatry if a person shows dangerous behaviour regarding his or her own safety or others, caused by a 
9 Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport. Psychiatric Hospitals (Compulsory Admission) Act. 
Status of June 2004. International Publications Series Health, Welfare and Sports, 2004: no 4; The Hague 
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mental disorder, which cannot be averted in any other less intrusive way than by using force. 
The focus of the law is on involuntary admissions to psychiatric hospitals. The law states that further coercive measures are only permitted within a mental hospital.10 The involuntary admission should avert the danger that is present. During the admission, practitioners offer the client therapy to treat the psychiatric illness; and in case a patient does not consent to therapy voluntarily and (still) causes dangerous behaviour or experiences dangerous consequences of the psychiatric disease, coercive measures may be used to avert the danger. In that case, several interventions are allowed under strict conditions. Again, there has to be danger present, caused by the mental disorder, and the coercive intervention has to serve the purpose of averting the danger. Coercion is not justified if it only serves therapeutic goals, although averting danger in a long-term perspective might be a reason for coercive measures. Coercion in psychiatry has a twofold aim: The primary aim is to manage and contain dangerous situations due to a mental disorder; and the secondary aim is to create a therapeutic environment and prevent new dangerous episodes. 
The law distinguishes situations of acute danger and danger that is not immediately acute, but present in the long run. In case of acute danger, for example, if a patient becomes aggressive, care workers have to estimate what intervention is best to avert danger and harm, in the interest of the patient, other patients, and colleagues. Practitioners are allowed to use forced seclusion, medication or fixation as measures to avert danger. Practitioners may decide if and when coercion is necessary within the frame of the law. The law prescribes that the decision to use coercion has to be proportional; no less invasive alternative should be available, and the restraining measure should be sufficiently effective. At this point, moral 
10  The possibility to administer coercive medication outside the hospital is discussed  at the moment. See: http://www.dwangindezorg.nl/de-toekomst/wetsvoorstellen/wet-verplichte-geestelijke-gezondheidszorg (viewed at 1-7-13)
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considerations come in, since different values have to be balanced to decide if coercion is necessary and proportionate. 
Seclusion is defined as the (involuntary) placement of an individual locked in a room in solitary, which is set up specifically for the purpose of protection of the patient and his environment in order to control dangerous behaviours.11 It is considered as a coercive intervention, as the door cannot be opened from the inside.12 Another coercive measure that is used at closed wards is forced medication. This is administering medication with the use of force or strong psychological pressure against the patient’s wishes. Thirdly, there is also an option to use physical restraints, such as fixation.
In 1999, a research project was started to engender a dialogue about the use of coercion and restraint in psychiatry.13 The aim of this project was to develop and implement normative criteria and guidelines for professionals in practices aimed at fostering reflection and dialogue regarding the quality of the use of coercion and restraint.14 These guidelines were developed in collaboration with different stakeholders (patients, professionals, managers and family), and focused on the ambivalence of coercion, the need for virtues as respect, openness, honesty and thoughtful contemplation, the process character of coercion, and the importance of evaluation of the coercive measures afterwards. 
11 Lendemeijer B &Shortridge- Bagget L. (1997) The use of seclusion in psychiatry:  a literature review. Scholarly Inquiry for Nursing Practice: An international Journal, 11, 299-315; W.A. Janssen (2012). Argus: assessment and use of data in evaluating coercive measures in Dutch psychiatry. Thesis. VU University, Amsterdam12 Although, when patients consent or ask for a stay in the seclusion room themselves, it is sometimes considered as non-coercive. 13 Berghmans R, Elfahmi D, Goldsteen M et al. (2001) Kwaliteit van dwang en drang in de psychiatrie [Quality of coercion and pressure in psychiatry]. Utrecht/ Maastricht: GGz Nederland &Universiteit Maastricht14 Guy Widdershoven, Tineke Abma, Bert Molewijk. (2009) Empirical ethics as dialogical practice. Bioethics, vol. 23:4: 236-248; Abma, T. G. Widdershoven, G. &Lendemeijer, B. (2005) Dwang en drang in de psychiatrie: kwaliteit van vrijheidsbeperkendeinterventies. 
Utrecht: Lemma
General Introduction
15
After the development of the quality criteria and guidelines regarding the quality of the use of coercion and restraint, twelve mental health institutions took the initiative to implement and valorise these criteria and developed projects to translate them into practice.15 The outcomes were presented at a national conference, which fed the political debate. The Dutch government supported these developments and decided to fund projects in psychiatric institutions to foster the reduction of coercion in general, and seclusion more specifically (2006-2012). Mental health care institutions were stimulated to develop interventions aimed at the reduction of seclusion. Supported by governmental funding, individual institutions started projects. The process and outcomes of the projects were monitored by research.
 Our research group was involved in projects in six mental health care institutions. The research method we used was responsive (process) evaluation. The research aim was not primarily to establish the effects of the projects, but to monitor the process, and use the (interim) findings to improve the projects. We focused on practical as well as moral issues experienced by various stakeholders, i.e. foreseen downsides, pitfalls and issues as well as expected opportunities and profits, and engendered dialogues on these topics. Questions like; ‘how do the practit ioners experience the aims of the projects; did they agree with the need for change, or did they feel offended by it, did they see opportunities to change’, were asked to different key-persons. The evaluation studies had various aims. Firstly, we assumed that insights in moral stances of key people might explain possible reluctance and concrete difficulties. Secondly, starting a dialogue on these subjects might be a first step towards the improvement of the practice (i.e. reducing coercion). Thirdly, besides explicating these expectations of the persons involved, the research aimed to sustain local learning and changing processes and stimulate mutual exchange of ideas responsively. 
15 Ibid
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Research methodology: Responsive Evaluation
The research presented in the articles of this thesis was conducted within the framework of responsive evaluation methodology. Responsive evaluation is a research methodology that attends to processes and fosters reflections and dialogues in practices between participants (stakeholders) on how quality of care is and how they can be improved.16 The central focus of this methodology is not on explaining outcomes, but on understanding the process of change. 
The responsive evaluation methodology originates in the tradition of social constructivism and is also referred to as the fourth generation evaluation.17 In contrast to classical evaluation studies, it considers negotiation and dialogue in and during the evaluation research as important.18 This approach came up in the 1970s, when researchers emphasized the need to broaden the scope for evaluation in educational research and evaluation19 by developing evaluation criteria responsively with all stakeholders (instead of with for example only policymakers). It was acknowledged that the subjects (stakeholders) of research have their own specific, situational, interactive, context-bounded (moral) orientation and perspective on programmes and projects. Their experiences and perceptions of the programmes and projects should be included in evaluation research to grasp and create a shared construction of meaning regarding the evaluation of programs or projects.20 
16 Abma TA, Molewijk B, Widdershoven GA (2009) Good care in ongoing dialogue. Improving the quality of care through moral deliberation and responsive evaluation. 
Health Care Anal. 17:217-235; Guba EG, Lincoln YS.(1989) Fourth Generation Evaluation. Beverly Hills. CA: SAGE; Abma TA, Widdershoven GA. (2005) Sharing stories:  
Narrative and dialogue in responsive nursing evaluation. Eval Health Prof. 28:90-10917 Guba EG, Lincoln YS (1989) Fourth Generation Evaluation. Beverly Hills. CA: SAGE. 18 T. Abma. Responsief evalueren. Discoursen, controversen en allianties in het postmoderne (1996). Thesis Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam19 Stake RE (1975) Evaluating the arts in education: a responsiveness approach. Columbus, Ohio. 20 Merel Visse (2012) Openings for humanization in modern health care practices. Thesis, VU University Medical Centre. Amsterdam 
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Responsive evaluation does not aim at measuring outcomes or objective facts, but at creating new reconstructions of meaning in which all participants are involved and open towards other perspectives.21 Responsive evaluation succeeds when a dialogue is realized on the issues that the participants find important within the projects of evaluation.22 Responsive evaluation methodology is part of a transformative paradigm. A normative ethical assumption that springs from this paradigm is that research should strive towards social justice, democratic participation of stakeholders in research and should be aware of power differences.23 Research should have a focus on developing shared meanings of good care in which participants with more silent, unpowered voices are given the opportunity to get involved and become partners in the evaluation process. It is presumed that bringing different perspectives together will contribute to the dialogue and foster a learning process. Voices that are not naturally involved and marginalized in the dialogue might contribute to the quality of the dialogue by presenting new angles or issues in the debate.24 In our studies, this normative assumption was expressed in various ways. We made differences in perspectives explicit and used several ways to stimulate dialogues, by presenting counter stories, thick descriptions, metaphors and exchange of narratives between peers. 
In responsive evaluation, the researcher collects narratives, experiences, opinions, ambiguities, and issues through interviews and focus groups to reveal meanings and ambiguities in daily practice from different perspectives. Subsequently, the researcher brings these data together and facilitates dialogues on the issues raised. The goal is to foster engagement and empowerment, develop deeper insights, and promote and stimulate the development of mutual understandings and learning processes. 
21 Abma TA, Widdershoven GAM (2005). Sharing stories: Narrative and dialogue in responsive nursing evaluation. Evaluation and the Health Professions; 28 (1): 90-109 22 Ibid23 Donna M. Mertens (2010) Philosophy in mixed methods teaching: The transformative paradigm as illustration. International Journal of Multiple Research Approaches. 4: 9-18 24 Vivianne E. Baur, Tineke A. Abma, Guy A.M. Widdershoven (2010). Participation of marginalized groups in evaluation: Mission impossible? Evaluation and Program 
Planning. 33 (3): 238-245 
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Responsive evaluation research follows an emergent design. The research design gradually emerges in conversations and negotiations with the participants. These participants, who are relevant participants in research, are under negotiation with stakeholders of the practice; thus, they need to have a certain interest in the project that is evaluated. Responsive evaluation research also aims to be sensitive regarding participants whose interests are not always noticeable or participants who aren’t empowered enough to stand up for themselves while they do have interests regarding the project. 
In responsive evaluation, the position and role of the evaluator is not that of an outsider. The researcher does not judge a practice from a distant perspective, but engages in a dialogue with participants in the practice. The evaluator functions as a collector of perspectives and facilitator of dialogues, and he or she acts as a Socratic guide25, creating openings to reflect, to question and to (re)consider common positions and perspectives by presenting others. Meanings and conclusions are in this sense never ending, but constantly in development. Conclusions are constantly checked with the stakeholders, which implies an on-going process. In this sense, responsive evaluation is distinguished from other qualitative empirical approaches in ethics. The process of reflection and analysis is not done solely from a researchers’ perspective, but in constant interaction with practitioners.26
Various steps can be distinguished in conducting responsive evaluation. First, the evaluator has to identify and create social conditions for the research; relevant participants (stakeholder- groups) have to be selected; identifying participants is done in negotiation with the practice in which special attention is given to less empowered groups, ‘silenced voices’, whose interests could be involved, but are not dominantly present in the debate or in the initial start of the research. In the second step, the evaluator interviews the stakeholders to gain insights regarding their 
25 Tineke A. Abma, Bert Molewijk, Guy A. M. Widdershoven (2009). Good care in on-going dialogue. Improving the quality of care through moral deliberation and responsive evaluation. Health Care Analysis, 17: 217-235 26 Ibid
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opinions, concerns and issues. Their role is not only to give information, but also to participate in analysing the data. They are invited to give explanations, regarding their visions and values and place it in comparison with other stakeholders. Guba and Lincoln referred to this as a circular and iterative process. The interviews have an open atmosphere; and a constant process of checking is required to ensure that the researcher correctly registers the perspectives and ideas of the interviewee. This means interviews are not ended after one conversation; after transcription and analysis, the results are presented to the interviewee and they are reflected on. A third step in responsive evaluation research is to bring different perspectives together. Homogeneous perspectives (converging interests) are explored with one stakeholders group to be followed by exploring perspectives together, within a heterogeneous composed stakeholder groups. This last step is important as it creates openings to bring together enclave perspectives that might be different in their authority and ability to influence policies.27 In this way, group thinking and polarization between groups with power differences can be avoided.28 
The credibility of interpretations is fostered by so called ‘member checks’.29 The evaluators validate the interpretations of interviews with the respondents and discussed central topics in focus groups. All receive a summary of the transcripts in which, according to the researchers, the main issues where presented. The interpretations were also discussed within the project groups of the mental health institutions; triangulation was created by the use of different sources and methods of data collections (different stakeholders, different researchers, different data collection – interviews, focus groups and moral case deliberations, observations, journal reports, document analysis) to strive towards an authentic representation of experiences – The results are thick descriptions; not only factual details but also 
27 Nierse, CJ, Abma TA (2011) Developing voice and empowerment: the first step towards a broad  consultation in research agenda setting. Journal of Intellectual Disability Research, vol 55, part 4, pp 411-421 28 Karpowitz, CF, Raphael C, & Hammond AS (2009) Deliberative democracy and inequality: Two cheers for enclave deliberation among the disempowered. Politics & Society, 37, 576-61529 Guba EG, Lincoln YS. (1989) Fourth Generation Evaluation. Beverly Hills. CA: SAGE
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meanings of experiences and events (hermeneutic interpretation). Another procedure to enhance credibility is to consider the perspectives of various participants, including perspectives that might not be obvious at front or marginalized. 
Moral Epistemology
Responsive evaluation implies a specific perspective on social processes, emphasizing the importance of values of stakeholders, and the need to foster dialogue concerning these values in order to foster understanding and improve social practices. Practices are regarded as inherently moral, requiring moral work from participants that can be supported by research interventions. Responsive evaluation is based on a specific moral epistemology, regarding moral knowledge as socially constructed in processes of negotiation between stakeholders. This moral epistemology is implicitly present in most responsive evaluation studies, which is not made explicit or made the object of reflection. Given my interest in normative aspects of psychiatric practices around coercion, I will further elaborate the moral presuppositions of responsive evaluation. Hence, for this purpose, I will refer to the work by Margaret Walker.  
Traditional moral-theoretical approaches aim to develop impersonal individual action-guiding codes or propositions, focusing on moral accountability and the moral duties of a practitioner, and also develop rights and rules. Consequently, this perspective is related to the legal-juridical paradigm. Margaret Urban Walker and other feministic moral philosophers30 criticized theoretical-juridical approaches of morality, and argued that abstract justifications have little impact on concrete practices, by which values and norms are expressed and embedded in interactions. 
30 Margaret Urban Walker (2007) Moral Understandings. A Feminist study in Ethics. Second Edition. Oxford University Press; Jagger AM (2001) Feminist ethics. In: Encyclopedia 
of ethics, ed. LC Becker and CB Becker, 528-39. New York: Routledge; MacKenzie, C and Stoljar N (2000) Relational autonomy: Feminist perspectives on autonomy, agency and 
the social self. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press; Verkerk MA (2007) Care ethics as a feminist perspective on bioethics. In New Pathways for European Bioethics, ed. Chris Gastmans, Chris Dierickx, Herman Nys, and Paul Schotsmans, 65-79. Antwerp and Oxford: Intersentia 
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They assert that morality and moral judgments cannot be detached from social backgrounds, and cannot be singled out from specific (personal) contexts and experiences. Walker argues that morality is more than developing guidelines; she does not focus on justifications and duties in general, but on dependencies and responsibilities in concrete situations. Furthermore, Marian Verkerk insisted that morality is constructed in specific situations; 
“Moral decision making is a search for a feasible and appropriate response to a 
particular situation, and not the application of a method that in virtue of its extreme 
generality is insensitive to the particularities that structures the situation.”31
Following this line of thought, a relational approach of moral epistemology can help to understand and analyse the moral challenges that are experienced in practice around the use of coercion. Developing insights in how values are constructed and intertwined in practices may shed light on underlying frictions and inconsistencies, and also foster reflections and dialogue in the practice itself. The evaluation studies we performed did not aim to develop a normative universal argument underscoring the need for reducing seclusions. The aim was to assist practitioners to (re)consider common practices of coercion and to create and stimulate alternative strategies from multiple perspectives. The goal was to contribute to cultural changes, and assist in the development of new and more adequate attitudes and responsibilities that would be translated and embodied in concrete practices. 
Margaret Walker describes moral knowledge as situated, expressed, developed and embodied in practices, and in interactions between people.32 Morality from this perspective is not about defining central concepts or moral codes out of or above the context. Morality is primarily existing, developing and meaningful in practice and 
31 Verkerk MA (2007) Care ethics as a feminist perspective on bioethics. In: New Pathways 
for European Bioethics, ed. Chris Gastmans, Chris Dierickx, Herman Nys, and Paul Schotsmans, 76. Antwerp and Oxford: Intersentia32 Margaret Urban Walker (2007) Moral Understandings. A Feminist study in Ethics.  Second Edition. Oxford University Press
22
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learned within practice. Morality develops in interactions between people relating to care and considerations towards each other at different levels. Through dialogue and participating in social settings, people learn from and through each other what is morally important and why, and what they may expect from each other. 
“This view prescribes an investigation of morality as a socially embodied medium of 
mutual understanding and negotiation between people over their responsibility for 
things open to human care and response”.33
This does not imply that insights in what is right are always immediately upfront. On the contrary, in social life, moral values and expectations are not always straightforward. Sometimes they are opposite or ambiguous. Different backgrounds, different practices, different responsibilities and expectations are involved that may not be directly visible or easily brought together. One of the instruments in making values and expectations explicit is by exchanging stories and fostering dialogue, thus, language is a common tool for understanding and interpreting others motivation and backgrounds and bringing one’s own to the fore. People exchange and share their narratives, visions and expectations in search for refinement of moral orientations in new situations. 
Walker believes that morality is interpersonal knowledge that is constantly under construction between people. In interactions, people learn that they are responsible for things and for others. In practice, they mutually give meaning to morality (mutual understandings); they express their moral orientations by assigning, accepting and deflecting responsibilities, and sometimes take over responsibilities. Particular understandings are expressed in the daily interactions between people. In interactions, people express and make sense of their own and others’ responsibilities in terms of their identities, relationships, and values. These three aspects are closely entangled in what is considered as moral responsibilities. Expressing a narrative is a way to present and describe a moral value or issue in terms of responsibilities; 
33 Ibid, p.9
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thus, responsibilities regarding oneself (identity) and expectations towards others (relations) is expressed as what is considered important (values). Therefore, quoting Walker: 
“Our (narratives), moral and otherwise, are produced by and in histories of specific 
relationships, and those connections to others that invite and bind us are themselves 
the expression of some things we value”.34 
Walker distinguishes several tasks for moral research, and explicitly argues for combining moral research with social science. Firstly, she pleads for reflective 
analysis. Attending to the interactions between people within practices, we can discover which moral values and norms are leading in concrete practices. Moral understandings are often implicit, and hence, making explicit how practices of responsibilities are constructed will reveal what norms and values are embraced, sustained or reproduced in interactions, and how they are entangled with the social lives of people. Reflective analysis demands comparison with other cases, particular understandings and contrasting practices of responsibility. This has to be done from within practices. Yet, the attempt to develop a complete sense of all the information available of morality in diverse settings, ‘is no small task for moral philosophy’, according to Walker.35 To study what is going on in a moral sense in practices, we need factual information (provided by social science research) to develop rich descriptions for insight in actual practices of responsibility and how the participants perceive them. 
The aim of reflective analysis is to gain knowledge of concrete and underlying moral understandings between people in their practices. From this, we can ask critical questions within practices regarding patterns of responsibilities and possible incoherencies. This second task is referred to as critical reflection. We can test if moral understandings are really intelligible and coherent to the participants 
34 Ibid, p.11935 Ibid, p.11
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involved in practices. Walker relates this aspect to the candor of participants to these understandings. It examines whether various points of view are transparent to the participants, against the background of some standards of shared intelligibility. 
“Critical reflection tests whether moral understandings really are intelligible and 
coherent to those who enact them, whether they are similarly so from diverse 
points of view within them, and whether they are the kinds of understandings that 
can be so.”36
Critical reflection focuses on how people understand themselves as well as each other, and how certain understandings are sustained, for example by relations of trust, by power (differences) or by manipulation.  It critically examines whether what is going on in actual moral orders makes the right kind of sense to the participants.37 Critical reflection is partly normative as it presumes and prescribes a standard of shared understandings and intelligibility. Relations of deception and suppression should be revealed and also made the object of reflection, to investigate whether they are actually acceptable by the participants.
Finally, a fully normative reflection should be part of moral philosophy, according to Walker. This implies reflecting on whether a particular way to live is also the best way to live within the specific context. Walker does not search for an ideal morality that transcends time and situations, but she sees it as a task for moral philosophers to find out whether certain things or ways of life really are good or right, or, at the least, better than others.38 This requires comparison between practices. Moral philosophers should reflect on specific perspectives, cultures, circumstances and practices of responsibilities and compare them with others. In this endeavour, empirical evidence is important, and different perspectives should be taken into account and weighed. A moral philosopher should not be doing this from an outsider’s 
36 Ibid, p.11-1237 Ibid, p.1238 Ibid, p.13
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perspective, but has to be aware of her own perspective and be open to that of others. In this thesis, the role of responsive evaluation and the evaluator is characterised by embeddings in, and dialogue with, practice. Through a process of involvement in practice, insights in underlying norms and values, (different) perspectives, and alternative strategies are assembled and brought into dialogue, to reflect with stakeholders on the current distributions of responsibilities and develop new ones. How the tasks of moral research formulated by Walker were met during the studies of this thesis will be elaborated in the discussion chapter of this thesis. 
Aims and Structure of the Thesis
The central aim of this thesis is to develop insight in the moral dynamics of the practice of (reducing) coercion in psychiatry, to foster dialogue and reflection on the moral values and norms, and to also contribute to the (re)constructions of responsibilities in psychiatry. 
The individual chapters present studies that are published as articles in various journals. The studies are based on qualitative research and characterised by embeddings within practice, focusing on the moral dimensions of the use and reduction of coercion. This approach aims to do justice to the common moralities within practices, to create room for responsive analysis, to foster reflection from within practices of responsibilities, and thus to stimulate moral improvements. These studies use various narrative strategies, springing from the responsive methodology and moral epistemology. 
The main research questions of this thesis are: (i) What are the main findings of the studies in this thesis? (ii) How can we understand these findings in the light of the theoretical framework of Walker? (iii) What can we learn from these findings about the role of responsive evaluation and the evaluator in facilitating and fostering dialogue in clinical practice? (iv) What recommendations can be formulated regarding further reduction of coercion in psychiatry and regarding future research on this subject? These questions are discussed in chapter 7. 
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Chapter 1
Chapter 2 presents a narrative of a person that experienced (coercive) treatments in psychiatry and reflects how the biomedical model of neuroscience might not fully meet the needs to recover when seen from a patient perspective. In Chapter 3, the involvement of family in patient care and prevention of seclusions are described from the perspective of nurses. How the project would reduce the use of coercion at one ward, and changed the moral perspectives of nurses will be discussed in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 and 6 presents studies that reflect on how moral deliberations within the context of reducing the use of coercion can be stimulated between teams of professionals. In the discussion section of this thesis (Chapter 7), the findings of the studies will be summarized, and the research questions will be addressed. 
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Abstract 
Due to the progress being made in the neurosciences, higher expectations for the use of medication, even against the patient’s will, are arising in mental hospitals. In this article, we will discuss whether the neurosciences and new psychopharmacological solutions really support patients who suffer from mental illnesses. To answer this question, we will focus on the perspective of patients and their experiences with psychiatric (coercive) treatments. The analysis of one person’s story shows that other issues besides appropriate medication are important for recovery from a mental illness. In daily life, issues such as coping, rehabilitation and social support are of major importance for a patient suffering from psychiatric disease. Thus, although progress in the neurosciences is a positive development for clinical practice, it does not mean that (coercive) medication alone will carry a patient into 
ǤǯǡƤappropriate medication and trust between the psychiatrist and the patient, but also upon relational aspects, such as being recognised as a person, belonging, accepting 
ǡǤƤthe conclusion that dealing with psychiatric diseases is more complex than what the biomedical model of neuroscience suggests and that one should include the social context of the patient in the recovery process. 
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Introduction 
“During the last two decades of the twentieth century, both psychiatrists and their 
patients have steadily recognised that mental illnesses are diseases of the brain that 
ƤǤǳ1 
Recent developments in the neurosciences are promising. Neuroscience gives us, 
ǡƤsolutions to repair the brain, as the above quote illustrates. Psychopharmaca, it is said, can eventually repair any mental disorder. Because of the claimed progress 
Ƥǡresults from this line of research to the assessment of diagnoses and the treatment of psychiatric diseases. Among psychiatrists and patients in mental hospitals, higher expectations are arising from the use of medication. For instance, in a context where, as a consequence of a mental disorder, a patient becomes a danger to others, most psychiatrists consider medication the best way to avert the danger (as opposed to seclusion or the use of other physical restraints, such as bandages). This is the case even if medication is supplied against the patient’s will.2In this paper we want to discuss whether the neurosciences and the new psychochemical solutions really support patients who are dealing with a psychiatric disorder. Is the progress in the neurosciences a welcome development for patients who suffer from mental illnesses? To answer this question, we will focus on the perspective of the patients and their experiences with psychiatric treatments. We will discuss the story of Jolijn, a consultant and co-author of this article, who spent her adolescence in a mental hospital. Jolijn’s story demonstrates two important issues 
ǡǡǤƤ
ƤǤ
1 Andreasen NC (2001) Brave new brain. Conquering mental illnesses in the era of the genome. Oxford: University Press, New York2 Landeweer E, Abma T, Berghmans R, Janssen W, Dute J, Widdershoven G. (2007) Dwangtoepassing binnen de instelling. Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport, Den Haag 
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process of administering drugs; rather, it requires deliberation and dialogue between the patient, the psychiatrist, and those people in the social surrounding of the patient. The second issue is that, even when the appropriate medication is found, this alone is not always sufficient for the process of recovery. The social context of the patient is important as well and cannot be ignored. Jolijn’s story, as well as other empirical data used in this paper, was gathered from stakeholders in clinical psychiatry (patients, family, psychiatrists and nurses) as part of an empirical-ethical evaluation of the Dutch Act on Coercive Measures in Mental Hospitals.3 This study was completed over a period of 14 months, from February 2006 to March 2007, and conducted by three partners (Free University of Amsterdam, Maastricht University and the Prismant Research Institute). The Dutch 
ƤǤ
ƤǤfocused on the use of restraints inside mental hospitals and consisted of 37 open interviews (12 former patients; 10 family members, 15 caregivers), three focus groups (two former patients; one family member) and an expert meeting with psychiatrists, legal experts and representatives from patient and family member organisations 
ǤƤevaluation studies of the Dutch Psychiatric Compulsory Admissions Act in May 2007. The aim of this paper is to show that in daily life, issues like coping, rehabilitation and social support are of major importance for the patient suffering from a psychiatric disease. First, we will start by explaining the biomedical model of mental illness which prevails in the neurosciences, and the impact it has on clinical practice. Then we will present the story of Jolijn and her experiences dealing with a psychiatric disorder, followed by her recovery. Finally, we will discuss what this story teaches us about recovery from psychiatric diseases. We will offer a suggestion about how to include the social context of the patient, in addition to the approach of the neurosciences, into the recovery process. One of the leading themes is that psychiatry has two legacies: the natural sciences (neurosciences) as well as the humanities. Both legacies should be integrated into the conceptualisation and treatment of psychiatric disorders. 
3 Ibid
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The impact of the neurosciences on clinical practice 
The neurosciences study the neural structures and dynamics that make perception, thought, memory, emotion and behaviour possible.4 In our empirical-ethical study 
ǡǡƪby developments in the neurosciences, clinical psychiatry uses a biomedical model to explain deviant behaviour in terms of neurological dysfunctions. The biomedical model is functional within the neurosciences and, with its focus on the physiological 
ǡƤpsychiatric disorders. Yet, the biomedical model also has consequences for diagnosis and treatment in clinical psychiatry. Psychiatric diseases are regarded as temporal disturbances of normal neuro-functioning in the brain which, following this model, can and should be repaired through the use of appropriate medication. The patient is seen as a biological actor who is (temporally) restrained by chemical processes in the brain. 
ƪǡclassify itself as part of an independent faculty within the medical sciences. In the interviews we conducted in mental hospitals, most of the psychiatrists regarded their profession as medical. Like physical diseases, which can be seen as harmful physical dysfunctions which can be cured by medication, psychiatric diseases can also be regarded as a dysfunction of the physical system which can be treated using advanced psychopharmaca. The primary responsibility of the psychiatrist is to assess the right diagnosis and to determine what kind of medication is necessary for recovery. Mental disorders are understood as biomedical disorders that can be cured (as opposed to chronic conditions that entail a capricious process of recovery and rehabilitation). The biomedical model of psychiatric diseases has an impact on the clinical practice of psychiatrists, nurses and patients. Psychiatrists consider themselves more 
Ƥ
4 Bennett MR, Hacker PMS (2003) Philosophical foundations of neuroscience. Blackwell Publishing, Oxford 
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broken leg. In one of the interviews, a psychiatrist compared himself with a surgeon, who gives treatments to patients in emergency situations without patient’s consent. The quote below illustrates this. 
“As a medical practitioner I’m not any different from a surgeon. They don’t have to 
wait for consent in case they arrive at an accident by helicopter. They immediately 
start giving the treatment that is necessary to save lives”. 
The idea is that psychiatry, as a profession, should focus on repairing the dysfunctions 
ǤǡƤǤ5 Although this focus is important, the question remains whether, and to what extent, 
Ƥ
ǤƤǯ
ǡƤǫIs recovering from a psychiatric disease only a matter of taking the appropriate medication and restoring the chemical imbalances in the brain to normal functioning? We will argue that, in daily life, having a psychiatric disease and coping with it is a much more complex process. Even repairing a broken leg does not automatically mean that the patient can immediately walk again: The patient has to undergo physiotherapy to strengthen the muscles, has to cope with uncertainties (‘‘Will I be 
ǫǯǯȌȋƤin mobility). The patient also needs encouragement from those in his or her social surrounding to fully recover. Likewise, one can question whether in psychiatry, taking the appropriate medication is enough to restore a patient’s normal functions. The biomedical model creates an identity problem in theory as well as in practice. In theory there is the discussion of the mind-body problem in the context of neuroscience and psychiatry. For example, Bennett and Hacker, in their work, Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience (2003), draw attention to the conceptual confusion, which exists in the neurosciences.6 They point to a mereological fallacy 
5 Double D (2002) The limits of psychiatry. Br Med J 324 (7342): 900–9046 Bennett MR, Hacker PMS (2003) Philosophical foundations of neuroscience. Blackwell Publishing, Oxford
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in the reductionist framework for neuroscience: the primary focus on the brain as the part where psychological attributes (of the mind) are located is meaningless because the proper subject matter can only be the whole human being. The mind and its psychological attributes have to be considered as a process and not as an object-like entity. In clinical practice, psychiatrists experience a dualistic position. On the one hand, they use a naturalistic perspective in diagnosing and subscribing medication (‘erklären’) and want to develop a more naturalistic identity, like somatic physicians. On the other hand, they have to interpret and give meaning to the stories of the patients who are suffering from psychiatric diseases (‘verstehen’). But this 
ƤǤ7We claim that both perspectives are necessary in order to provide good clinical care during a patient’s recovery process. Which perspective should lead depends on the person and his or her circumstances and features. As we feel that nowadays the humanistic approach to psychiatry has become undervalued, in the next paragraph we will give voice to a former patient by presenting the story of Jolijn, a woman who suffered a major depression in her adolescence. In this story it will become clear that patients do not experience recovery as a linear (physical) process, as the biomedical model supposes. In spite of the developments in the neurosciences, recovery from a mental illness is still not always possible. Most of the time recovery is about accepting limitations that spring from the illness, as well as discovering what the patient (still) can do. Deegan describes the process of recovery as an urge, a wrestle and a resurrection.8Ƥǡnew values in accepting a different life perspective. This perspective on recovery differs from the perspective of the biomedical model. To improve clinical practice, psychiatrists must listen to the stories of patients in order to develop a mutually acceptable treatment strategy. Accepting and overcoming a mental illness is a broader paradigm than repairing dysfunctions by administering the appropriate medication. 
7 Nieweg EH (2005) De psychiater in spagaat - over de kloof tussen natuur-en geesteswetenschappelijke psychiatrie. Tijdschrift voor psychiatrie 47 (4): 239–2488 Deegan PE (1988) Recovery: the lived experience of rehabilitation. Psychosoc Rehabil J 11(4):11–19 
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The impact of neuroscience on the lives of patients: a patient’s story 
In the context of our empirical-ethical research on coercive measures in mental hospitals, we spoke with Jolijn about her experiences with coercion. In an open, conversational interview, we asked her about her experiences and opinions of coercive treatments in psychiatry. During the interview she told us her life story. She related how she was involuntary admitted to a mental hospital and how she eventually got out again. The interview lasted 1.5 hours, was tape-recorded, completely transcribed, and analysed using a narrative framework.9 Later on in the process, the respondent was again consulted to give feedback on our presentation of her story in this paper. Jolijn approved of our description, and her responses have been included in this version. Jolijn was 16 years old when she felt her life was not worth living anymore. She felt lonely and miserable because of all the changes that had happened in her life. Her parents had broken up, her mother had had a nervous breakdown, and she could not get along with her father. At that stage in her life she decided to take an overdose of medication to commit suicide. After a hospital stay during which she tried to cut her wrists, she was, without her consent, admitted to a mental hospital. 
Ƥgood. She did not trust the staff and the staff did not trust her. She kept on trying to commit suicide, which brought her long periods in the seclusion room against her will. She was convinced that the staff of the mental hospital could and would not help her. She refused medication, but was forced to use it. The coercive measures made her think there was no way out of her misery. The medication made her drowsy and she experienced only negative effects. She distrusted her body, felt poisoned and even compared this to being raped. The relationship between Jolijn and the staff of the hospital worsened. Trust between them was on such a low level that, when she accidentally cut her Achilles tendon right in 
9 Lieblich A, Tuval-Mashiach R, Zilber T (1998) Narrative analysis. Reading, analysis and interpretation. Thousand Oaks, Sage 
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front of the eyes of the staff, they did not believe the symptoms of this irregular injury and it took weeks before she could get the medical treatment she needed. Eventually this led to her being transferred to another hospital. By that time she had just reached 18 years of age. In this second hospital, Jolijn’s experiences with the staff were much better. Jolijn described her impressions on how they treated her: 
“Then I got transferred to another hospital. The staff said to me, ‘You have been 
traumatised by the staff of the previous ward. We want to make you feel safe again’. 
And that division was actually really nice. There was some sort of match between 
the staff and me. You could really laugh with them. We went to the movies or just for 
a drink. I felt recognised as a person, like I was allowed to participate in normal life, 
where before I was not.” Although her experiences at this hospital were much better, after a while she decided she wanted to get out. As the staff did not think she was ready to leave, she ran away 
ǤƤlive, but when she found it, she picked up normal life, went back to school and got her degree. Later on she became politically active in the patient rights movement. At this moment, Jolijn is successfully leading an action group against seclusion rooms and is pleading for better treatment of (young) people in mental hospitals. She is regularly invited to international congresses to tell her story and help to improve psychiatric practice. When we look at her recovery, it gives us a good perspective on the aspects that, according to Jolijn, are important for recovery from a major depression such as hers. In the following section we will look more closely at her experiences of being given medication against her will and how that eventually led to her using marihuana; she considers this an effective form of self-medication. After that, we will discuss the fact that, although this self-medication was part of her recovery, it alone was not 
ƤǤand family, along with being allowed to participate in society were, according to her, important aspects in her being able to recover. 
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Experiences with medication 
In the story of Jolijn, self-medication proved important for her recovery. But during 
ƤǡƤappropriate and right dose of medication. The medication she received against her will, she said, did not help her at all. It made her feel frightened and insecure. She no longer trusted her own thoughts and she felt poisoned. It made her distress even worse. Since she was already receiving strong medication, starting to smoke marihuana proved to be a small step when some other patients offered this to her. 
Ƥǣ
“Before my admission, I actually was very athletic. I didn’t smoke and swam in 
competitions all the time. So I wasn’t interested in using drugs or anything. But as I 
ǡǯƤ
smoking marihuana. Well, aren’t illegal drugs just medicines that can’t be bought in a 
drugstore?” 
ƤǤ	
ƤǤthis unforgettable moment in her recovery trajectory: 
ǲƤǡƤ
happiness inside. I just sat against the wall, feeling so amazed I could feel this well. 
I just forgot about all the shit. It remains drugs of course, but it really had an impact 
on me. For me, this was the moment that changed everything. Feeling good seemed 
possible all of a sudden” Starting to use marihuana ‘‘changed everything’’, according to Jolijn. It gave her control again, and made her aware of her capabilities and forgotten possibilities in life. She experienced positive feelings, which before seemed impossible. Problems with her parents at home, concerns over her physical well-being and struggles with the staff, all moved to the background, and new perspectives emerged. The start 
ƪ
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ǤǦƤǤǡwe cannot say that her recovery solely depended on her use of (self-administered) medication. Her use of marihuana started after she got in contact with other patients in the hospital. They offered her marihuana, and implicitly stimulated her to actively take responsibility for the direction of her own life. Her fellow patients did not force her to take the marihuana like the doctors forced her to take the medication, but rather invited her to either choose or refuse the drugs. Jolijn experienced that she had a choice (accepting or refusing the drugs), and rediscovered her own agency and responsibility—responsibility not only for herself, but also for others, since her fellow patients trusted her in keeping the secret of smoking in the hospital. Still another aspect that eventually fostered the process of Jolijn’s recovery was the psychiatrist who approved that using marihuana was a better option than cutting herself. Jolijn experienced his approval as another important stimulus which urged her to continue her new, unconventional but creative and effective way of dealing with her illness, as the following quote shows: 
“I started smoking marihuana, and then I didn’t cut myself anymore. I was not 
depressed all the time anymore. The psychiatrist acknowledged that using 
marihuana was a better option than cutting myself.” 
The story of Jolijn illustrates that the use of this self-administered medication contributed to her recovery, but that recovery is not about (self-administered) medication alone. For Jolijn, the fact that the use of marihuana was her own choice made her feel in control. The decision offered to her by her fellow patients triggered a process of empowerment. Jolijn became a subject (versus an object), and a moral agent who took responsibility for her life again. Jolijn’s story also demonstrates that recovery through medication is a dynamic process of intensive social interactions with others, including fellow patients and professional experts. Finding the appropriate medication for an individual is a process of searching and experimenting (versus the standard linear application 
ƤǮǯȌrequiring a close co-operation between psychiatrist and patient. There should be a basis of trust between patients and psychiatrists so that patients will not feel 
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out of control. Trust is an important condition to discuss and deliberate upon in terms of symptoms and side effects. Attention should be given to the fears and prejudices that exist.10 From the story of Jolijn, we conclude that recovery is not 
Ƥǡ
Ƥfrom a certain psychiatric disease. The medication should match the personal values and individual circumstances of the patient. For Jolijn, the use of marihuana 
ǤƤof addressing her self-destructive behaviour. The story shows that chemical substances can be important for recovery, but only as one step in the process and in a context where the person feels safe and can trust the medication and the person administering it. With this preliminary conclusion, we can assert that the work of a psychiatrist should not only be about administering medication. It should also be about creating trust, consensus, motivation and empowerment. Through this approach, patients become partners and co-owners of their treatment of medication, will accept and 
ǡƤƤǡǡ
ƤǤǡwe will discuss which other steps are important in the recovery process. 
Coping and rehabilitation 
ǡƤǡ
ƤǤdid not make her feel better. Instead, it was her self-administered medication that 
ƤǤof major importance as well. Jolijn experienced a caring, supportive attitude in the second hospital where the staff made her responsible for her own life. For example, 
10 Widdershoven G, Abma T (2007) Hermeneutic ethics between practice and theory. In: Ashcroft RE, Dawson A, Draper H, McMilan JR (eds) Principles of health care ethics, 2nd edn. Wiley, London, pp 215–221 
Psychiatry in the age of neuroscience
41
instead of the punishment she was expecting, because she acted against the rules by going out for a day, she received a compliment when she returned. The staff did not rigidly stick to the hospital rules, but rather was able to view the situation from a positive angle. Jolijn was able to take on her own responsibilities. The positive feedback fostered a trusting working relationship between Jolijn and the staff (as 
ƤȌǤhow surprised she was:  
“After I spent a day outside the hospital against regulations, I was prepared for a 
major punishment. But then they said, ‘You have come back without any problems, 
so you have proven that you are able to handle more freedom’. So instead of a 
punishment, I got a compliment! That was really nice.” For Jolijn, rehabilitation meant being treated as a person and a moral agent with capabilities to direct her own life, and not primarily as a patient. Getting her own responsibilities meant that the staff trusted her. This recognition made her trust 
ǡƤǤpossible for her to identify with them. This basic recognition of being a person and a moral agent served as the beginning of Jolijn’s opening up to other persons and developing new perspectives. The staff asked Jolijn what she wanted in her life. They made her reconsider such questions which motivated her not to become what they called a ‘chrono’, a person who will never be leaving the hospital. 
“They gave me a lot of respect and pointed out my own responsibilities and wishes in 
life. They said: ‘If you could choose a kind of hobby or sport, what would you choose?’ 
Well, I hadn’t thought about what I wanted for two years– I was only thinking about 
ǤƤǢǯǤ
humanity back to me.” So according to Jolijn, her recovery was also about belonging to a group of peers, enjoying and participating in life and being recognised as a person. Taking over responsibilities (again), making contact, developing friendships and trusting others were important aspects of her recovery. Recovery is more than explaining and 
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repairing psychiatric diseases. For persons suffering from a psychiatric disorder, 
Ƥ
Ǥƪimplications of Jolijn’s story for the biomedical model of the neurosciences, and for clinical practice. 
Recognition and trust 
ƤǤexplains what is happening when a person experiences a mental illness by referring to dysfunctions of the brain and suggests that the solution is to take the appropriate medication and repair the malfunctions. But this explanatory story does not fully relate to the actual stories of patients such as Jolijn. As she pointed out in her story, 
ƤǤClinical psychiatry aims to heal the patient and focuses on the patient’s wellbeing. What exactly is in the best interests of the patient is not objectively given, but rather determined and constructed by (inter)personal factors. First, one of the consequences 
ƤƤƤǤ
Ƥmatch of medication. Standard solutions are furthermore problematic because of the severe side effects they sometimes cause.11 As the story of Jolijn shows, it is also important that patients trust the medication. Dialogue and deliberation are necessary in order to arrive at a constructive pathway to recovery. Coercive medication is less effective because of the stress and distrust it causes. Second, for Jolijn, being recognised as a person and a moral agent with her own responsibilities, along with 
ǡƤthe right medication. Those were the conditions, which had to be met in order to make her recovery possible. 
11 Helmchen H (2005) Forthcoming ethical issues in biological psychiatry. World J Biol Psychiatry 6(Suppl 2):56–64 
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The way the biomedical model looks at persons with psychiatric diseases does not fully do justice to the patients’ experiences in daily life. Patients hardly explain 
ƤǤthe social context. Other patients also experience their disabilities not as primarily biological, but mainly as social.12 Clinical psychiatry’s focus on well-being and recovery demands a broader model to include these relevant factors. People need 
ƤȋȌǡȋto change and to direct their lives), acceptance of their own responsibilities in the recovery process and the development of a social role in society. In mental hospitals, most professionals consider (coercive) medical treatment as the best option in order to avert dangerous behaviour. Yet it is important to realise that clinical psychiatry is more complex than that. Trust and recognition seem to be important features for clinical practice aiming at and working on the recovery of psychiatric disorders (in terms of coping with the illness, instead of repairing it). From the perspective of patients, medication alone is not enough to help them in their recovery. As the story of Jolijn shows, coercive medication can even worsen things. This means that, even in the context of a crisis, professionals should try to balance medical treatment with the narratives involved. They should strive for dialogue and deliberation with the patient to come to a joint perspective of what is in the best interest of the patient. This implies a shift from a paternalistic to a deliberative relationship in which patients become partners and co-owners of their own treatment. Active engagement of patients in their recovery process means that patients are recognised as persons with unique capabilities and possibilities for growth. Honneth defends the importance of recognition for the well-being of persons in The Struggle for Recognition.13 Recognition is seen as a vital human need. Inspired 
ǡƪ
ǦǮǯǤƤ
12 Deegan PE (1988) Recovery: the lived experience of rehabilitation. Psychosoc Rehabil J 11(4):11–1913 ȋͳͻͻͷȌǤƪǤPolity Press, Cambridge 
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intersubjective conditions based on the establishment of relationships of mutual recognition for individual growth and development, which makes sense considering Jolijn’s story. Based on modern social theory, he divides personal development into 
ǣǦƤǡǦǦǡwhich can only be acquired and maintained intersubjectively. These modes are developed by mutual recognition as a person in relationships of love and friendship 
ȋǦƤȌǡȋǦȌas a particular, unique person (self-esteem). In the story of Jolijn, we see that the vital human need of mutual recognition was of major importance for her recovery. Being recognised as a person (as opposed to being treated solely as a patient), at 
Ƥǡ
ƤǤin the second hospital (and even could have a laugh with the staff), she felt invited and allowed to participate in normal life again. This paved the way for her to create new perspectives on life, and to see how she could live a meaningful life even with a psychiatric disorder. Jolijn became less self-destructive and developed hope for 
ǤƤand more. Mutual recognition cannot develop without a foundation of mutual trust. Annette Baier acknowledges that trust is a basic condition for every good that can exist and develop within mutual relationships.14 Trusting each other is a complex and vulnerable process, but also an inevitable one. In all sorts of ways, we depend on each other, and for that, we have to trust each other. Especially in the clinical setting of psychiatry, patients are in a vulnerable position. They depend on the physicians in order to recover from a mental illness and to leave the hospital. Trust means giving some discretionary power and control over one’s self to another person, thus 
ǤǡƤ
ǤƤǡǤ
Ǧǡƪǡ
14 Baier AC (1994) Moral prejudices. Essays on ethics. Harvard University Press, Cambridge/MA 
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and ignorance instead of mutual engagement, co-operation and agreement. The staff distrusted Jolijn to such an extent that eventually, they did not believe her when she said she had injured her Achilles tendon. Likewise, Jolijn distrusted the staff. They had admitted her to the hospital against her will. She did not have any reason to trust them. They did not convince her they were looking after her best interests. In the second hospital, a trusting relationship did develop. Jolijn came to trust the staff of that hospital because the staff acknowledged (recognised) her as a person and as a moral actor (and not primarily as a patient). They also trusted her to handle her own responsibilities. Although mutual recognition and trust are difficult processes, the story of Jolijn shows that these are vital ingredients for recovery. Patients should become partners and co-workers of their own recovery. Some critical psychiatrists might object to this, by referring to the fact that developing a trusting relationship with mutual recognition is not always possible, according to the type of psychiatric disorder at hand, for instance in the case of a psychosis. Sometimes distrust can be part of the psychopathology. We do not seek to deny that building trust is a difficult process. The clinical practice of psychiatry can be frustrating and complex, and most of the time it is very hard to reach any success. However, despite the fact that clinical practice is confronted with frustrations and difficulties, we still claim that trust and recognition are vital ingredients to eventually creating a perspective on recovery for persons with psychiatric disorders. The primary focus should always be on restoring and building trust. Mutual trust and recognition eventually create the necessary context for repairing any dysfunctionings of the brain. Within that context, psychopharmaca can be of assistance in the recovery process. 
Conclusion 
In this paper we have made a case for a patient’s perspective on recovery as an important extension and correction of the biomedical model of the neurosciences. We have illustrated this with Jolijn’s story, which offers the perspective of a former patient who was involuntarily admitted to a mental hospital. This story shows us 
Ƥǯ
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and recovery. Finding medication that the patient can trust is a deliberative process wherein recognition as a person, personal growth and taking responsibilities are important, instead of being seen primarily as a patient. We concluded that medication alone is not enough for recovery. Medication should match with the wishes and values of the person suffering from the mental illness. Another aspect that the story of Jolijn made clear was that, for her recovery, other things were just as important as using medication. Being recognised as a person, belonging within a social setting, taking on her own responsibilities, developing friendships and trusting others determined 
ǤƤdiseases is more complex than the biomedical model presupposes and that one should include the social context of the patient into the recovery process. Mutual trust and recognition are vital ingredients for the success of clinical psychiatric practice. To create a mutual and overall recovery story, professionals must strive for dialogue and deliberation with the patient and aim to arrive at a joint perspective of what is necessary in psychiatry, as a practice of healing persons. 
Ƥ ǡprofessionals should acknowledge that their role and identity are more complex than a naturalistic perspective in diagnosing and subscribing medication (‘erklären’) supposes. The perspective of the patients shows us that understanding and relating to the stories of patients (‘verstehen’) cannot be ignored if one wants recovery and coping to succeed. As Jolijn put it. 
“It is not that the healthcare workers don’t want to develop good care, but traditions 
ƤǤƤǤ
education and guidance to eventually get on with their lives. That’s what the main 
goal of psychiatry should be.”
Psychiatry in the age of neuroscience
47
48
Chapter 2
Triad collaboration in psychiatry
49
Chapter 3
Triad collaboration in psychiatry:
Privacy and confidentiality revisited
Elleke Landeweer, Tineke A. Abma, Linda Dauwerse, Guy A. M. Widdershoven
Published in: International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics (2011) Vol. 4, No.1 (spring 2011)
50
Chapter 3
Abstract
Within psychiatry, patients, family, and professionals are involved and interrelated. Yet it is not easy for healthcare professionals to involve family actively in patient care. Taking a feminist perspective, we investigate why health-care professionals experience ambivalence in involving family in attempts to reduce seclusion, suggesting how they can improve family involvement by adopting a relational view on autonomy. Professionals should view patients not only in terms of individual autonomy and rights, but also in terms of relations and dependencies that need to be considered in fostering patient care.  
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Introduction
Recently, there has been increased interest in the involvement of family members in treating psychiatric patients who are involuntarily admitted into mental hospital.1 Family is, for instance, expected to be of use in preventing escalations and aggression on the wards by giving information about patient needs and providing support to the patient. Yet, in practice, family is not routinely involved in the treatment process, and is not even regularly informed about situations.2 Professionals mention privacy and confidentiality as issues that constrain collaboration with family.3 Professionals experience moral dilemmas when a patient does not consent to giving information to relatives, even if he or she would benefit from involving the family. They are insecure about what and how much information could be shared with families without violating the patients’ rights to privacy and confidentiality when consent is missing. Fang-pei Chen describes professionals walking a fine line between adhering to confidentiality guidelines and working for the clients’ best interests.4 Family, on the other hand, experiences powerlessness and feelings of isolation. They fear that professionals use confidentiality as a means of avoiding contact with them.5 
1 Goodwin, Val, and Brenda Happel (2006) Conflicting agendas between consumers and carers: The perspectives of carers and nurses. International Journal of Mental Health 
Nursing 15: 135-43; Wilkinson, Claire, and Sue McAndrew (2008) “I’m not an outsider, I’m his mother!” A phenomenological enquiry into carer experiences of exclusion from acute psychiatric settings. International Journal of Mental Health Nursing 17: 392-401 2 Marshall, Tina, and Phyllis Solomon (2003) Professionals’ responsibilities in releasing information to families of adults with mental illness. Psychiatric Services 54(12): 1622-283 Goodwin, Val, and Brenda Happel (2006) Conflicting agendas between consumers and carers: The perspectives of carers and nurses. International Journal of Mental Health 
Nursing 15: 135-43; Wynaden, Dianne, and Angelica Orb (2005) Impact of patient confidentiality on carers of people who have a mental disorder. International Journal of 
Mental Health Nursing 14: 166-714 Chen, Fang-pei (2008) A fine line to walk: Case managers’ perspectives on sharing information with families. Qualitative Health Research 18(11): 1556-65.5 Wilkinson, Claire, and Sue McAndrew (2008) “I’m not an outsider, I’m his mother!” A phenomenological enquiry into carer experiences of exclusion from acute psychiatric settings. International Journal of Mental Health Nursing 17: 392-401. 
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The ambivalent relationship in psychiatry between professionals and family or intimates of psychiatric patients is based on an underestimation of the dependency of psychiatric patients on their families and social networks. This conforms to the view of the self in bioethics that overrates independence and individual autonomy and underrates more feminine traits such as interdependence and connection.6 Hilde Lindemann Nelson and James Lindemann Nelson7 explain that the medical world is used to weighing the merits of treatment in terms of benefits and risks to the individual patient beyond impact on other people, and vice versa. In normal life most persons are part of a family, and they share important decisions on matters such as health with their intimates. The privileged position for individual interests of patients is still more remarkable in the context of mental health care. Patients usually are closely dependent on their relatives before and after (involuntary) admittance to a psychiatric hospital, often requiring assistance in daily activities that is provided by their intimates’ informal care. Nonetheless, professionals are reluctant to involve family in the care process on the wards. From a feminist perspective, dependency and relationships should play a more prominent role in bioethics.8 In psychiatry, this might enable health-care professionals to overcome hesitations when patients do not grant consent to inform relatives. Active family involvement could help to prevent seclusions on the ward. However, a feminist approach cannot be implemented easily in a masculine psychiatric fapproach, we should have more insight into tensions and ambivalences in practice, and to see how health-care professionals try to find ways to give the family a proper place. In this article, we take a look at several closed wards in psychiatry to see how nurses experience involvement with family and informal caregivers, and to observe which values they consider important in this respect. We discuss the perspectives of 
6 Jaggar Alison. M (2001) Feminist Ethics. In Encyclopedia of Ethics, ed. L. C. Becker and C. B. Becker, 528-39. New York: Routledge. 7 Lindemann Nelson, Hilde, and James Lindemann Nelson (1995) The patient in the family: 
An ethics of medicine and families. New York and London: Routledge. 8 MacKenzie, Catriona, and Natalie Stoljar (2000) Relational Autonomy. Feminist 
Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency and the Social Self. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press; Verkerk, M.A. (2007). Care ethics as a feminist perspective on bioethics. In: New Pathways for European Bioethics, ed. Chris Gastmans, Chris Dierickx, Herman Nys, and Paul Schotsmans, 65-79. Antwerp and Oxford: Intersentia.182-198
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nurses because they are closely involved in the daily care of patients at the ward, and thus participate in the masculine field of psychiatry while at the same time dealing with patients and family on a regular basis, a feature that requires practical, contextual knowledge. We will present and analyze four nurses’ narratives about their relationship with patients and family members and their ways of involving family in the process of care. The stories exemplify different positions on privacy and confidentiality found in practice, situated in various contexts (youth, adult, and elderly care). The stories are not per se representative, as it is not our intention to test our theoretical notions and draw generalizations. We interpret the stories from a feminist perspective, focusing on tensions and ambivalences with regard to involvement of the family, and look for ways to foster family involvement by acknowledging relational autonomy and interdependency. 
Theoretical framework
In this article, we are inspired by feminist approaches to bioethics that offer an ontological perspective on autonomy as relational. This framework enables us to reassess the focus on individuals as separate and independent selves, and to acknowledge the influence of human interdependencies and social relationships.9 A feminist approach to ethics starts from the assumption that people are not isolated individuals, but connected and involved with each in a vulnerable or tragic position. While a liberal conceptualization of autonomy ignores this vulnerability in its rational orientation of the self, feminist approaches acknowledge human weaknesses, tragedy, and misfortune. People rely on one another for practical help and moral support, 
9 Jaggar Alison. M (2001) Feminist Ethics. In Encyclopedia of Ethics, ed. L. C. Becker and C. B. Becker, 528-39. New York: Routledge; MacKenzie, Catriona, and Natalie Stoljar (2000) Relational Autonomy. Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency and the Social 
Self. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press; Verkerk, M. A. (2007). Care ethics as a feminist perspective on bioethics. In: New Pathways for European Bioethics, ed. Chris Gastmans, Chris Dierickx,, Herman Nys, and Paul Schotsmans, 65-79. Antwerp and Oxford: Intersentia.182-198; Walker, Margaret Urban (2007) Moral understandings. A 
feminist study in ethics. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press; Tronto, Joan (2009). Consent as a grant of authority. A care ethics reading of informed consent. In Naturalized 
Bioethics: Toward Responsible Knowing and Practice, ed. Hilde Lindemann, Marian Verkerk, and Margaret Urban Walker. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 182-198
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and need each other to navigate through difficult episodes and circumstances. Their relationships are based upon moral considerations (“What do I owe to others?”) and on experiences such as one’s upbringing and its effects upon family relations. We adopted the expressive-collaborative model of morality introduced by Margaret Urban Walker in Moral Understandings10 to assist us in analysing the tensions and ambivalences among participants in the psychiatric clinic in terms of dependencies and responsibilities. Within interactions and relations, people learn from each other that they are responsible for themselves, things, and other persons. Moral attitudes of people are not isolated. In practice, people constantly react to and relate to each other in re-establishing shared values and moral understandings, in trying to convince the other of their point of view, or in adopting the other persons’ perspective.11 Moral issues are often presented in stories or narratives. To recognize a moral issue or problem, we need to know the story behind it: how the person and other people are involved (for example, through power differences), what kind of relationships and values are included, and what kind of responsibilities and expectations are questioned. This process is dynamic; moral issues constantly demand new relations and dependencies between people. Walker’s model of morality will be helpful for understanding how privacy and confidentiality in the stories are constructed and valued, and why ambivalence is created in specific situations. To focus on the ambivalences among professionals, patient, and family as stakeholders more thoroughly, we supplemented our moral framework with the work of Hilde Lindemann Nelson.12 She distinguishes two systems of ethics--the health-care system and the sometimes forgets that there is a larger system of health-care delivery: the family.13 Moreover, family care and professional care are two systems that 
10 Walker, Margaret Urban (2007) Moral understandings. A feminist study in ethics. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press 11 Haidt, Jonathan (2001) The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review 108(4) 814-34; Landeweer, Elleke, Tineke Abma, and Guy Widdershoven. Forthcoming. Moral margins within a mental health institution. A case study of moral development concerning the use of seclusion. 12 Lindemann, Hilde (2007) Care in Families. In Principles of health care ethics, 2nd ed. Eds. Richard Ashcroft, Angus Dawson, Heather Draper, and John McMillan. England: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 20 13 Ibid, p. 351
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can conflict when they meet. One explanation for this friction is that families use a different ethical discourse, one that has often been overlooked in moral theory. Lindemann explains that traditional health-care ethics uses several doctrines that are not present in the discourse of family ethics. The logic of families differs from these doctrines. One difference is that health-care ethics is patient-centered, whereas in families, everyone counts. Second, health-care ethics views autonomy as individualistic, but in families autonomy is relational. Whereas health-care ethics insists that nothing may be done to or for a patient without the patient’s free and informed consent, in families, trust is often more important than consent. While health-care ethics understands the patient’s best interest as self-interest, in families interest extends beyond the individual self. Lastly, health-care ethics emphasizes the importance of preserving patient confidentiality; however, in families, many confidences are shared.14 Following the work of Walker and Lindemann, we decided to focus on stories about family involvement told by nurses working in closed wards, and to analyze them in terms of relationships and values. Both theories emphasize the relational aspects of moral agency, which gives us tools to analyze trust, dependencies, and power differences in the stories. Walker gives a general meta-philosophical perspective on ethics, enabling us to analyze the moral issues and ambivalences experienced in practice. Lindemann adds to this theory by providing a more focused view on family ethics that explains the difficulties and ambivalence experienced in practice between health-care professionals and family members. Both Lindemann’s family ethics and Walker’s meta-ethical theory of moral understanding resonate with feminist approaches, as they start from the idea of relational autonomy. 
Methodology 
This research was part of a larger study aiming to evaluate and support a project in a large Dutch mental hospital to minimize coercion and restraint in closed wards. 
14 Ibid, p. 352-53
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The goal of the project was to reduce the number of seclusions by developing strategies to prevent such forced interventions, and to find alternatives such as a time-out or comfort room, or taking a walk with a patient in a time of crisis. The need for reducing coercion developed from the growing awareness that there is no evidence for therapeutic effectiveness of seclusion. The use of forced seclusion is therefore not part of good care. Although coercion may sometimes be necessary, it is detrimental to the patient as it produces traumas and distrust.15 An explicit strategy of the project was to involve family members in attempts to reduce seclusion. This aspect of the project was particularly interesting to us as feminist bioethicists. It was acknowledged that family should play a more important role in health care, especially regarding the use of seclusion. Yet the project did not mention specific views on how family could be involved in practice. This required experiments, and we expected that these would not always be easy, given the dominant individualistic approach focusing on patients’ rights. One of the main research questions in our evaluation study investigated how practitioners dealt with family and what role they gave them in relation to the use of seclusion. The evaluation study took place between February 2007 and February 2009. It was carried out by a team of two junior researchers and one senior researcher. During the evaluation study we followed a responsive methodology to gather and analyze data.16 This interactive methodology is cyclical and iterative. The expectations and issues of relevant stakeholders (patients, family, nurses, psychiatrists, and managers) and the benefits professionals recognized family involvement as important because the family knows the patient and his or her needs, 
15 Hoekstra, T., H. G. M. Lendemeijer, and M. G. M. J. Jansen (2004) Seclusion: The inside story. Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing 11: 276-83; Taxis, J. C. (2002). Ethics and praxis: Alternative strategies to physical restraint and seclusion in a psychiatric setting. Issues in Mental Health Nursing 23: 157-70; Landeweer, E, T. Abma, J. Santegoeds, and G. Widdershoven (2009) Psychiatry in the age of neuroscience: The impact on clinical practice and lives of clients. Poiesis and praxis 6: 43-55 16 Guba, E. G., and Y. S. Lincoln (1989) Fourth generation evaluation. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage; Greene, J. C., and T. A. Abma (2001) Editors’ notes. In Responsive evaluation. New 
Directions for Evaluation nr. 92, ed. J. Greene and T. A. Abma, 1-6. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass; Abma, Tineke, and Guy Widdershoven (2005) Sharing stories: Narrative and dialogue in responsive nursing evaluation. Evaluation and the Health Professions 28(1): 90-109
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and because the patient will return to the family after hospitalization. Yet family involvement was also regarded as difficult as it was not standard practice and staff expressed doubts concerning privacy and confidentiality. Because of the contested nature of this issue, we choose to explore the ambivalence concerning involvement of family members in more depth. As part of the evaluation, many interviews (N=18) and focus groups (13 groups, totaling 91 participants) were completed. To collect data on the particular subject of family involvement, we conducted seven interviews with family members and six interviews with nurses at their wards. Next we organized two homogenous focus groups, one with family members and one with nurses. The focus group of the family members took place during a meeting of the family advocacy organization. The focus group with the nurses was organized within the hospital during their working time. Furthermore, the researchers kept a reflective diary during the whole process. The interviews were recorded, transcribed, and summarized. The summary was sent to the interviewee in order to check if the first analysis was adequate (known as “member check”).17 The stories were analyzed through open-content analysis.18 Themes were identified and compared to themes of other stakeholders. The focus groups were recorded and summarized, followed by an open-content analysis and member check. For this article, the interviews with four nurses were selected as the primary sources for reasons motivated in the introduction. Interviews with family and focus groups were used as background information to support analysis and triangulate the data. The narratives presented below are based on the interview transcripts and have been rewritten for the format of the article. The language of the respondents is closely followed. In confidentiality and privacy, and second, how did they involve family in the process of care? 
17 Meadows, L. M., and J. M. Morse (2001) Constructing Evidence within a qualitative project. In: The Nature of Qualitative Evidence, ed. J. M. Morse, J. M. Swanson, and A. J. Kuzel, 187-201. London: Thousand Oaks, Sage18 Charmaz, K. (2005) Grounded theory in the 21st century. Applications for advancing social justice studies. In: The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research, ed. N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln, 507-535. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage
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Four nurses’ narratives 
No advice to the family 
Agnes (all names are pseudonyms) is a nurse in an acute closed ward. In this ward, adult patients are involuntarily admitted because they are in crisis caused by mental illness. Patients are suffering from acute psychosis in crisis that causes a threat to themselves and/or others. In the interview, Agnes tells how family is involved in the process of care at the ward: 
“Family is hardly involved at our ward. Many patients don’t have much contact with 
relatives, because so much already has happened over the years. They don’t have 
a social network anymore. In case family is still involved they are called in case a 
patient is brought to the seclusion room, but of course only if the patient consents. 
During the intake at admission we ask people if they have any relatives. We ask if it is 
all right to give information to the relatives in case they call us. If people say no, we 
respect that and explain to the relatives that we cannot supply any information. 
At our ward we often see that before the admission things got really out of hand in 
the home environment, which then is the reason why the person is admitted against 
ǤǢǤ
that case it is important that the relationship is restored, but that may take time. For 
example, yesterday the husband of one of our patients called. He told me that his wife 
had asked for her driver’s license, cash card and ID card, and asked, “Should I give it 
to her or not? I actually don’t want to give the documents to her. What do you think 
about it?” I know the woman will be really angry with her husband if he does not 
give her the documents. But I cannot give him advice because I should not put myself 
between the patient and the family. That would be very unproductive. I understand 
both perspectives: that’s hard sometimes. So I told him he has to decide it for himself, 
that I could not advise him on that issue. But it is a very difficult situation. The 
patient is really suspicious towards her family, especially towards her husband. And if 
the husband would bring her the documents she would throw them away. She is in a 
really manic episode. So sometimes it is really difficult. 
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Every family is different. We don’t know how their relationship was before the 
admission. That is why it is hard to involve family. They are emotional. We are looking 
ǢǤ
strange for them if their relative is admitted and they don’t know what is happening 
ǤǤǢ
are looking at the illness. A person gets admitted to our ward because he or she is in 
need for emergency treatment. We look more objectively at people. 
We have to take the patient seriously. We cannot say to a patient, “You are 
wrong.” Not in this context. That’s a difference, and really difficult to explain to 
relatives, because they are not in a professional caregiving relationship. If I say to 
a patient, “I believe your parents, and not you,” I wouldn’t be able to build a trustful 
relationship. Although we have to take both parties seriously, we choose the side 
of the patient in case family and the patient are not on the same track, even if the 
patient is very psychotic and suspicious because of the mental illness.” 
This narrative shows an individualistic interpretation of confidentiality and privacy, related to traditional health ethics discourse.19 Although Agnes does recognize family as important, she does not involve them in the care process. She says that many patients do not have a social network; if family is involved in the lives of patients, the relationship is most often problematic. If a patient does not explicitly agree to sharing information with family or involving them in the care process, the health-care professionals at this ward are reluctant to share information with the family. The idea is that the professional should not position herself amid family tensions. Most important is to develop a trustful relationship with the patient by respecting his or her wishes, for this is the best way to foster beneficial treatment. Agnes thus decides not to advise family, even if this may result in wrong decisions on the side of the family. Family is regarded as emotional and lacking objective perspective. In practice, they are not considered as a source of knowledge for treatment, nor as potential participants in the care process. 
19 Lindemann, Hilde (2007) Care in Families. In Principles of health care ethics, 2nd ed. Eds. Richard Ashcroft, Angus Dawson, Heather Draper, and John McMillan. England: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 20 
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Flexible confidentiality 
Andy is a nurse at a semi-closed ward that functions as a residence for patients to live for longer periods of time. Most of the patients there have received psychiatric treatment for years. The aim of this ward is to offer a home and to assist the patients in living as well as possible with their psychiatric handicap. Andy explains how he and his colleagues try to involve family members in patient care. 
“Family can be a good support, but sometimes it is also rather difficult. In case of an 
emergency, these people are not immediately available, although they might be able 
to avert the crisis situation. But in case a patient is not doing well, we’ll inform family 
about that. Sure. For example, with the mother of Janice, one of our patients, we 
agreed to call her in case her daughter is getting agitated and is not willing to cool 
down in the isolation room. If she refuses to walk with us to the room on a voluntary 
basis, we will call her mother. If she is cooperative, we will not inform her mother. She 
does not have to know that her daughter has spent an hour in the seclusion room. But 
if there are a lot of problems, we have to tell her. Janice knows this and it is fine with 
her. That is important, because we have to consider the patient’s privacy. We will not 
tell things if our patients do not consent. Only in a life-threatening situation, you have 
to inform relatives. I mean, there is a limit to our professional secrecy or privacy. But 
this also depends on how much contact a patient has with his family. If they only see 
each other once a year, than we will not immediately call them, unless someone is 
seriously ill or so. There is a limit somewhere. But most of our patients have a good 
relationship with their families and that is really important for them. 
At our ward we intensively sustain contact with family, like with Janice’s mother. 
Janice has a strong connection with her mother, so it is important for her wellbeing 
that the relationship with her mother is stabile. If there are troubles, Janice gets 
stressed. Her mother has a major influence on her state of mind. So from that 
perspective it is important to nourish family contacts. That’s why we give it so much 
attention. If there are any tensions between mother and daughter, we attend to the 
mother too. We always make time to have a talk with her if she visits her daughter 
and inform her about how Janice is doing. But we don’t tell her every detail about 
Janice, of course. For example, Janice sometimes uses cannabis. We will not tell her 
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mother about that, because Janice doesn’t want us to. It is a difficult subject between 
them. So that is something we know, but do not tell her mother. If her mother wants to 
know about drug use, she has to ask Janice herself. 
We consider family as important, because they are of major support for our patients. 
I mean, we as caregivers come and go, but family is there forever. They have been 
through a lot together. But we realize it might also cause stress, because of their 
shared past. But in the end, a mother is a mother, and even if she causes stress, we 
have to respect that it is the mother of Janice and for her she is very important.” 
In his narrative, Andy explains that involving family is important. Involvement of family and informal caregivers is related to the amount of contact and confidentiality between the patient and his relatives. For Andy, family has an intrinsic value. Family involvement can be beneficial for treatment, but even if it is not, it is still important to sustain family relationships if they care for each other. Confidentiality and privacy do play a role, but Andy is flexible; for example, Janice’s mother should know important developments, but it is not necessary to tell her everything. Short periods of seclusion could be stressful for the mother. On the other hand, the use of cannabis is an issue just between Janice and the staff because it would be stressful for Janice if this subject was revealed. This way of dealing with confidentiality resembles selective communication between school and family. Teachers do not share for their own lives. On the other hand, important information is exchanged between professionals and family, such as how the student deals with his school responsibilities. Andy attends to the dependencies that exist between families in that way. As Janice will always be fragile due to her psychiatric illness, she will need others, including her mother, to care for her. Andy acknowledges and cherishes family ties by taking into consideration the specific dependencies and balancing the specific needs of Janice in relation to her mother. 
Involving the family as spokesperson 
Denise is a nurse at an acute closed ward for elderly patients with psychiatric handicaps. The ward deals with a combination of problems related to old age and psychiatric illnesses. The ward is not a residence; patients receive diagnoses and 
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treatment and are assisted in finding a proper post-treatment residence. Denise tells how she works with family and elaborates on a special case in which the sister of a patient found it difficult to accept the illness of her brother. 
“At our ward, we always work with a family spokesperson of our patients. We involve 
them in the care process as much as possible, although it might depend on how much 
family can handle. We have to consider that. Sometimes family is too stressed and 
ǢǤ
ǤǦǢ
reach some sort of consensus on what a patient needs. 
Sometimes we have different views on what is needed. For example, in the case of 
Jan, we as professionals thought coercive medication was needed. Before making 
such decisions, we always involve family. In the case of Jan, his sister was our 
contact person. Jan was admitted to our ward because he was in a psychosis and 
had threatened his sister with a knife. So we expected the sister would agree to 
coercive medication. But she did not accept it. She said no to it, and she did not want 
her brother to receive medication against his will. So at that moment we got into 
an impasse. If Jan would not receive medication, we could not offer him treatment 
at our ward. He was too difficult to handle. In the end his sister agreed to the forced 
medication, but only after her brother spent his weekend leave at her place. We had 
to convince her that medication was really necessary, and she had to experience how 
it affected her brother before she was persuaded. 
We always try to explain our philosophy during the patient’s admission. For us, the 
approach is self-evident, but we have to explain it to the family. We prefer to explain 
the way we work during intake conversations, but sometimes intakes are hectic, 
family is not always ready to get into a talk, so we have to improvise with information 
sharing. 
At the intake we ask family what they expect from the admission and how they 
want to be involved. But another goal of ours is to shorten the admission as much as 
possible. For that purpose we need collaboration with family. We need their support 
and assistance. It is a good if family knows treatment strategies and understands why 
certain choices are made. This helps us to develop a mutually shared goal and share 
responsibilities. 
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In case of Jan and his sister this process was not without problems. The sister did 
consent to the coercive treatment as she realized it was necessary, but she still had 
difficulties with it. This was due to the family background. The whole family worked 
in a circus and Jan had always been the leader of the family, with much status and 
dominance. The sister was used to always doing what her brother told her. But now 
that Jan had gotten a psychosis, she was emotionally troubled about what to do. And 
besides that, forced medication has a big impact. I would also be reluctant if it would 
be my brother, I suppose. But in the end, if you considered the options it is no longer a 
real choice anymore. It would have been better if we had reached an agreement with 
the sister on it. Now she is saying we made this choice, not her, and that is making 
the situation more difficult. In the end, Jan went back home again to his sister. She 
was disappointed, because she expected that we could make his illness disappear, but 
that was not possible. Jan suffered from a chronic psychotic illness that could only be 
managed with medication. And Jan did not realize anything was wrong with him. So 
involving family is not so easy. The sister was involved, but in the end she distanced 
herself again. Family has their own issues too. It is our responsibility to try everything 
to reach shared decisions and get all parties on the same track. We tried to support 
the sister by explaining about the illness. We tried to explain that there had been 
some serious escalations, but she wanted to forget about it and, for example, said the 
threatening with the knife was not that serious. She was emotionally confused. And 
we tried to provide care for her, but there are limits. They have to be willing to receive 
care. But we did inform ambulatory care to watch out for Jan and his family.” 
Denise’s narrative recognizes the importance of family involvement. Yet the role of the family is first and foremost that of a surrogate, a spokesperson who can give consent on behalf of the patient. If the family agrees to the proposed treatment, all is well. If not, the staff will explain the approach further and try to get the family to go along with the proposal. Confidentiality and privacy are not relevant; these values are not mentioned at all. The patient is not regarded as having a separate world from the family. Although the family is addressed, their perspective is not really taken into account. The knowledge of the sister is not valued. Family is regarded as emotional. In the end, staff and family do not try to understand each worried. 
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Involving the family in treatment decisions 
Tina is a nurse at an acute closed ward for young adult patients aged eighteen through twenty-five. The adolescents wrestle with their identity and suffer from psychiatric problems. Often drug abuse is involved and the patients exhibit behavioural problems. The ward aims to diagnose the psychiatric problems of these patients, but also attends to increasing their chances for the future through education, work, social contacts, and hobbies. Most of the young people still are living with their parents. For that reason the professionals are working closely with families. 
“Parents of our patients in principle always have access to our treatment strategies. 
Formally we are bound to the consent of the patient to inform his or her parents 
from the age of eighteen years. And although we always try to attend to the wishes 
of our patients, sometimes our professional ethics prescribe us not to interpret the 
consent rules too strictly. We need to inform parents about the decisions we make. 
Most of the time we can explain this to our patients and in the end they approve. But 
if a patient, such as Paul, needs to go to emergency care because he took too much 
medication and is in a bad shape, and has made it clear that we should not inform 
his parents, that raises a dilemma. We told Paul: “Your parents care a lot about you 
and are closely involved in your life. We want to work with you in an open and honest 
way, together with your parents. If you don’t want us to inform your parents about 
every detail, that is fine. You can tell them yourself. But we want to keep your parents 
up to date so that they won’t find out what happens at the ward from others.” We 
always try to avoid that kind of situation and try to persuade our patients to consent 
to sharing information with their loved ones. We think a good relationship between 
our patients and their parents is really important. So it is exactly in the best interest 
of our patients to share information with their parents in an honest and open way. 
When a patient is allowed to go on weekend leave, we call the parents to discuss the 
plans for the weekend. First of all, they have to consent to it, and agree that it is all 
right if their son is coming home for the weekend. 
Of course if one of our patients tells something to us in confidence, and explains 
that he is not ready to inform his parents about it, we respect that. And in case the 
relationship with the family is disturbed, or the patient does not have contact with his 
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relatives anymore, the situation is different. In that situation we will look at options 
to restore the relationship and offer family therapy. 
I would say the surplus value of involving family at our ward is self-evident. I can 
explain it by telling you about the opposite situation. Most of the time lack of 
involvement really has a negative impact on the patient. In case of a conflict, the 
patient will focus on disagreements and is no longer attending to his or her own 
problems. The benefits of a good relationship with family are that you can be more 
persuasive with the patient in explaining why a certain approach is important. 
Parents still have a major influence on the boys and girls, even if their relationship 
is ambivalent. They are important and our patients depend on them. So their 
involvement is important. Especially their approval has a positive impact. Together 
we are able to put the patient on the right track again. Our patients need the support 
of their parents to deal with their problems.” 
Although the patients of the ward are eighteen years and older and their consent is important, Tina recognizes the dependencies between the patients and their relatives. Like Andy, she interprets consent rules f lexibly to reflect the need for good family ties, as the patients still depend on their parents. Family is informed about treatment strategies and decisions. Honesty and openness are important values in this process and, if necessary, attempts are made to convince the patients to cooperate with their family. Tina explains that they make clear to the patients why the family has to be involved, and that it is in their best interest to foster a good relationship with their parents. Family has intrinsic value. The ward does not want to assume the responsibilities of parents, but wants to collaborate with parents to foster treatment. Confidentiality and privacy are interpreted in the context of the patient’s relationship with the family. The nurses inform and involve parents in determining basic treatment goals. The patient is allowed to decide for himself if he wants to inform his parents about details, and is invited to sustain an open and honest relationship with his parents. Openness, honesty, relationships, and fostering family ties are more important than confidentiality and privacy as central values in this narrative. The aim is to foster the family relationship so that the patient can get back to his parents. For this, professionals need the involvement of the family. They aim to develop shared decisions. 
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Discussion 
The complexities associated with family and individualism have been the focus of feministic theorizing. Traditional liberal bioethics has tended to neglect the domestic realm as an arena of ethical importance. Symbolically, the family has been associated with feminine values like trust and interdependencies.20 This is not to say that families are always harmonic places; power differentials and struggles are part of family life. For example, feminists have made it clear that those doing the caring work in the family are women. Their caring work is essential for our survival and is in fact part of the economy, though it is not acknowledged and valued as such. Women’s work and time is hidden and unpaid.21 Feminists have therefore been promoting a more equal division of tasks between men and women. They have also promoted a more caring and inclusive way of dealing with people in vulnerable positions, and a more realistic conceptualization of autonomy as the traditional liberal concept of the self as career typically excludes those in a vulnerable position. The masculine emphasis on values of independence, autonomy, and individualism does not provide guidelines to balance privacy and confidentiality without ambivalence. It neglects the significance of many features of human, family life, namely our connectedness with special others and the needs and vulnerabilities that arise from it.22 Mental health care seems to differ from regular health care in that involvement with family is even more complex. In the narratives, we saw that various normative understandings of confidentiality and privacy had an influence on how nurses and family collaborated. In all the presented narratives, it is evident that family is considered important, but is also seen as complicated. Due to different habits, working routines, and characterizations of the wards (varied goals and patients), the involvement and participation of family varied. How autonomy, confidentiality, 
20 Jaggar Alison. M (2001) Feminist Ethics. In Encyclopedia of Ethics, ed. L. C. Becker  and C. B. Becker, 528-39. New York: Routledge21 Walker, M. A. (ed) (1999) Mother time: Women, aging and ethics. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield22 Lindemann, Hilde (2007) Care in Families. In Principles of health care ethics, 2nd ed. Eds. Richard Ashcroft, Angus Dawson, Heather Draper, and John McMillan. England: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 20, p 60
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and privacy are understood is related to how they are perceived within a framework of values of the ward, expressed in mutual expectations and responsibilities.23 Yet, ambivalences are reduced in the narratives in which families are involved, in an effort to respect their relationships and dependencies. In the first narrative, a trustful relationship between the professional and the patient is of the highest value. The responsibility of professionals in the acute ward is to avert a crisis situation. They focus primarily on individual patient treatment goals. Family is of (instrumental) value if they can contribute to reaching these goals. But family is also considered a possible threat and a risk to the relationship between the professional and the patient. From this perspective, confidentiality is interpreted in a strict and individualistic way. The nurse does not give any information to the family if the patient is even slightly opposed to this. The family is not at all part of the process. This is evident in the case of the man whose wife demanded her passport, but received no advice from the nurse on what to do, and is left alone in his worries and doubts. In the second story, family ties are not only valued as instrumental, but also have intrinsic value. How confidentiality and privacy are interpreted depends on the intensity of the family ties. Although the patient has a veto on certain matters, other issues are shared with the family, even if the patient is opposed. In this case, the approach to confidentiality is more or less in line with Lindemann’s family ethics. Within a family, one shares information, although not everything is always in the open. The hiding of the use of cannabis by the nurses parallels the way in which brothers and sisters keep certain behavior secret from their parents. The family is also seen as a source for caring if they need support. Unlike the first case, the family is not left alone. In the third narrative, the family is involved because the patient lacks autonomy and a reliable decision-making capacity. Unlike in the first narrative, family is informed and involved in decisions. Yet the role of the family is that of spokespersons who can give proxy consent since the patient is unable to give consent himself. 
23 Walker, Margaret Urban (2007) Moral understandings. A feminist study in ethics. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press
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Confidentiality is not an issue, since the family receives the same information the patient would have received had he been competent. Yet the family is supposed to consent to treatment options that are beneficial to the patient. The family is not considered intrinsically valuable, but is instrumental for obtaining proxy consents. The family is not a source of knowledge, and does not provide a perspective that may help the staff see the patient in another light. When the family does not consent, as in the case of Jan’s sister, there is no interaction apart from an attempt to explain further in order to reach a decision consistent with that of the ward’s recommendation. Thus the family is left alone, as in the first case. In the last narrative, the family is considered intrinsically valuable. The staff aims to involve them explicitly in decision-making processes together with the patient. They are striving to reach shared responsibilities for treatment goals of the patient. Confidentiality and privacy are interpreted depending on the specific situation, but patients will be strongly motivated to cooperate with their families, as it is in their best interest. This approach is clearly in line with Lindemann’s account of family ethics. Families from this perspective are valued as a complex web of love, obligation, projects, and traditions, part of what makes life good.24 In families, individual interests are not valued as more important than the interests of other members, but that does not necessarily imply conflict. Family members depend on and are loyal to each other; the loyalty and connectedness with one’s family and special others is important because it is grounded in a deep-rooted relationship in which family members have been giving and receiving support from each other for years and therefore owe each other something. The loyalty between family members is not just a psychological need, but also a moral value. It does not stand in opposition to autonomy, but is part of it. Personal development and growth acquire meaning when they are supported by the family. Family loyalty is in this sense crucial for the patient’s recovery. The ethical value of the family thus creates specific needs, vulnerabilities, and mutual dependencies, and produces intrinsically valuable does more justice to the context and background of the patient together 
24 Lindemann, Hilde (2007) Care in Families. In Principles of health care ethics, 2nd ed. Eds. Richard Ashcroft, Angus Dawson, Heather Draper, and John McMillan. England: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 20, p. 90
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with his or her relatives. It requires that the family not be treated as a problem, but approached as a source of power and resilience. 
Conclusions 
In their critique of the rational atomist self and dominant masculine health-care ethics, feminist scholars have developed the concept of relational autonomy. Relational autonomy refers to the idea that human beings can only become autonomous and build up an identity and meaningful life if they give and accept care and support from others.25 At times people become vulnerable in their lives, and are therefore mutually interdependent and connected.26 This implies a revaluing of the family as an important partner of the patient and professional in the health-care setting.27 Feminist theory also implies a rejection of the individualistic presuppositions of traditional accounts of confidentiality (plus informed consent, and other features). This article illustrates the complexities inherent in making this theoretical position work in the actuality of psychiatry’s clinical setting. Lately, involving family in the care for psychiatric patients is presented as a way of improving the quality of care. Families are usually involved in admittance of the patient to the mental hospital. They ask for professional help because they can no longer cope with their relative’s situation. While the patient is in the hospital, family can provide information about important aspects of the patient’s life and condition, and help to take care of the patient, either by visiting or by providing support in treatment or when the patient shows signs of crisis. After discharge, the family is usually involved in taking care of 
25 Verkerk, M. A. (2007). Care ethics as a feminist perspective on bioethics. In: New 
Pathways for European Bioethics, ed. Chris Gastmans, Chris Dierickx,, Herman Nys, and Paul Schotsmans, 65-79. Antwerp and Oxford: Intersentia.182-19826 Tronto, Joan (1993) Moral boundaries. A political argument for an ethic of care. New York: Routledge 27 Lindemann, Hilde (2007) Care in Families. In Principles of health care ethics, 2nd ed. Eds. Richard Ashcroft, Angus Dawson, Heather Draper, and John McMillan. England: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 20 
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the patient at home. Yet involving the family is not always easy, since patients might be opposed to giving them information, or to inviting them to be present at the ward. As a result, family members often express frustration over the much needed but lack of trust from professionals. The four cases presented show that in the context of psychiatry, nurses try to involve family in various ways. On the one hand, they may use the family in an instrumental way as support when beneficial for the patient, as long as the patient agrees. A spokesperson from the family can also give consent for the patient when he or she is not competent. In this approach, the family is not regarded as a value in itself. Family members are not seen as having their own experiential knowledge that might help to enlarge the perspective of the professional. This instrumental approach might result in the family feeling alone, sensing that they are not being taken seriously. On the other hand, the family may be regarded as a value in itself, since the patient is a relational person in need of support from those who live with and care for him. The focus is not so much on consent of the patient, but on finding ways of involving the family, even if the patient is ambivalent. The family is regarded as an important source of knowledge and as a source of support. In the latter perspective, confidentiality is not regarded as an absolute barrier against family involvement, but is seen as a value that needs interpretation and should be handled with flexibility. Confidentiality is not seen as opposed to family relations, but as something that should be part of family relations; important events and experiences are shared, but less important ones can (and sometimes should) be kept private. These relations are not opposed to autonomy, but form a network in which autonomy can develop and flourish. In this sense, family life is compatible with confidentiality; it serves as the context in which one can trust others to care about what really matters, but not to burden others by revealing things that might as well be kept from them. Relational autonomy and family ethics can serve as a vehicle for making the triad between professional, patient, and family in psychiatry work. The feminist ontology of the self as being relational is a useful experienced by patients in mental health care. 
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Abstract 
In this article, we focus on core values of psychiatric nurses in relation to coercion and restraint. We analyze changes that took place in a project aiming at reducing coercion at a closed inpatient ward of a psychiatric hospital. Using the philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer and Margaret Urban Walker, we analyze both the process of moral changes through dialogue and the outcome in terms of new identities and moral responsibilities. We conclude that the project stimulated nurses to redefine their roles and develop a deeper intersubjective understanding of core values of their profession. 
Key words: coercion, dialogical ethics, empirical ethics, intersubjectivity, moral responsibilities, moral dynamics, psychiatry. 
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Introduction
Coercion and restraint are crucial and controversial issues in inpatient psychiatric settings. These methods aim at assuring safety of the patient or others and to prevent harm. In case a person with psychiatric disabilities admitted in a mental health hospital (in this article referred to as patients) becomes violent or aggressive, coercion and restraint are used to avert danger and harm. Yet, the (extensive) use of coercion and restraint has raised critique among patients, patient advocacy groups  and others.1 Issues for debate include the therapeutic effectiveness of coercive measures such as seclusion and the psychological harm and antipathy towards treatment and working relationship with nurses.2 Coercion, whatever form it takes, produces traumas and fuels distrust among patients and nurses.3 Coercive interventions can be seen as tragic interventions, surrounded with ambivalences: it is experienced as both necessary and wrong.4 In the 
1 Welles FE (2006) Dwang: separatie versus medicatie. De ingrijpendheid van 
dwangmiddelen in de psychiatrie vanuit patiëntperspectief. [Coercion: seclusion or 
medication. The intensiveness of coercion in psychiatry from the perspective of patients] Utrecht NL: Stichting PVP; Hoekstra T, Lendemeijer HGM, Jansen MGMJ (2004)  Seclusion: the inside story. J Psychiatr Ment Health Nurs 11: 276-283; Lewis M, Taylor K, Parks J. (2009) Crisis prevention management: a program to reduce the use of seclusion and restraint in an inpatient mental health setting. Issues Ment Health Nurs. 30: 159-164; Taxis JC. (2002) Ethics and praxis: alternative strategies to physical restraint and seclusion in a psychiatric setting. Issues Ment Health Nurs. 23: 157-170; Carlsson G, Dahlberg K, Ekebergh M, Dahlberg H. (2006) Patients longing for authentic personal care: a phenomenological study of violent encounters in psychiatric settings. Issues Ment 
Health Nurs. 27: 287-3052 Johnson ME, Hauser PM.(2001) The practices of expert psychiatric nurses: accompanying the patient to a calmer personal space. Issues Ment Health Nurs. 22: 651-6683 Landeweer E, Abma T, Santegoeds J, Widdershoven G. (2009) Psychiatry in the age of neuroscience: the impact on clinical practice and lives of clients. Poiesis Prax 6: 43-55; Abma TA, Widdershoven GAM. Moral deliberation in psychiatric nursing practice. Nurs 
Ethics 2006: 13: 546-557; Austin W, Bergum V, Goldberg L. (2003) Unable to answer the call of our clients: mental health nurses’experience of moral distress. Nurs Inq 10: 177-183 4 Taxis JC. (2002) Ethics and praxis: alternative strategies to physical restraint and seclusion in a psychiatric setting. Issues Ment Health Nurs. 23: 157-170; Carlsson G, Dahlberg K, Ekebergh M, Dahlberg H. (2006) Patients longing for authentic personal care: a phenomenological study of violent encounters in psychiatric settings. Issues Ment Health 
Nurs. 27: 287-305; Radden J. (2002) Psychiatric Ethics. Bioethics 16: 397-411; Hantikainen V, Käppeli S. (2000) Using restraint with nursing home residents: a qualitative study of nursing staff perceptions and decision-making. J of Adv Nurs 32 (5): 1196-1205
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case of restraint the patient still has some freedom to choose an alternative. Yet, restraint can be manipulative and hard to identify given its more subtle character.The problematic character of coercion and restraint is especially relevant for nurses. In this article we’ll refer to nurses at random in he of she form, as both men and women work equally at the wards. On the one hand nurses are responsible for the safety of patients at the ward. On the other hand their profession requires them to provide care. Nurses are asked to evaluate unsafe situations, to protect patients from others or themselves. But these are not neutral and objective assessments. Personal and cultural value structures like distrust and control influence and may bias judgments. This results in ambivalence when the values of ethics of care (trust, recognition etc) contradict with the need for safety and control within wards. There are 58 mental health care hospitals in the Netherlands with an average total amount of 50.000 admitted patients (total amount of residents in the Netherlands are 16.300.000). Over time the amount of involuntary admissions has risen. In the last 20 years the amount of acute involuntary admissions has doubled.5 Seclusion as intervention to avert danger during admissions in the psychiatric wards is more frequently used in the Netherlands compared to other European countries. Per 1000 admitted patients seclusion is used around 305 times.6 As a response to the problematic and ambivalent nature of coercion and restraint, a societal debate was raised ten years ago in the Netherlands to reduce coercion in psychiatry. This resulted in funding by the government for projects in psychiatric institutions to foster changes in ward cultures towards reducing the amount of coercion in general, and the amount of seclusions more specifically. Participants in psychiatric care aimed to develop alternatives to the use of seclusion and create prevention strategies. 
5 Mulder CL, Broer J, Uitenbroek D, van Marle P, van Hemert AM, Wierdsma AI. (2006) Versnelde stijging van het aantal inbewaringstellingen na de invoering van de Wet Bijzondere Opnemingen in Psychiatrische Ziekenhuizen (BOPZ). Ned Tijdschr Geneeskd; 150 (6): 319-3226 Janssen WA, Noorthoorn EO, de Vries WJ, Hutschemeakers GJM, Lendemeijer HHGM, Widdershoven GAM. (2008) The use of seclusion in the Netherlands compared to countries in and outside Europe. Int J of Law and Psychiatry; 31:463-470
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We monitored and supported several of these projects aiming to reduce coercion and restraint at the wards. The goal of our research was to map the (cultural) changes that occurred during the projects and to develop recommendations to enable the projects to adjust their strategies during implementation. In this article, we will describe and analyse one of the projects in one mental health hospital to illustrate the transformative moral dynamics among nurses that were set in motion. The transformations are exemplary for other projects although the processes of change in various participating institutions all had their own pace. In the project under consideration, several interventions were implemented to make nurses aware of the need for reducing coercion and involve them in this endeavour. At the ward an experienced nurse was assigned as an ambassador to enthuse others. She received extra hours to spend on the project. Nurses received a training course in techniques to reduce aggression. Also, nurses were asked to develop own ideas to prevent seclusion and restraint. Regular meetings were set up with nurses to evaluate what lessons could be learned if coercion had been used and how to prevent it next time. Episodes of coercion were systematically documented and registered, and analysed looking for patterns and regularities. A project group consisting of the manager of the ward, two ex-clients, two nurses, the psychiatrist of the ward and a family member, monthly discussed the development of the project. All these interventions started more or less at the same time. Our research aimed to look back and reflect on the results of these interventions, and to help the team to make changes more permanent and to improve the situation further. Our qualitative research showed that during the project, the nurses developed a deeper understanding of how they saw their own identity, how they wanted to relate to patients and colleagues and what they considered as core values working as a team of nurses in a psychiatric inpatient setting. Nurses experienced their responsibilities differently compared to the old days. In this article, we will elaborate on the process of change in the nursing team and the new views on the essentials of nursing practice, which came out of this process. We will describe two cases that illustrate these changes. The first case is an example of how moral changes were set in motion in a dialogue about involving ambulatory care workers in trying to reduce coercion on the ward. This was a new development, because before ambulant care and inward care were separate compartments of the hospital. As soon as the patient was admitted at 
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a closed ward, the ambulatory care worker was not involved anymore. The dialogue was organized, because the nurses, while looking back at results of prior actions, came to the conclusion that the connection with ambulatory care was a subject for improvement. The second case shows the changes in moral attitudes and professional identity the nurses experienced looking back on the results of prior interventions in the project. They realized they had changed from guardians into co-workers with patients. The meaning endowed to the value of safety also shifted, and trust and recognition became more important values. The two cases are supported by other data, such as interviews with clients and family members. We selected these two cases as they exemplify the most remarkable changes according to the participants. 
Theoretical framework
The study presented here is an example of empirical ethics, aiming to articulate and foster a process of changing value commitments and responsibilities among nurses in psychiatric hospitals towards coercion reduction and prevention. Empirical ethics as a research method tries to bridge the gap between ethical theory and social practice. Traditionally moral philosophers focused on semantics or epistemology of moral claims and moral reasoning, and showed little interests in socially and practically embodied moral concepts.7 Such approaches are less productive in the context of moral uncertainty issues in health care practice. In health care settings, moral issues and concerns are emerging on an everyday basis and are in need to be discussed and interpreted by the people involved in order to develop shared intersubjective understandings and practice improvements. Nursing ethics should relate to how persons comprehend a specific morally laden situation, based on actual questions, doubts, disagreements, responses and negotiations.8 Morally laden situations are 
7 MacIntyre A.(2006)Moral philosophy and contemporary social practice: what holds them apart? In: MacIntyre A. The Tasks of Philosophy. Selected essays, volume 1. Cambridge, New York. Cambridge University Press; 104-122 8 Austin W. (2007) The ethics of everyday practice. Healthcare environments as moral communities. Adv Nurs Sci. 30 (1): 81-88
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situations in which nurses are confronted with daily issues that demand normative evaluations. For example how much freedom a psychiatric patient at the ward can handle, how much trust can be given to a patient, how much control is necessary at the ward and whether or not to an exception on the ward rules. Answering to these daily moral issues is particularly an intersubjective search.9 Empirical ethicists aim to observe the phenomenon of the moral habitat (moral attitudes, responsibilities and expectations), and correspondingly to facilitate dialogue and reciprocal learning processes.10 This requires bringing in observations and different stances in dialogue with relevant stakeholders. To understand and ref lect on the moral processes in practice and on our own role as facilitators, we adopted the model of hermeneutic dialogue developed in hermeneutic philosophy by Hans-Georg Gadamer.11 To explain the changes in moral values experienced by nurses involved in the projects we introduce the expressive-collaborative model of morality developed by Margaret Urban Walker in Moral Understandings.12 Reflections on the empirical data aim at uncovering the intersubjective moral developments and transformations. They provide tools to develop a deeper understanding of the intersubjective experiences of core values of nurses.Gadamer emphasizes the role of dialogue in understanding. He distinguishes three ways of understanding the other/ the world.13 The first stance is objectivist. The other is seen as an object; the knower observers the other from a neutral, outside 
9 Drew N. The primacy of intersubjectivity. (2008) Adv in Nurs Sci. 31 (1): 74-8010 Widdershoven G, Abma T, Molewijk B.(2009) Empirical ethics as dialogical practice. 
Bioethics. 23 (4): 236-248; Frank AW.(2004) Ethics in medicine. Ethics as process and practice. Internal Medicine Journal. 34: 355-35711 Gadamer, HG. (1960) Wahrheit und Methode. Tübingen: Mohr12 Walker MA. Moral understandings. A feminist study in ethics. (2006) Second edition. Oxford University Press. (First edition published in 2001)13 Gadamer, HG. (1960) Wahrheit und Methode. Tübingen: Mohr; Widdershoven G. (2005) Interpretation and dialogue in hermeneutic ethics. In: Ashcroft R, Lucassen A, Parker M, Verkerk M, Widdershoven G, eds. Case Analysis in Clinical Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 57-75; Widdershoven GAM, Abma TA (2007) Hermeneutic ethics between practice and theory. In: Ashcroft RE, Dawson A, Draper H, McMillan JR, etd. 
Principles of Health Care Ethics. West Sussex-Wiley, 215-222; Bernstein RJ (1983) Beyond 
objectivism and relativism. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
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perspective and explains the observations with the use of general and universal laws.  The second stance is what Gadamer calls subjectivist. The knower tries to understand the other by placing himself in the footsteps of the other. Although this way of knowing is strongly embedded, it can also lead to relativism. According to Gadamer, both stances are problematic as they ignore what the outside world means for the knower and the knower’s perspective and his or her place in the world. The knower does not relate to his own perspective in both these stances. The third position goes beyond objectivism and relativism.14 It requires to be really open to what the other has to say, without abandoning own experiences. Being open means the person is willing to recognize the views of the other as valid.  He is open and responsive to the interpretations of the other. He is ready to accept the other’s issues as being relevant for him. According to Gadamer: “…this simply means that we try 
to understand how what he is saying could be right.”15This is hermeneutic understanding. Perspectives merge and lead to what Gadamer calls a “fusion of horizons” through dialogue. The term “horizon” as a philosophical notion refers to frameworks of meaning. New situations are interpreted within such larger existing frameworks. These frameworks are formed by tradition and culture. Because interpretations are based on frameworks, they have implicit presuppositions. According to Gadamer, such presuppositions have the form of prejudices.  Prejudices cannot be averted. They can, however, be challenged when one is confronted with other perspectives, which entail different presuppositions. In a dialogue, participants change and adapt their interpretations and understandings towards shared meanings. Shared meanings are the result of dialogue when views are changed and merged. Walker regards morality as ‘a socially-embedded medium of mutual understanding and negotiation between people over their responsibility for things open to human care and response’.16 Moral issues constantly will come up and demand new constructions of responsibilities and expectations. In daily practice, 
14 Bernstein RJ. (1983) Beyond objectivism and relativism. Oxford: Oxford University Press15 Gadamer, HG. (1960) Wahrheit und Methode. Tübingen: Mohr 16 Walker MA. (2006) Moral understandings. A feminist study in ethics. Second edition. Oxford University Press. (First edition published in 2001), p. 9 
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moral issues are presented by using stories or narratives. Walker distinguishes three kinds of narratives in which responsibilities are expressed and developed. The first presents the narrative of identities (roles and related expectations). The second, closely related narrative concerns relations (mutual needs and interest, development of trust). The third narrative is that of values. Although we analyse these narratives separately, they are fundamentally connected: “Our identities, 
moral and otherwise, are produced by and in histories of specific relationships, and 
those connections to others that invite and bind us are themselves the expression 
of some things we value.”17 Both theories claim that intersubjective processes and dialogues contribute to evolvement and improvement of moral stances as a constant search between people. The responsive methodology we used in our qualitative research subscribes our theoretical propositions. 
Methodology
The study presented here is part of a comprehensive empirical ethical research program, which started in 1999, to develop and implement criteria of quality for coercion within Dutch psychiatry.18 In the implementation phase of this project, we conducted evaluation studies of coercion reduction projects within five psychiatric hospitals in the south of the Netherlands.19 The central aim was to map the implementation process of the coercion reduction projects and to provide 
17 Ibid, p. 11918 Abma TA, Widdershoven GAM. (2006) Moral deliberation in psychiatric nursing practice. 
Nurs Ethics 13: 546-557; Widdershoven G, Abma T, Molewijk B.(2009) Empirical ethics as dialogical practice. Bioethics. 23 (4): 236-248; Abma TA, Molewijk B, Widdershoven GAM (2009) Good care in ongoing dialogue. Improving the quality of care through moral deliberation and responsive evaluation. Health Care Anal. Published online:  13 January 200919 Abma T, Voskes Y, Landeweer E, Scholten M, Kuipers E, Richartz B, Bijnens L, Hermann G, Widdershoven G. (2009) Lerende netwerken. Uitdagingen en oplossingen voor dwangreductie in de praktijk. [Learning networks. Challenges and solutions for reducing coercion in practice] MGv. 64: 571-582
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recommendations to adjust the projects and to further improve the quality of care. The ward we present in this article is a closed inpatient ward of a psychiatric hospital. The ward houses a maximum of 15 patients. During daytime three to four nurses are working at the ward. At night two nurses are present. Patients at the ward are both involuntary and voluntary admitted. All patients experience serious acute psychiatric disturbances, like psychosis, suicidal thoughts, or manic episodes. The acuteness of their psychiatric disturbances and the related risk of harm are the main reasons for (involuntary) admission. The evaluation studies followed a responsive design.20 Responsive evaluation aims to foster quality improvement of practices through reflections and dialogues among program participants and external stakeholders.21 It does not stand outside or above practice, but is embedded within practice, and an inspiration for dialogical and interactive approaches to empirical ethics.22 Responsive evaluation does not aim at evaluating projects after interventions are implemented based on preordained program goals, but focuses on the process of implementation itself. In line with hermeneutic understanding, responsive methodology aims to articulate different issues and organize a dialogical process with program participants and external stakeholders to exchange perspectives and develop mutually shared perspectives. The evaluator participates in dialogues as a facilitator. He has to acknowledge his own perspectives to be able to understand and relate to the multiple perspectives. Transparency towards own normative stances contributes to trustworthiness of the research as it openly reveals how knowledge is constructed and influenced by 
20 Abma TA, Molewijk B, Widdershoven GAM. (2009) Good care in ongoing dialogue. Improving the quality of care through moral deliberation and responsive evaluation. 
Health Care Anal. Published online: 13 January 2009; Guba EG, Lincoln YS. (1989) Fourth 
generation evaluation. Beverly Hills CA: SAGE; Abma TA, Widdershoven GAM. (2005) Sharing stories: Narrative and dialogue in responsive nursing evaluation. Eval Health 
Prof 28: 90-109 21 Widdershoven GAM, Abma TA. (2007) Hermeneutic ethics between practice and theory. In: Ashcroft RE, Dawson A, Draper H, McMillan JR, etd. Principles of Health Care Ethics. West Sussex-Wiley; 215-22222 Widdershoven G, Abma T, Molewijk B. (2009) Empirical ethics as dialogical practice. 
Bioethics; 23 (4): 236-248; Abma TA, Baur VE, Molewijk B, Widdershoven GAM (2010) Inter-ethics: towards an interactive and interdependent bioethics. Bioethics; 24 (5): 242-55 
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the evaluation team.23 For example, the normative stance of the research and public debate was that the use of coercion is morally wrong. The aim of the projects was to reduce coercion. It did not aim to determine justifiable ways of coercion. The first step in the data collection was to identify the issues of the participants. In this evaluation participants included practitioners (nurses, psychiatrists, managers, and ambulatory care workers), patients, and their families. The evaluation team (first and third author) used open interviews for interviewing the respondents individually at the mental health care hospital. A selective set of topics were leading in the interviews, including expectations and experiences of the project to reduce coercion, ideas on how to reduce coercion, foreseen barriers and pitfalls of the projects and how to overcome them. The next step was to organize homogeneous (converging interests) focus groups in which the issues from the interviews were further discussed. Focus groups resemble group interviews, but differ in that respondents are encouraged to interact and respond to each other. Participants do not have to agree with each other, and can be inspired by other visions. Focus groups are also referred to as focussed dialogue meetings. The ideal focus group exists of 10-12 participants and will take two to three hours. Then heterogeneous (diverging interests) focus groups and interactions were fostered between the various participants to exchange different perspectives. These steps were repeated several times (beginning, middle and end phase of the project) to collect data at different moments during the implementation of the project (see table 1 for an overview of the phases and activities). The three phases were connected in a cyclic way; data from the interviews were used as input for focus groups to further explore issues and their relation, and the issues from the focus groups formed the input for the dialogue groups. Data collection and data analysis interchange in an iterative, interpretative process. All the interviews and focus groups were audio taped and entirely transcribed. We checked the first analysis with the respondents in so-called ‘member checks’24 by mailing them a resume of the transcriptions and asking them if they recognised 
23 Abma TA, Widdershoven GAM. (2008) Social relation as/in evaluation. Evaluation; 14 (2): 209-225 24 Guba EG, Lincoln YS. (1989) Fourth generation evaluation. Beverly Hills CA: SAGE 
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our description and interpretation. Analyses of the interviews were also regularly discussed within the evaluation team to prevent bias. The second author functioned as a peer debriefer during the study; she critically followed the emerging design and asked for justification of methodological decisions such as whether saturation was reached, and whether or not negative cases were taken into account. To meet standards of rigor preliminary analysis were checked with the respondents. As the issues and themes raised in the interviews and focus groups were discussed over and over among all participants (hermeneutic dialectic process) a one-sided picture of the process could be prevented.25
Case Period of data collection Interviews Focus groupsPhase 1Beginning June 2007- Sept 2007 13 1 homogenous group (nurses)Phase 2Middle May 2008 – Sept 2008 7 1 homogenous group (nurses)1  heterogeneous group (2 nurses, 1 psychiatrist, 2 patients, 1 manager, 1 family member) Phase 3End Sept 2008 – Nov 2008 3 1 homogenous group (ambulant nurses)1  heterogeneous group (ambulant nurses, inward nurses and patients)Total June 2007-Nov 2008 23 7
Table 1. Scheme of data collection
CASE 1: Preventing coercion by including ambulatory care workers
This case is an example of how moral changes were facilitated by organizing dialogues. In the interviews and homogeneous focus groups participants were asked for their ideas to reduce coercion. The majority of the participants reckoned coercion could be further reduced if nurses of the closed ward would collaborate more intensely with ambulant care workers. Our next step was to organize a heterogeneous dialogue with various parties to jointly explore how their collaboration could be developed. 
25 Abma TA, Widdershoven GAM. (2005) Sharing stories: Narrative and dialogue in responsive nursing evaluation. Eval Health Prof ; 28: 90-109 
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A dialogue which aimed to stimulate nurses to search for new ways of preventing coercion by bringing together nurses from the ward and nurses from an ambulatory team: broadening their horizons. Ambulatory care in psychiatry is the mental health care performed on an outpatient basis. In case of ambulatory care the psychiatric care can be managed without an admission in the hospital. Most of the persons suffering from chronic mental illness receive ambulatory care, while in some periods they are in need of a hospital admission. As most of the patients receive ambulatory care before they are (involuntary) admitted, nurses at the ward wanted to explore how to strengthen the cooperation with professionals working outside the closed wards with the same patients. The idea was that as ambulatory caregivers know the patient in other, better periods of their illness, they might give useful information about the patient and assist in supporting and making contact with the patient. By collaborating with each other, nurses hoped to be able to place care in a long-term perspective. This idea was further explored in a dialogical meeting (heterogeneous focus group) with ward nurses, ambulatory care workers, patients and management of the hospital. We will discuss some ideas that were developed on how ambulatory care workers could support their patients before, during and after an (involuntary) admission. Ambulatory care workers proposed they could give relevant information to the ward about suitable ways to treat a specific patient before or at the start of the admission: “The ambulatory care worker can make an estimation about the 
amount of freedom a patient will be able to handle despite the level of paranoia 
of the patient.” (Ambulatory worker)Patients additionally pointed at the importance of passing on ‘basic personal information’ like the religion of the patient, special diets, allergies, etc to be able to attend better to the needs of a patient. All participants emphasized the necessity to share treatment strategies that are developed with the patient before he or she is (involuntary) admitted. The following quotation is an example of how prior information can be of help: “For example, there are people who really feel threatened 
by being approached by a woman when psychotic, and will become aggressive. If 
we know that in front, we can anticipate to it.” (Nurse working on the close ward)
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Furthermore, participants agreed that ambulatory nurses can supply information to the patient in case an admission is about to happen. This information should include telling what the patient could expect at the ward, what has been changed since the last admission, etc. Ambulatory workers can also support the patient during the admission. For instance, when a patient asks for some personal things, the nurse may ask the ambulatory worker for help to get them. Since the ambulatory care worker has a long-term relationship with the patient, he may also be able to put the patient at ease. This support might reduce agitation and frustration of the patient and the need for coercion. The ambulatory care worker can also assist in bringing the patient and the staff at the ward closer to each other. In addition, patients report that at admission they sometimes feel abandoned by ambulatory caregivers, which is frustrating: “It is not a good thing if a patient feels like, ‘I am 
admitted at this ward, but my ambulatory psychiatrist does not visit me in here. 
He apparently has better things to do.’” (Patient)Finally, the ambulatory professional can evaluate the admission with the patient and help to find strategies how to prevent an admission next time. Together with the patient, he can advise on improvements of the ward. In the dialogue meetings the participants found several ways to collaborate and support in care and prevention of coercion. Ambulatory care workers listened to the difficulties the ward nurses were confronted with and considered how they could support the nurses to reduce coercion and improve the care for their patients. Thus, the meeting illustrated hermeneutic understanding. Participants recognised different interests, but also acknowledged mutual goals and were willing to be open and responsive to the issues that were put on the agenda. The process resulted in better mutual understanding, and in concrete suggestions for improving care through collaboration. This not only means that participants adapt their behaviour to one another; they also come to see their own practice in a new way. Ambulatory nurses no longer see their work as ending at the door of the institution. They take a role and responsibility during and after admission. Ward nurses no longer regard their work as intensive care completely different from care in the community. They emphasize the common ground between care inside and outside the hospital. The process of exchange of perspectives on care and cooperation in the end implies a new view on the essentials of psychiatric nursing in general and dealing with coercion in 
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particular. Nurses are open to share responsibilities to improve care for the patient and reduce the use of coercion. Constructions of moral responsibilities are changing and consequently also identities and core values. The second case shows more in depth that this results in new definitions of nursing practice and nurses’ identity. 
CASE 2: From guardians to co-workers 
The first case illustrated how nurses were enabled to develop new views on prevention through processes of dialogue, including new ways of cooperation with ambulatory colleagues. The nurses at the ward no longer considered themselves as the sole experts and ‘problem solvers,’ but recognized the value of close working relations with other colleagues in order to meet the needs of the patient. This also implies a new view on the role of nursing in dealing with situations of risk. In this case, we will focus on how nurses describe their new role, their identity and their relationship with patients. This case is different from the first one, in that the focus is on reflection on change, not on fostering further change. Yet, the difference is gradual, since reflection and facilitation are not opposed, but actually presuppose one another.In evaluating the project, we talked with nurses in interviews and (homogenous and heterogeneous) focus groups about what had changed. Looking back at how they used to work, they signified major changes in their responsibilities towards patients and in the way they relate to patients. Before the project started, nurses used to regard and describe themselves as cowboys or guardians. This perspective influenced how nurses viewed their responsibilities and effected normative expectations of others. The identification of nurses as guardians effected how responsibilities were understood. At the mental health institution, the nurses of the closed admission ward had to solve problems of aggressive behaviour. If a patient was staying in another part of the institution and became aggressive, he was brought to the closed facilities. Not surprisingly in this context, safety was considered the main responsibility of the nurses. They worked at the ward that dealt with the most difficult and dangerous patients. From that perspective the use of coercion was considered normal practice. To protect safety on the ward they tried to control the situation as much as possible. For example, they used specific ward rules for eating and sleeping. If, despite control, an outburst 
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happened, they reacted by using coercion and restraint: “The use of our seclusion room 
was part of our normal daily practice. If a patient became aggressive, for instance 
by throwing a glass against the wall, the patient would be put in the seclusion room. 
Without asking any questions about why the patient got so agitated.” (Nurse) Gradually, as discussions about the necessity of the use of coercion started, nurses became aware of the need for reducing coercion and restraint and began to look for alternative and experimental approaches. Deliberating on prevention of coercion, care for the wellbeing of patients became more prominent. Empowerment, stimulation and giving more control to patients became more important new values. Due to the project, nurses were motivated to look for new ways to deal with patients. For a patient arriving at the ward, it was no longer considered self-evident he should be put immediately into the seclusion room to ensure safety. The nurses of the ward started judging the need for seclusion and welcomed new patients in a normal room (with colleagues visually nearby, to guard safety). Looking back, they regard this approach as a good way to reduce aggression, because patients feel less threatened: “Sometimes a patient may have been really aggressive toward a police 
officer. But if two nurses approach this person in a friendly manner and offer a 
talk and a cup of coffee, the agitation often diminishes”. (Nurse)Another example of a change is the reduction of daily rules on the ward. It is, for example, no longer considered necessary to close the kitchen during the day. Patients are allowed to make use of the kitchen whenever they want to get a sandwich or make a cup of tea. This results in fewer irritations among patients, as they feel no longer controlled by others. It creates more space and enhances control by patients themselves. It also leads to a more flexible and patient-centred attitude of nurses. Nurses reflect on the purpose of rules and weigh the relevance of the rule in specific situations (group interests versus individual interests) instead of following blindly on general ward agreements. The staff also decided to abandon strict rules for de-seclusion processes. It used to be common to let the patient out for a short time period, to see if the patient could handle the stress of being among other patients at the ward. After this try-out, the patient would go back into seclusion room. This had adverse effects. Even if the patient appeared to be able to handle the stress well, he was brought back to the seclusion room. This often led to a negative reaction of the patient; he behaved well, but still needed to go back to the seclusion room. On the other hand, if a patient would become stressed, 
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the staff would not take immediate action, because it was agreed that the patient would only go back to the seclusion room after the set time period. Nurses did not approach the agitated patient earlier on to avoid confrontations, but this reactive attitude often induced escalations. Abandoning these rules enables nurses to anticipate tensions and crisis situations better. It compels them to look seriously at safety-issues in an earlier stage of the process. Nurses are forced to make contact with the patient and to talk about safety, and be clear about boundaries concerning safety and intolerable behaviour.Together all these adjustments stimulate nurses to take more initiative and anticipate possible tensions by relating to the patient. “Nowadays we act much 
sooner. We say, for example, ‘we heard you received some bad news, you have to 
stay  longer at this ward despite your wishes. I would feel really bad if I were in 
your shoes. How about you?’ So you anticipate those kinds of situations.” (Nurse)The process of transition was not easy. At first, nurses rigorously tried not to use coercion and to ignore dangerous behaviour. The effect was, paradoxically, an increase of coercion; the nurses waited too long and things would get out of hand and difficult to repair. This created moral distress: “People in our team became really 
tense and felt like they were not allowed to use any form of restriction anymore. 
Because of that, we actually created more unsafe situations. Reducing seclusions 
is really important, but sometimes you just cannot prevent to intervene.” (Nurse)Eventually nurses regained control, not by using more coercion, but by approaching patients, confronting them with their behaviour and involving patients in maintaining safety on the ward. They developed a shared understanding of responsibilities together with patients. Patients were no longer seen as dangerous people who had to be controlled. They were considered as human beings who could participate in developing good practices and could be considered as moral subjects.An example of the involvement of patients in securing safety is the development of treatment strategies, which entails the views of the patient concerning how nurses should act in case of agitation and how to avoid using the seclusion room. In case it is not possible to prevent seclusion the event is evaluated with the patient afterwards, to learn to avoid this next time. In describing these new procedures, the manager of the ward says: “We refer much more to the patient as a person, to his healthy 
behaviour instead of his illness. In this way we experience a reduction of aggression 
and resistance.” (Manager of the ward)
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To summarize, nurses experienced major changes in treating patients. Several adjustments were made in rules and procedures which contributed to different ways of dealing with patients attending more to the person behind the illness and anticipating on possible tensions. Moreover, nurses became aware that staying in control of safety is not realised by being repressive and using coercion and restraint, but by getting into contact with patients (relational safety) and involving them in preventing coercion and promoting safety. The examples show moral transitions in the three kinds of narratives Walker distinguishes. There are changes in how the team of nurses experienced their own responsibilities and assignments and what they expect of other (patients, ambulatory care workers). Parallel, there are changes in the relationship between the team of nurses and patients, as well as in relations between nurses (narratives of relations). Eventually, also shared values have changed (narratives of values). Coercion is no longer considered normal practice, but seen as an intervention that should be avoided as much as possible by averting dangerous situations by building a relationship with the patient. In terms of identity, the professional changed from a guardian into a ‘co-worker,’ working together with both the patients and other nurses. Before the project started, the professional-patient relationship was based on mutual distrust. Nurses distrusted patients because of the psychiatric illness that caused danger. Patients did not trust nurses because of the use of coercion and restraint. Both parties felt their safety being under threat. Slowly, patients were regarded as potential partners (moral subjects) in developing a shared understanding of responsibilities. These altered identities mean that the relationship between patient and professional is altered toward a more trusting relationship. By developing a more equal relationship, patients get offered a partnership, trust and mutual responsibility in developing a recovery process. In the new situation, relationships are less strategic. Nurses realise that getting into contact with patients is a better way to secure and foster safety. Knowing the patient makes it easier to estimate risks and anticipate on possible dangerous situations. Consequently, nurses actively try to understand the background stories of the (dangerous) behaviour of the patient by understanding the person behind it. When a patient becomes aggressive, nurses want to know why. They wonder what causes the aggression and what can be done about it. The ambulatory care worker can assist in estimating the needs and interests of the patient and support the relationship 
The Essence of psychiatric nursing
91
between the patient and the nurses of the ward. They have a longer relationship, built on trust. They know each other also in periods without crisis. 
Discussion
An important finding of our research was that nurses reported themselves that their roles had changed. In retrospect they connected this role change to the emergence of reflection, openness and dialogue. During the project, a dialogical process came forth within the mental health institution to engage nurses to think about their practice in general and coercion more in particular. As a result, illustrated in the two cases, the relationship between patients and nurses and among professionals (nurses and ambulatory workers) fundamentally changed. The focus now is toward mutual understanding, collaboration, contact and trust. The first case showed that the number of people involved in estimating risks and dealing with danger has expanded. Before, dealing with risks was only a concern of the nurses at the ward. Gradually, ambulatory care workers were seen as possible partners, who can help to develop a better, mutually shared perspective on safety-issues. The second case made explicit that patients are approached and involved as partners in care. While formerly the practice of nursing was organized around the value of safety and guarding control over the ward, now the essence of nursing is defined in terms of sharing responsibilities with others. Nurses see their identity as being a co-worker. Interpreting good care involves activities of all parties. Patients and ambulatory care workers have a role in finding out what good care means in situations. Gadamer’s hermeneutics can help to understand what nurses need to reflect on their core values and develop their identity. First and foremost openness is required. This was at first lacking at the closed wards. Nurses did not talk about the routine of coercion. In the dialogues nurses learned to share their experiences and perspectives and to listen and open up to other perspectives. Through the dialogical processes the nurses were actively invited to think about their roles and responsibilities in relation to coercion. In the dialogues the nurses encountered different views on what it means to be a nurse and what it means to take care for psychiatric patients in crisis. 
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Whereas Gadamer’s hermeneutics helps to understand the process of change, Walker’s philosophy enables us to look more closely at the outcome that is the resulting views on core values and identity of psychiatric nursing. Walker invites us to look at the nurses’ stories about values, relationships and identity. Nurses no longer regard control and safety as fundamental values; instead they emphasize notions like care, trust and responsibility. Relationships have become more equal, aiming at mutual understanding and involving patients and colleagues in searching for ways to prevent escalation and address the needs of all participants. The nurses’ identity is defined in terms of being co-workers. The new situation also creates new challenges. Routines and prejudices are no longer implicit, but open for discussion. This could create insecurity. The work of nurses requires more subtlety and demands different capabilities because of new responsibilities. Nurses experience that it is not easy to build mutual trust in case a patient is admitted against his will. To meet the needs and interests of patients, nurses have to stimulate and convince them to participate, which is not an easy process as it is not always clear to what extent the patient himself is capable or willing to take on responsibilities and become involved. A further issue for concern regards which partners to include in the process of assigning responsibilities. The cases expressed that patients are seen more and more as full-fledged partners in developing good care practices and ambulatory nurses have also become involved. Yet, other partners may play a role too. In the Netherlands currently the involvement of family is an issue of debate. Family members may help to prevent or stop coercive measures. Some institutions have started working with ex-patients to understand the patients at the wards in a better way. Finally, there is debate whether or not policemen or commercial guardians should be asked for help in case of criminal behaviour. Gadamer and Walker emphasize the role of dialogue and reflection. By making moral expectations and prejudices transparent, participants in practice are able to critically ref lect on moral issues. Contradictions and incoherencies become explicit, which may provide a basis for new and better understandings. Yet, moral understandings are constantly under construction, and new perspectives and partners will emerge. Thus, developing good practices is an iterative process, in which normative conclusions will always be temporal. In our project, nurses have become aware of this, 
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since they acknowledge that it is not easy to structure their work in line with their newly developed identity and the mutual relationships with patients and colleagues that come along with this. Yet, they are convinced that this is more fruitful in the end, as patients are less oppressed and more involved in developing good care. Other mental health care institutions could learn from these developments that facilitating dialogues about roles and responsibilities will contribute to awareness how to reduce coercion at the closed wards. It brings nurses and other practitioners closer to their essence and core identities related to psychiatric care. 
Conclusion
The essence of psychiatric nursing is to deliver good care in critical situations. The two cases in our project show that through dialogue, nurses are able to find ways to reduce coercion by changing the distribution of responsibilities. Nurses at the ward recognised that, in taking responsibility for safety at the ward, they need not take the role of guardians. Sharing responsibilities with patients and with ambulatory nurses provides new opportunities to reduce coercion and foster good care. The project stimulated nurses to redefine their roles and develop a deeper intersubjective understanding of core values of their profession. The process of searching for the essentials of nursing is never finished, since new ways of dealing with morally complicated topics such as coercion tend to raise new questions and challenges, requiring further communication in which new viewpoints and new parties will emerge. This requires being open for change and having confidence that moral reflection with all parties involved will result in a better understanding of nursing values and a further development of nursing practice. Future research could monitor these processes further by attending to experienced pitfalls and possible solutions. To sensitise and educate nurses into moral issues moral case deliberations could be used.26 Moral case deliberations provide a practical tool to systematically organize moral reflections among nurses on the work floor. 
26 Molewijk B, Abma TA, Widdershoven GAM (2008) Teaching ethics in the clinic. The theory and practice of moral case deliberation, Journal for Medical Ethics, 34: 120-124
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Abstract
In this paper we introduce narrative and hermeutical perspectives to clinical ethics support services (CESS). We propose a threefold consideration of ‘theory’ and show how it is interwoven with ‘practice’ as we go along. First, we look at theory in its foundational role: in our case ‘narrative ethics’ and ‘philosophical hermeneutics’ provide a theoretical base for clinical ethics by focusing on human identities entangled in stories and on moral understandings as a dialogical process. Second, we consider the role of theoretical notions in helping practitioners to understand their situation in clinical ethics practice, by using notions like ‘story’, ‘responsibility’, or ‘vulnerability’ to make explicit and explain their practical experience. Such theoretical notions help us to interpret clinical situations from an ethical perspective and to foster moral awareness of practitioners. And, thirdly, we examine how new theoretical concepts are developed by interpreting practice, using practice to form and improve our ethical theory. In this paper, we discuss this threefold use of theory in clinical ethics support services by reflecting on our own theoretical assumptions, methodological steps and practical experiences as ethicists, and by providing examples from our daily work. In doing so, we illustrate that theory and practice are interwoven, as theoretical understanding is dependent upon practical experience, and vice-versa. 
Keywords: clinical ethics, theory, practice, narrative theories, hermeneutics, professional roles, story. 
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Introduction
ǡƤ
Ǥƪwithin such institutions has led to a variety of ‘clinical ethics support services’ (like ethics committees, ethics counsellors, ethics support services and so on).1 Recently, 
ƪǡattributes, and the possibility of evaluating clinical support services.2 But we observe 
ƤǤǡƪseems to be missing. The relationship between practice and theory is obscured. Of course, several authors have hinted at similar points throughout the years3, often in reference to the ambivalently perceived phenomenon of the institutionalization of clinical ethics.4ƪǯ
ƤǤƪhas a more epistemological and methodological role to play, as we will outline in the following text. Moreover, some clinical ethicists seem to stay ostensibly arrested in clinical practice, up to the point of a certain suspicion against a theoretical and 
1 See for the UK, e.g. A. Slowther. Embedding Clinical Ethics in a Health Care System:  The Experience of the UK Clinical Ethics Network. Bioethica Forum 2008; 1(1): 40–452 See, e.g. The American Society for Bioethics and Humanities (2006) Core Competencies 
for Health Care Ethics Consultation. 
ǣȋƤͳͻͻͺȌǢSociety for Bioethics and Humanities (2009) Improving Competencies in Clinical Ethics 
Consultations: an Educational Guide. Glenview: ASBH; R. Gillon (2010) What Attributes Should Clinical Ethics Committees Have? BMJ; 340: c2946; Vorstand der Akademie für Ethik in der Medizin (2010) Standards für Ethikberatung in Einrichtungen des Gesundheitssystems. Ethik Med; 22: 149–1533 See, e.g. M.P. Aulisio (1999). Is it Enough to Mean Well? HEC Forum; 11(3): 208–217; G.J. Agich (2001) The Question of Method in Ethcics Consultation. Am J Bioeth; 1(4): 31–41; H.T. Engelhardt (2003) The Bioethics Consultant: Giving Moral Advice in the Midst of Moral Controversy? HEC Forum; 15(4): 362–382. E.G. Howe (1996) The Three Deadly Sins of Ethics Consultation. J Clin Ethics; 7(2): 99–1084 For some early work see, e.g. J. Fleetwood, R.M. Arnold & R.J. Baron (1989): Giving Answers or Raising Questions? The Problematic Role of Institutional Ethics Committees? J Med Ethics; 15: 137–142; D.C. Blake (1992) The Hospital Ethics Committee. Health Care’s Moral Conscience or White Elephant? Hastings Cent Rep; 22(1): 6–11
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ƪǤ5 Thus we see the danger that clinical ethicists might downplay the crucial role of ethical theory in general, or announce their own morally preferred course of actions as universally solid ethical method. As clinical ethicists, we work in institutionalized clinical ethics settings in two different European countries (the Netherlands and Switzerland). We (deliberately) shift between ‘theory’ and ‘practice’ in our applied work, when we develop methods or work as ethical facilitators, members of ethics committees, clinical ethicists and/
ȀƤǤ
ǡƤǡ
Ǥƪapproaches that we choose for our own applied work. Secondly, we use theoretical notions in our daily work to help practitioners understand their situations involving acute or retrospective moral or ethical dilemmas. Thirdly, our interaction with clinical practice leads to new theoretical insights. These insights again change, 
ǡƤǡȋǨȌƪbackground theories and how we use them to understand practical situations and moral dilemmas. Our proposed threefold consideration of theory actually comes in circles. From an epistemological point of view, our understanding of the relationship between theory and practice is not linear nor deductive or inductive, but rather moves along spiral lines of increasing knowledge based upon lived experiences in concrete situations and context.6 Thus we think that providing any kind of ethical 
ƪȋͳȌtheory as background assumptions, (2) the theoretical notions that are used to help 
ǡȋ͵Ȍƪǡthus theory-making, and the circular relationship between the three. In this text we will elaborate on the three roles of theory and the circle 
ƪǤ	ǡthe contemporary foundational assumptions of our own work (narrative ethics and 
5 ǤȋʹͲͲͻȌǫƪPhilosophers in Medical Ethics. In Cutting Through the Surface. T. Takala, P. Herissone-Kelly & S. Holm, eds. Amsterdam: Rodopi: 55–606 Cf. Aristotle’s Ethica Nichomachea EN 1095a 
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philosophical hermeneutics). Secondly, we give some examples of how we make 
Ƥsituations. Thirdly, and in line with our idea of the continuing interaction between 
ƪǡpractical experience alters our theoretical framework. We end with some conclusions and with a brief perspective on the complexity of the profession of a modern ethicist. 
The foundational role of theory
To speak in the terms used by Thomas S. Kuhn:7 the foundational ‘paradigm’ of our own work as ethicists can be traced back to theories of narrative ethics and philosophical hermeneutics. We now point out some basic ideas of these philosophies and relate them to the setting of clinical ethics support services. 
Narrative theories
Narrative theories have received quite some attention from biomedical ethics in recent years. Indeed, we can even speak of narrative ethics. An excellent meta-ethical framework that illustrates why narratives are important for doing ethics is the moral epistemology of Margaret Urban Walker. In her book ‘Moral Understandings’ (2007)8Ƥunderstanding of ethics. She opts to transform taken-for-granted assumptions about the often implicitly given moral knowledge that informs both moral theory and 
7 T.S. Kuhn (1962) ƤǤ Chicago: Chicago University Press8 M.U. Walker (2007) Moral Understandings. A Feminist Study in Ethics. 2nd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. More benchmarking work in narrative bioethics has been provided by authors like Arthur W. Frank, Dietmar Mieth, or Hilde Lindemann. 
	Ƥ
ǤƬǤȋͳͻͻ͸Ȍand Narratives. In The Narrative Study of Lives, 4, R. Josselson, ed. Thousand Oaks: Sage: 275–287; R. Porz (2008) Zwischen Entscheidung und Entfremdung. Paderborn: Mentis; E. Landeweer et al.(2009) Psychiatry in the Age of Neuroscience: the Impact on Clinical Practice and Lives of Patients. Poiesis Prax; 6: 43–55
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practice. In her analysis, morality is practice-based, lived out through practices of responsibility. Morality is thoroughly interpersonal, collaborative and expressed 
ǡǡȀƪǤsocially embedded; there is no such thing as a pure (idealistic) core of ethical theory or independent moral reality. In addition, morality is expressed in narratives and our identities are entangled in stories. For example, a story is the basic form to represent a moral problem, and the production of narrative accounts of ourselves follows socially recognized forms and occasions of telling, to quote Walker: ‘Our (narratives), moral 
ǡƤǡ
connections to others that invite and bind us are themselves the expression of 
some things we value.’9 
Ƥǡcan say: a narrative approach to clinical ethics (i) accentuates our responsibilities in the social sphere and acknowledges our dependencies within it, (ii) constructs moral identities by means of narratives, and (iii) conceives human beings – in general – as storytelling agents. In this way Walker is able to locate broad moral marks that relate to the narratives of people and affect our moral selves and our moral life, like gender, social authority, power, and recognition.10 In relation to our work as ethicists in Switzerland and the Netherlands, the basic theoretical presuppositions of narrative ethics shape our methodological procedures in clinical settings. Our proceedings in case discussions, our work in ethics committees, our research and teaching are framed by our assumptions that moral agents are not independent, not asocial, not timeless and not space-free individuals, rather the opposite. We pay attention to the stories people tell us and we stimulate practitioners to tell stories, because stories express implicit and explicit values of the storyteller. In addition, we try to create room and space for narratives to be told and exchanged (although this is not easy, e.g. in a time-pressure-driven institution like a university hospital). Creating settings of dialogue and understanding now brings us to the next corner stone of our own paradigm: philosophical hermeneutics.
9 Walker, op.cit. note 8, p.11910 L. Code (2002) Narratives of Responsibility and Agency. Hypatia; 17(1): 156–173
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Philosophical hermeneutics
Hermeneutics is the art of interpretation. Thus, philosophical hermeneutics deals with understanding, human experiences, meaning-making, or – to put it more philosophically – the human demand of intending to understand the world. From a hermeneutical perspective, life can be described as a continuous process of interpretation (even if we are not always aware of it ourselves). The German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900–2002) concisely displayed the role of language and dialogue in this process. His main work ‘Truth and Method’ provides an account of the very nature of human understanding in its universality, bound and mediated via language (both ontologically and practically speaking).11 The title of 
ǮǯƤǡnot by method alone. This is not to be understood as a rejection of the importance of methodology, but rather as an insistence on the priority of understanding as being dialogical, practical and always dependent on the situation at hand.12 According to Gadamer, dialogue results in a learning process. One does not learn by taking things over mechanically, but by investigating the validity of the other’s point of view. It means being open to what the other has to say.13 In the 1960s Gadamer (clearly!) did not think about clinical ethics support services as we do today. But we can nevertheless carry forward some of his core ideas to current settings of clinical ethics consultancy. We can summarize: a philosophical hermeneutical approach to clinical ethics (iv) calls for the understanding of human beings and situations, (v) acknowledges that this understanding is mediated by 
11 H.G. Gadamer (1990) Wahrheit und Methode.òǣȋƤͳͻ͸ͲȌǤǣrecent authors like Paul Ricoeur, Charles Taylor, and Richard Rorty have followed the 
ǤƤown work, e.g. G. Widdershoven. Dialogue in Evaluation: a Hermeneutic Perspective. Evaluation 2001; 7: 253–263; G. Widdershoven & T. Abma (2007) Hermeneutic Ethics between Practice and Theory. In Principles of Health Care Ethics. R. Ashcroft et al., eds. West Sussex: Wiley: 215– 222; R. Porz & G. Widdershoven (2010) Verstehen und Dialog als Ausgangspunkt einer hermeneutischen Ethik. Bioethica Forum; 3(1): 8–1112 
ƪǮǯȋȌȋrationality), brought forward by Aristotle, op.cit. note 11, p. 317ff13 13 Cf. G. Widdershoven, T. Abma & B. Molewijk (2009) Empirical Ethics as Dialogical Practice. Bioethics; 23(4): 236–248
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language, words, concepts, and (vi) fosters the articulation of experiences of the ones affected and results in a merging of perspectives.14 Following these three points, hermeneutics as theory of understanding through dialogue provides the basis for clinical ethics understood as ‘moral deliberation’.15 Understanding the endeavour of clinical ethics support services as ‘moral deliberation’ differs from the conception of clinical ethics as an ‘expert’ consultancy. In moral deliberation the practitioners are seen as the experts of their own professional world, they are supposed to develop the answers to their moral questions in interaction with each other. The ethicist acts as a facilitator to help enable this process, not as a decision-maker or consultant. He shapes the structure, content, and setting of e.g. clinical case discussions, to foster deliberation. Following the ideas of hermeneutics mentioned above, the emphasis in clinical support services is on openness to humans and situations, fostering dialogue, and thereby encouraging a fusion of horizons. Clearly, these basic attitudes of philosophical hermeneutics come with their own values attached, but it is important to note that the core values of our hermeneutical paradigm do not determine what is morally good or bad in the clinical case in question. In our work, we try to be open about our background assumptions, we depict and explain them, and they become transparent in the process of discussing a clinical case. Theories are not considered 
ƤǤexplaining practice, but are also responsive to practice. 
Using narrative and hermeneutical theory in practice
In our daily work, in one-to-one dialogues, in interdisciplinary discussions, in moral case analysis (either acute or retrospective), and in teaching settings or vocational 
14 Gadamer uses the German term ‘Horizontverschmelzung’ (merger of perspectives, or fusion of horizons), see Gadamer, op.cit. note 11, p. 38315 B. Molewijk et al. (2008) Teaching Ethics in the Clinic. The Theory and Practice of Moral Case Deliberation. Ǣ 34: 120–124; B. Molewijk et al. (2008) Improving Moral Case Deliberation in Dutch Health Care; Improving Moral Competency of Professionals and the Quality of Care. 	Ǣ 1(1): 57–65 
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training, we use a variety of theoretical narrative and hermeneutical notions to help the health care professionals come to terms with verbalizing, understanding, dismantling, or solving their problematic situations from their point of view. Our theoretical background knowledge assists us for example in stimulating practitioners and in asking questions and thus helps us to enable practitioners to develop a view on 
Ǥƪthis in regard to the notion of ‘story’, which stems from our foundational narrative basic assumptions. Then we give a concrete and detailed example of a moral case deliberation, in which narrative and hermeneutical theory enabled us to help practitioners articulate and conceptualize their experiences of a dilemma situation on their ward. 
A general example: the notion of ‘story’ 
Let us start with the notion of ‘story’. As noted above, this notion is a very important term in narrative ethics. Clearly, for us the notion is well known and part of our foundational background theories. For practitioners, however, the notion of ‘story’ can be novel, as they are generally not used to thinking in terms of ‘stories’ when they discuss their patients. They generally discuss ‘cases’, rather than ‘stories’. Cases can be compared and possible solutions should be evidence-based. But often a case of a moral dilemma lacks comparison, and there is no evidence-based solution in sight. A change in perspective can help here. Thus we encourage healthcare professionals to re-tell the moral problem as their own ‘story’, therewith deliberately expressing their emotions, values and experienced responsibilities (‘thick case descriptions’). 
ǡǡƪto emotions, and – most important – their own morality becomes apparent. We stimulate them by asking questions like: ‘Can you tell me your personal story about the case?’ ‘Can you tell me the story of the patient as you perceived it?’ In a second step we help them to clarify the hidden values and the implicit moralities in these stories. This way of working is not as simple as it may sound, as healthcare professionals 
ǮǯǡƤǯinventions without any link to reality. So we – as ethicists – need to introduce the word ‘story’ in a careful way before we start asking our triggering questions. We need 
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to explain that ‘story’ is a valid theoretical notion in our ethical language, and that stories are not arbitrary, but carry meaning and values, that they have a beginning and an ending, and a certain relation to reality. Of course, we do not do this explication by reading out Walker’s book to the healthcare professionals, we rather give a brief and applicable grasp of the notion of ‘story’ to help them understand their practice from a different angle. In this sense, the use of the notion of ‘story’ is an example of how we apply narrative theories in daily practice. 
A concrete example: a case of moral deliberation 
Narrative and hermeneutic ethics focuses on concrete experiences. Articulating such experiences and deliberating about them involves conceptual work. Theories and theoretical notions can be useful in helping practitioners to clarify what motivates them in their work. We will illustrate this with an example from a moral deliberation meeting at a haematology-oncology ward. In moral deliberation meetings, concrete cases that are experienced as morally troublesome by practitioners are discussed. During a moral case deliberation at a haematologyoncology ward, one of the nurses presented the case of a female patient, Marina:16 
Marina, age 19, has acute leukaemia. She stays at the haematology-oncology ward for 
a second line of treatment. She needs stem-cell transplantation. One of her brothers is 
compatible as a donor. 
ǡǤǢ
brothers live with the father. Marina had severe anxiety problems at the age of 
fourteen. She recovered from this. It is not known whether she had any psychological 
or psychiatric treatment at that time. 
16 We present this case in an anonymized form. During a moral deliberation meeting, a case is discussed with all the real details. The participants however are requested not to disclose details about the case and each other’s views outside the meeting. In line with 
Ƥǡǡrecognizable, and we decided not to specify the position of individual participants in the meeting. 
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Marina is somewhat tense in dealing with uncertainty. She takes her temperature 
often when she has a light fever, and constantly asks the nurses about possible causes. 
She is worried about losing weight and eats too much, which results in sickness and 
vomiting. She sometimes asks for pain medication, not because she is in pain, but 
because she is afraid she might be in pain later. 
Marina has told the social worker at the ward that she needs positive and reassuring 
information. She does not want to know about possible negative side-effects and risks 
of her treatment. She wants these to be explained to her mother, not to herself. 
Next week, a meeting with her about future treatment is scheduled at the ward. At 
this meeting the transplantation and the possible side-effects are on the agenda. The 
staff is unsure about how to approach Marina at the meeting. 
The staff experienced a dilemma. Marina’s request not to be informed about possible negative side effects and risks of treatment did not correspond with their professional ethics and ward policies. On the one hand, they did not want to disrespect her; on the other, they felt Marina had to be informed. In the moral deliberation session, the participants formulated the dilemma as follows: 
Should we follow the wish of Marina and tell the possible negative side effects only 
to her mother? Or should we insist that treatment can only take place if she herself 
knows about the side effects, so that she can monitor her condition and warn the staff 
at the ward if things go wrong? 
After a round of explanatory questions, the participants investigated the values and norms relevant in the situation for the staff. What values motivate their actions and concerns? How can these values be translated in concrete norms for action? 
Ƥǡǯhealth appeared to be an important value; the norm related to this was formulated as follows: She should know the risks, so that she can anticipate it, which will improve the chances of recovery. Yet, respect also was regarded an important value; the corresponding norm was: we should not provide information if she does not want it. As the moral deliberation went along, two other 
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values were brought to the fore as relevant for the staff. One was responsibility. The corresponding norm was: She should only receive this intensive treatment if she is prepared to play the role of a responsible patient, who co-operates actively 
ǤƤtake action. The fourth value was: living with vulnerability. The norm belonging to this value was: She should learn to live with her anxieties and take control over her 
Ǥƪǡconclusion. They came to realize that active involvement of the patient in the therapy was crucial for them, given the intensity of the treatment. They therefore decided to tell Marina that she would not be eligible for treatment if she refused to hear about the side-effects. They acknowledged that this would be hard for her. They agreed to explain carefully to Marina why they had come to this decision, and to promise her to be considerate in telling her about the side-effects. In this moral case deliberation, narrative and hermeneutic ethics helped to provide conceptual tools for thorough 
ƤǤǯǡǡinvolved, both care providers and patients. Using this theory, the facilitator invited the group to consider the values and norms of all parties in the case. When the value ‘patient responsibility’ was mentioned as important for the staff, the facilitator asked what exactly were the staff’s expectations of Marina and how their understanding of responsibility could be brought to action. Another example: hermeneutic ethics involves the Aristotelian notion of virtue as the right middle. This clearly helped to investigate what it means to be able to live with one’s illness, as a middle way between being over-anxious on the one hand, and being extremely self-assured on the other hand. Narrative and hermeneutical theory can help to facilitate participants in their 
ƪin concrete narratives and to discuss the values that play a role in these stories. Yet ethicists should bring in theoretical knowledge carefully. They should not 
Ƥthe practitioners, but investigate with them in what sense these concepts can be helpful. We will illustrate this by going back to Marina’s case deliberation again. At the very beginning of the deliberation, the dilemma – as formulated by the participants – clearly seemed in line with principlism: it can be rephrased in terms 
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ǮƤǯǮǯǤǡǡbut invited the participants to articulate what they deemed important in these two values. So the two principles were a starting point for further deliberation, a trigger to elaborate the concrete context at stake. In moral case deliberation, this 
Ƥor autonomy, but by asking further questions related to the experiences at hand, motivated by theory. For instance: In what sense is Marina’s health important for you? Why do you want to promote it? Why are the wishes of Marina important? What 
Ƥǫǡelucidate experience. Thus, experiences are not reduced to theory, but theory helps to understand experience. Based on our narrative and hermeneutic background, 
ǤƤwhen certain principles are mentioned, but to clarify what is really important for them. In the case of Marina, it turned out that various non-principlist values were relevant: responsibility and vulnerability. These values can be related to the theoretical framework of ethics of care. Again, however, the facilitator will use such theoretical knowledge not to draw conclusions, but to raise questions. What do the participants mean when they say that the patient should be responsible? What does dealing with vulnerability entail? The theoretical background of the facilitator helps to raise questions which stimulate the participants to investigate further what they strive for and deem important in their practice. In the case, responsibility appeared to be more important than dealing with vulnerability. This conclusion does not follow from care ethics theory, it was drawn by the participants, stimulated by the 
ƪwith Marina in particular. 
Developing theory through practical experience. 
In our practical experiences in clinical support services throughout the years, some 
Ƥconcepts to classify or interpret these incidents, or to directly help practitioners fostering a successful moral deliberation. One might be tempted to think about that 
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as a backlash, a sign of insecurity, or even a lack of competence, but we rather tend to perceive such situations as a positive chance of learning from practical experience. This is especially true when the new experience is accompanied by a novel solution that was developed within practice itself. So, practical experiences can help in theory making, both in the development of basic foundational theories and applicable theoretical concepts. We now present a practical situation, which involved new ways of working in clinical ethics and thus stimulated a process of theory-making triggered by our practical experience. In this example the process of theory-making relates to art and metaphors. The example is situated in a closed ward in a Dutch mental health care institution. One of us was present in this setting as an ethicist to enable moral 
ƪǤto guarantee safety if one of the service users behaves in dangerous ways. But the service users reported traumas as a result of forced seclusion and also the care workers wished to minimize the frequency of seclusions. Yet the care workers carried on with their working routines. The goal of the ethicist was to stimulate 
ƤǤwas not easy to achieve, as the moral dilemmas were obvious. The use of forced seclusions was considered necessary to keep things safe in the ward. This was clearly 
Ƥǡany change in working routines and moral distress. The care workers often talked about football with each other and with the service users. They showed great interest in football strategies. The ethicist started to join these talks more attentively. She started asking questions about the football strategies they favoured: ‘What do you prefer; a defensive or an offensive style of playing?’ In a next step, the ethicist invited the care workers to compare their working routines with their preferred football strategies. It turned out, that they preferred offensive and collaborative strategies in football, but that their own practice was actually quite defensive. This put their practice in a new light, and stimulated them to change. The creative football metaphor 
ƪǤThe football metaphor stimulated the care workers to overcome rigid views and to enter in new moral negotiations about the meaning of ‘safety’ on their ward. This sounds trivial, but this innovative way of looking at the routines brought new 
Theory and practice of clinical ethics support services
109
discussions. Practitioners were invited to look at their daily routines as visitors to a gallery are stimulated to look at an artwork. The football metaphor served as a vehicle of understanding. This practical example clearly showed us that clinical ethical work needs creative tools and artistic concepts to come up with analogies, metaphors, comparisons that break free from daily routines and working methods (steer the dialogue with new perspectives). The experience described above may be used to 
ƪǡand hermeneutic ethics as foundational theories. 
Conclusions 
We have discussed a threefold account of the relationship between theory and practice based on narrative and hermeneutical approaches to clinical ethics. The relationship between theory and practice which we presented takes the form of a ‘hermeneutic circle’.17 In our approach, theory helps to articulate practical experiences and translate them into values and norms. But this process of articulation may also shed new light on aspects of existing theoretical concepts and it can even stimulate theory-making. This entails a circular process, an alternation of theory and practice. Theories can foster moral understandings and assist in developing strategies to deal with dilemmas. But theories only make sense if they can be related to practical experiences. Without this practical link, theories lose their meaning. However, we also saw that theories should be used in a careful way. If the ethicist brings in theory too early, the participants (or practitioners) might be blocked to investigate their moral experiences on their own. If the ethicist brings in incomprehensible theoretical notions, he (or she) might even ruin the whole endeavour of deliberation. Thus the ethicist should check whether the theoretical 
ƤȋȌǤchecking this, the ethicist will also learn something about the theories themselves. 
17 Gadamer, op.cit. note 11, p. 270ff
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Consequently, using theories to interpret experiences makes theoretical concepts clearer. In this paper, we have displayed our own foundational assumptions, based on narrative theory and philosophical hermeneutics. We have indicated our basic attitudes to our daily work by summarizing (i) that we acknowledge our dependencies and responsibilities within the social sphere and (ii) that we believe that all human identities are constructed by means of narratives as (iii) we perceive human beings as story-telling agents. In addition, (iv) we emphasized our focus on fostering mutual understanding, (v) we acknowledge that understanding is mediated by language, words and concepts, and (vi) we opt for taking personal and professional experiences seriously, making them accessible in dialogues, and learn from each other in changing perspectives. Along those lines, we also depicted our understanding of how an ethicist should act. Following a narrative and hermeneutic approach, an ethicist should not 
ǡƪǤ
ǡƤǤcommunicative and empathic skills, and he or she should demonstrate an earnest interest in practitioners’ daily work to stimulate them to take their own moral concerns seriously and to enable them to express their moral understandings in dialogue. Thus our ethicist is a facilitator (the ‘midwife’, as Socrates might say) who helps practitioners to investigate their own moralities critically. Of course, there is more to this role. Being a facilitator also requires knowledge of the clinical setting, the health care system, ethical theories, and moral practice. But again: this knowledge 
ƪǤ	ǡworking as an ethicist along the lines of narrative and hermeneutic perspectives requires openness to the possibility that people in practice may come up with ideas and solutions that you might not have thought about yourself yet. 
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Abstract 
In the closed wards of mental health institutions, moral decisions are made concerning the use of forced seclusion. In this article we focus on how these moral decisions are made and can be improved. We present a case study concerning moral deliberations on the use of seclusion and its prevention among nurses of a closed mental health ward. Moral psychology provides an explanation of how moral judgments are developed through processes of interaction. We will make use of the Social Intuitionist Model of Jonathan Haidt that emphasizes the role of emotions, intuitions and the social context in moral judgments and reasoning. We argue that this model can help to explain social dynamics in the context of enforced seclusion. In the discussion we explore how moral psychology can be complemented with the normative perspective of dialogical ethics to develop strategies for improving psychiatric practices. We conclude that social processes play an important role in moral deliberations and that moral development can be fostered by bringing in new perspectives in the dialogue. Moral case deliberation provides a practical tool to systematically organize moral reflections among nurses on the work floor. 
Keywords: dialogical ethics, empirical ethics, moral case deliberation, moral deliberation, moral psychology, seclusion in psychiatry 
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Introduction 
In psychiatry decisions concerning the use of forced seclusion have moral aspects.1 Legally in the Netherlands forced seclusion in psychiatry is authorized to avert dangerous behaviour due to a mental illness of a service user who is involuntary admitted to a mental health institution. This is regulated by the Psychiatric Hospitals Compulsory Admission Act.2 In mental health institutions, care workers are allowed to use forced seclusions if the person shows dangerous behaviour at the ward. Nurses at the ward are responsible for the daily care on the ward, including safety and wellbeing for service users as well as other care workers and family. Care workers have to estimate what is the best way to handle, in the interest of the service user, other service users and care workers. This is not an easy process, and care workers experience moral stress in deciding and conducting the morally appropriate action3, especially in deciding whether or not seclusion is needed4, Several values and norms are involved and might contradict, such as good care versus safety and autonomy versus beneficence. Developing a critical reflective stance towards one’s moral perspectives and arguments that guide decisions may help to improve the quality of decisions and decision making processes.5 However, such reflection can be 
1 Paterson B and Duxbury J. Restraint and the question of validity. Nurs Ethics 2007; 14(4): 535–45; Leung WC. Why the professional-client ethic is inadequate in mental health care. Nurs Ethics 2002; 9: 51–60; Olsen DP. Influence and coercion: relational and right-based ethical approaches to forced psychiatric treatment. Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing 2003; 10: 705–122 Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport. Psychiatric Hospitals (Compulsory Admission) Act. Status of June 2004. International Publications Series Health, Welfare and Sports, 2004: no. 4; The Hague3 Austin W, Bergum V and Goldberg L. Unable to answer the call of our patients: mental health nurses’ experience of moral distress. Nursing Inquiry 2003; 10: 177–83; Corley MC. Nurse moral distress: a proposed theory and research agenda. Nurs Ethics 2002; 9: 636–504 Liegeois A and Eneman M. Ethics of deliberation, consent and coercion in psychiatry. J Med Ethics 2008; 34: 73–6; Abma TA, Widdershoven GAM, Frederiks BJM, Horen van RH, Wijmen van F and Curfs PLMG. Dialogical nursing ethics: the quality of freedom restrictions. Nurs. Ethics 2008; 15(6): 789–8025 Walker MU. Moral understandings. A feminist study in ethics, second edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007; Pols J. Good care. Enacting a complex ideal in long-term psychiatry [Thesis]. The Netherlands: University of Twente, 2004; Vanlaere L and Gastmans C. Ethics in nursing education: learning to reflect on care practices. Nurs Ethics 2007; 14: 758–66
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hampered by the absence of an ethical climate in which it is common to question and reflect on social habits and work routines.6 Even in situations of doubt the autonomy of the professional is most often respected (if I do not question your work, you won’t discuss mine) and critique not taken seriously.7 Therefore it is not easy to develop a critical and reflective stance towards moral perspectives. In this article we will discuss the process of moral deliberation in a meeting of nurses in a Dutch mental health institution investigating the possibilities for reduction of seclusion at their wards. The nurses worked on two acute closed wards with a high rate of seclusion. One ward was designed for adult service users (N=20), the other ward was meant for adolescents (N=6). Both wards participated in a project intending to reduce seclusion in the mental hospital. The meeting which we will focus on was organized as part of a study aiming to evaluate the project and to contribute to it by fostering participants to share experiences and to identify pitfalls and chances to reduce seclusion. Comparable studies have been conducted in five other institutions which aimed to reduce seclusion during the same period (2006–2008).8 The basis of these projects is the growing awareness that there is no evidence for the therapeutic effectiveness of seclusion. The use of forced seclusion is therefore not a part of good care. Although coercion may sometimes be necessary, it is detrimental to the service user as it produces traumas and distrust.9
6 Pauly B, Varcoe C, Storch J and Newton L. Registered nurses’ perceptions of moral distress and ethical climate. Nurs Ethics 2009; 16(5): 561–73; Doane GAH. Am I still ethical? The socially-mediated process of nurses’ moral identity. Nurs Ethics 2002; 9: 623–357 Mintzberg H. Mintzberg on management. Inside our strange world of organizations.  New York: The Free Press, 19898 Landeweer E, Abma T, Richartz B, Vervoort P and Widdershoven G. Dwangreductie:  naar nieuwe morele kaders en verantwoordelijkheden. MGv 2009; 6(64): 593–6029 Hoekstra T, Lendemeijer HGM and Jansen MGMJ. Seclusion: the inside story. J Psychiatr Ment Health Nurs 2004; 11: 276–83; Lewis M, Taylor K and Parks J. Crisis prevention management: a program to reduce the use of seclusion and restraint in an inpatient mental health setting. Issues Ment Health Nurs 2009; 30: 159–64; Taxis JC. Ethics and praxis: alternative strategies to physical restraint and seclusion in a psychiatric setting. Issues Ment Health Nurs 2002; 23: 157–70.; Carlsson G, Dahlberg K, Ekebergh M and Dahlberg H. Patients longing for authentic personal care: a phenomenological study of violent encounters in psychiatric settings. Issues Ment Health Nurs 2006; 27: 287–305.; Johnson ME and Hauser PM. The practices of expert psychiatric nurses: accompanying the patient to a calmer personal space. Issues Ment Health Nurs 2001; 22: 651–68; Landeweer E, Abma T, Santegoeds J and Widdershoven G. Psychiatry in the age of neuroscience: the impact on clinical practice and lives of clients. Poiesis Prax 2009; 6: 43–55
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In this article we will first describe the method of our study. This method is in line with empirical ethics, combining qualitative research with ethical analysis. Next we will focus on the meeting of the nurses we organized to illustrate how moral judgements concerning forced seclusion changed through dialogue. In order to interpret the process of change, we will use a model from moral psychology; the so-called Social Intuitionist Model (SIM).10 Moral psychology is a sub-discipline of psychology, which explains moral thoughts (intuitions as well as arguments) from a psychological perspective. In the discussion we will put this analysis in a normative perspective, by introducing dialogical ethics.11
Methodology 
The central purpose of this study was to evaluate the project aiming at reducing seclusion in the participating wards of the mental healthcare institution and contribute to its implementation by making explicit the perspectives of parties involved and bringing them into dialogue. At the closed ward designed for adult service users, the nurses often used the seclusion room. In 2007 the average of service users involved in forced seclusion was 10 persons within three months with an average length of 50 days. This meant that almost always one of the two seclusion 
10 Haidt J. The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review 2001; 108(4): 814–34; Haidt J. The emotional dog does learn new tricks. A reply to Pizarro and Bloom. Psychological Review 2003; 110(4): 197–8; Haidt J. The emotional dog gets mistaken for a possum. Review of General Psychology 2004; 8(4): 283–90; Haidt J and Bjorklund F. Social intuitionists answer six questions about moral psychology. In: Sinnott-Armstrong W (ed.). Moral psychology. Volume 2: the cognitive science of morality: intuition and diversity. London: MIT Press, 200811 Widdershoven G, Abma T and Molewijk B. Empirical ethics as dialogical practice. Bioethics 2009; 23(4): 236–48; Abma TA and Widdershoven GAM. Sharing stories: narrative and dialogue in responsive nursing evaluation. Evaluation and the Health Professions 2005; 28(1): 90–109; Abma TA, Molewijk B and Widdershoven GAM. Good care in ongoing dialogues. responsive evaluation and moral deliberation. Health Care Analysis 2009; 17(3): 217–35;Widdershoven GAM and Abma TA. Hermeneutic ethics between practice and theory. In: Ashcroft RE, Dawson A, Draper H and McMillan JR (eds). Principles of health care ethics. Chichester: Wiley, 2007, p.215–22
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rooms was occupied. The project had the aim to reduce the amount (including the duration) of forced seclusion by 40%. The project team invited the practitioners to develop strategies to prevent and reduce the use of seclusions. Meetings within the institution on this topic were organized, practitioners received training on techniques to prevent aggression, and a new registration system was implemented to determine the amount of seclusions more precisely. The study followed a responsive approach.12 This means that the design was not preordained, but developed during the process, responding to the findings and fostering conversations with as many stakeholders as possible. The purpose was to enhance the personal and mutual understanding among the stakeholders by bringing their issues into dialogue. Being responsive to the participants, this methodology aims to articulate different issues experienced by different stakeholders and to organize a dialogical process with participants to exchange perspectives and develop mutually shared perspectives. The researcher participates in dialogues as a facilitator. The first step in the data collection was to identify the issues of the stakeholders. We conducted open individual in-depth interviews with nurses (N=7), ambulatory care workers (N=1), psychiatrists (N=4), a service user representative (N=1), a family representative (N=1) and managers (N=5). A selective set of topics guided the interviews, including expectations and experiences to reduce seclusion and barriers and pitfalls. The next step was to organize homogeneous (converging interests) focus groups in which the issues from the interviews were further discussed. We conducted two focus groups with nurses (N=12; N=9). Then a heterogeneous (diverging interests) dialogue was organized between the various participants (nurses, psychiatrists and management) to exchange different perspectives (N=8). The three phases were connected in a cyclic way; data from the interviews were used as input for focus groups to further explore issues and their relation, and the issues from the focus groups formed the input for the mixed dialogue group. 
12 Abma TA and Widdershoven GAM. Sharing stories: narrative and dialogue in responsive nursing evaluation. Evaluation and the Health Professions 2005; 28(1): 90–109; Guba EG and Lincoln YS. Fourth generation evaluation. Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE, 1989; Greene JC and Abma TA. Editors’ notes. In: Greene J and Abma TA (eds). Responsive evaluation. New Directions for Evaluation 2001; 92: 1–6
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All the inter views and focus groups were audio taped and ent irely transcribed. We checked the first analysis with the respondents in so-called ‘member checks’13 by providing them with a resume of the transcriptions and asking them if they recognized our description and interpretation. Analyses of the interviews were also regularly discussed within the evaluation team to prevent bias. The second author functioned as a peer debriefer during the study; she critically followed the emerging design and asked for justification of methodological decisions such as whether saturation was reached, and whether or not negative cases were taken into account. As the issues and themes raised in the interviews and focus groups were discussed over and over among all participants (hermeneutic dialectic process) a one-sided picture of the process could be prevented.14 The study is an example of empirical ethics as it aims to identify ethical aspects of psychiatric practice and to help improve practice. It is empirical, in that it gathers data on experiences and views of practitioners. It is ethical, in that these experiences and views are used to develop a normative perspective, not external to the practice, but in interaction with practice. Empirical ethics combines qualitative research with ethical analysis and reflection.15 It implies a close intertwining of empirical work and ethical analysis.16 Empirical ethics tries to bring practice closer in line with ethical ideals, such as reducing the amount of forced seclusions.17 McMillan and Hope describe the empirical ethical research process as a cyclical model in which ethical analysis and 
13 Guba EG and Lincoln YS. Fourth generation evaluation. Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE, 198914 Ibid 15 Musschenga AW. Empirical ethics, context-sensitivity, and contextualism. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 2005; 30: 467–9016 McMillan J and Hope T. The possibility of empirical psychiatric ethics. In: Widdershoven G, Mcmillan J, Hope T and Van der Scheer L (eds). Empirical ethics in psychiatry. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008, p. 9–2317 Kon AA. The role of empirical research in bioethics. The American Journal of Bioethics 2009; 9 (6–7): 59–65; Widdershoven G, Molewijk B and Abma T. Improving care and ethics: a plea for interactive empirical ethics. The American Journal of Bioethics 2009;  9 (6–7): 99–101
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qualitative data are entwined.18 We followed this cyclical approach in our study. We started with empirical research, and later interpreted the issues emerging from this with the help of theories. These theories were not chosen in advance of the study as the empirical issues were not known prior to the study. As our empirical work proceeded several empirical issues came up in the conversations with the stakeholders. One issue was that participants experienced a closed culture at their wards, in which there was no room to experiment with alternatives for seclusion. In order to understand this experience better, we turned to a theory in moral psychology, namely the SIM model of Jonathan Haidt.19 This model explains that moral judgments are influenced by social and cultural processes. With this theory in mind, we expanded the collection of data and analysed them. Based on the theoretical notions of the SIM model, we aimed to stimulate further deliberation on the close culture by inviting outside nurses to participate in a group discussion with nurses of the wards, expecting that this would challenge the nurses to reflect on their motives for the use of seclusion. Since the SIM model helped us to explain the situation and to stimulate deliberation in practice, a further question came up: how to determine whether the changes in moral views of the nurses were actually an example of moral development, improving the moral quality of the decisions concerning seclusion at the wards? In order to answer this question, we turned to dialogical ethics20, in order to complement the SIM model with a normative perspective. Again the use of this particular theoretical framework was engendered by the data, but also steered 
18 McMillan J and Hope T. The possibility of empirical psychiatric ethics. In: Widdershoven G, Mcmillan J, Hope T and Van der Scheer L (eds). Empirical ethics in psychiatry. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008, p. 9–2319 Haidt J. The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review 2001; 108(4): 814–34; Haidt J. The emotional dog does learn new tricks. A reply to Pizarro and Bloom. Psychological Review 2003; 110(4): 197–8; Haidt J. The emotional dog gets mistaken for a possum. Review of General Psychology 2004; 8(4): 283–90; Haidt J and Bjorklund F. Social intuitionists answer six questions about moral psychology. In: Sinnott-Armstrong W (ed.). Moral psychology. Volume 2: the cognitive science of morality: intuition and diversity. London: MIT Press, 200820 Abma TA, Widdershoven GAM, Frederiks BJM, Horen van RH, Wijmen van F and Curfs PLMG. Dialogical nursing ethics: the quality of freedom restrictions. Nurs. Ethics 2008; 15(6): 789–802
Moral margins concerning the use of coercion in psychiatry
121
the process of data collection and analysis. Thus, empirical research and theoretical analysis were combined in a cyclical way, as described by McMillan and Hope (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Cyclical model of empirical medical ethics.21 
Case study 
The closed culture issue 
When the mental health institution started in 2007 with the project to reduce forced seclusion, the members of the project group indicated the project might be difficult to implement, because wards had their own ways of working and might not be open to changes. Safety was considered the most important value at the wards and care workers experienced seclusions as necessary to be able to guarantee safety. A project team member said: ‘In our organization safety is most important. Compared to other institutions we tend to take less risks and choose for securing the situation more often’. Furthermore, the different wards had been autonomous for a long time and developed their own working habits and routines. They were not used to comparing their way of working and reflecting on their routines. Another project team member mentioned: ‘They are not familiar with exchanging experiences with 
21 McMillan J and Hope T. The possibility of empirical psychiatric ethics. In: Widdershoven G, Mcmillan J, Hope T and Van der Scheer L (eds). Empirical ethics in psychiatry.  Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008, p. 9–23
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other wards. Care workers know each other, but do not use each other in exchanging good practices’. In the interviews, the respondents indeed showed reluctance toward the aims of the project. Care workers emphasized they never used the seclusion room unless it was absolutely necessary to assure safety. A senior nurse explained: 
“Nurses expect their safety is guaranteed. That is most important in our work. We 
don’t want to get assaulted when we are trying to do our job. So we have to accept 
that sometimes the use of seclusion is the only way to keep things safe at our ward. 
This is not because we enjoy using force on patients. It is because we have no choice.”
They did not see any alternatives to prevent seclusion. Besides, they were worried they would be criticized and held responsible if things went wrong. Every change in working habits was regarded as jeopardizing the safety at the wards. It seemed that the specific wards handled the use of seclusion in ways they had become used to and felt safe with, but did not explicitly reflect on it. For example, the following quotation of a nurse did not give rise to any further discussion in the focus group: 
“If a patient has been really aggressive and violent, the nurses need their time to feel 
comfortable letting the patient out of the seclusion room into the ward again even if 
the patient is already cooled down. If you do not consider that, nurses will report sick 
next time.” We refer to the reluctance of care workers to the project plans as the closed culture 
issue. We consider it an aspect of culture, since implicit working habits and values are involved. Safety was experienced as the highest value, but what it meant in concrete situations was not made explicit in terms of good care. Moreover, talking about reducing seclusion gave rise to a defensive attitude in which care workers emphasized they really used seclusion only if necessary. We refer to this defensive attitude as closed, since care workers were sceptical towards new (external) ideas about how to prevent seclusion and foster good care (lack of openness). The nurses in the focus group recognized this as a characteristic of their institution. Consider the next quote from another nurse: 
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“At our ward the daily structure is almost considered as holy. For example the therapy 
Ǣ
ward is. They are sacred. I would prefer if we consider what is needed for individual 
clients at the beginning of the day. But to change this structure we need approval of 
all the people involved.” In order to stimulate reflection on the closed culture issue we decided to organize a focus group with the nurses of the two acute closed wards (10 participants) and two nurses working on similar wards of other mental health institutions. The expectation was that the two outsider nurses would bring in other perspectives. As they were peers who knew about the complexities at closed wards and empathic persons, it was expected they would not be experienced as threatening (at least less threatening then ethicists asking critical questions). In the focus group we invited nurses to present a case in which they used forced seclusion. A case was introduced of a service user with whom the nurses of the closed ward had been closely involved. The service user was a woman called Janice (pseudonym), diagnosed with a borderline personality disorder. 
No alternatives?Two weeks before the focus group meeting Janice had arrived at the ward. She had been transferred from another ward, because things got out of hand in a relational struggle with the professionals of that ward. It was expected Janice would benefit from new surroundings and new relationships with other nurses. In the first week Janice did well. She agreed with the nurses to warn them if she would begin to feel stress. The nurses would then offer various alternatives to reduce her stress, like a conversation with a professional, going for a walk, or taking a bath. During the last days, however, Janice had stopped alerting the nurses when her stress rose. Consequently, several escalations had occurred. She had been kicking against doors and throwing chairs through the living room. Janice was not willing to think or talk about how to reduce her stress. Eventually Janice was forcefully brought to the seclusion room. This was experienced as very intense. One nurse shared his experiences during the focus group meeting: 
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“I cannot think of any other option looking at the outburst that happened. Janice 
ǡǢǯ
she wanted. We ended up in an impasse in which she was physically aggressive and 
eventually this led to seclusion. So now she is staying involuntary in the seclusion 
room. What should we do now? She does not want to stay secluded, but we don’t want 
it to escalate again. She has been in and out of the seclusion room for almost three 
days now. What can we do otherwise than to use the seclusion room?”
Other nurses confirmed this story. One of them said: ‘Janice did not want to do anything. She would wait until only two nurses were present at the ward and then she would explode. She would bite nurses and pull their hair.’ The nurses concluded they had to intervene to preserve safety. They did not question their decision. Questions they were struggling with at the moment of the focus group meeting concerned the future. On the one hand they wanted Janice to leave the seclusion room, but on the other hand they did not know how to prevent future episodes of outbursts of aggression. When asked by the outsider nurses, the nurses of the ward explained they were not comfortable with the option of forcing Janice to leave the ward, because they were not sure she would stop her aggressive behaviour outside. One of the nurses explained: ‘What if she damages the cars on the parking lot? We need to have some control in case safety is threatened.’ 
Playing on safe 
The idea behind transferring Janice to this ward was that new surroundings might trigger her to show positive behaviour. Despite these intentions the staff got involved in a struggle with her. In case of danger, they felt obliged to take over responsibilities and take care of preventing harm. One nurse refers to his encounter with Janice in the kitchen: 
“She stood in the kitchen, reached for a knife and told me ‘I am going to hurt myself’. 
I really did not know what to do, so I stayed in the kitchen to guard her. I would feel 
responsible if she hurt herself.”
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The nurses discussed whether there were possibilities to enable Janice to take responsibility for her behaviour. The outsider nurses stimulated the nurses of the ward to investigate the perspective of Janice. One reason they could think of why Janice was acting out so much was that she recently lost a lot of things that were important to her, because her relationship had ended and she had to leave her apartment. The nurses felt empathic towards her, but still did not regard different approaches as an option: ‘In the end the woman wants the fight and she does everything to get it. That is out of our control, but we are responsible.’ 
An outsider’s perspective
Although the outsider nurses recognized and acknowledged the difficult struggles that could develop in these kinds of situations, they explained that their wards had chosen to use another strategy to prevent such impasses. In their hospitals it was allowed to consider the option not to take over responsibilities for the service user if it did not appear beneficial for the service user in the long run. One of the external nurses explained that in her hospital the policy was not to use seclusion in case of borderline personality disorders, and to let them free to leave the ward. She explained that by changing the policy, the number of crisis situations had been reduced: 
“In dialogue with all the care workers the hospital decided to change the closed ward 
into an open ward. In the beginning it was really scary, because there was a person 
with a borderline personality disorder who said: ‘I am leaving, and I probably will 
never come back.’ Then I said, ‘I hope you’ll come back, but it is your own choice. I will 
be here and wait for you’. Fortunately, he always came back.” Besides, the outsider nurses referred to the guideline of the Dutch psychiatric association (NVvP) on communication and contact with persons with personality disorders. The guideline advises not to take over responsibilities for problems of the patients and to avoid being manipulated into a defensive position. Without confronting the nurses of the ward directly, the outsider nurses invited them to consider why they were using other approaches than the common professional standards on these kinds of disorders. 
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During the conversation, the nurses of the ward became aware of the dissonances in their approach of Janice. While they would say that Janice should take responsibility for her own behaviour, in practice they would take over responsibilities in case of danger. They began to see that they might try to convince Janice to be responsible also in case of dangerous behaviour. They questioned the policy of their institution, given that other institutions had other policies concerning borderline personality disorders. The culture of their institution was to control the danger and keep it inside. This led to the conclusion that they could not solve the impasse with Janice given the limited degree of risks they were allowed to take. 
Changing perspectives
In this case story we notice several interesting processes. In the beginning of the focus group the nurses of the ward did recognize the impasse, but did not question their decision in using seclusion. They were convinced they had chosen the right strategy, because they should guarantee safety. This was not discussed, but experienced as consensus. As the dialogue in the focus group evolved and the nurses of the other hospitals contributed to the discussion and told about their experiences, the nurses of the ward started to consider other perspectives. They came to the conclusion that the policy of their hospital to consider safety as the highest value gave rise to impasses, and was in conflict with general professional guidelines. They came to realize that the moral margins of their institution had an impact on their flexibility to foster good care based on the needs of the service user. The new view, which was developed during the focus group, really meant a change of values, in that the nurses were prepared no longer to put safety first in a rigid sense. They had learned that taking no risks does not always do justice to the service user as a person. One of the nurses commented: 
“I don’t think that structure at the ward is a bad thing, but we are not flexible enough 
to change it even when we know that it would benefit the service users. We lack 
creativity and this means that in the end a service user does not receive the care he 
needs.” 
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Analysis from the perspective of moral psychology 
In this section we will analyse the changes in moral views described in the case study from the perspective of moral psychology, using the Social Intuitionist Model. 
The Social Intuitionist Model
According to Jonathan Haidt and others, moral judgments are not the direct result of rational moral reasoning.22 On the contrary, Haidt emphasizes the role of moral emotions and intuitions in the development of moral judgments. Making moral judgments appears not an a priori rational process in which participants balance pro and cons of the options. Rather, moral judgments are based on direct moral intuitions that appear automatically in an emerging situation. They are made quickly and without effort, coming from gut feelings and moral emotions. Only afterwards, people use moral reasoning to account for and support moral judgments to others. Interesting for our case study are the social aspects in moral processes that Haidt reckons. He claims that because people are highly attuned to existing group norms, other people’s moral judgments and moral reasoning have a direct influence on one’s decisions. Social forces seem not only to influence outward compliance with social conventions, but also influence people’s direct and private judgments.23 Haidt used these insights to develop a model for moral psychology that replaces the more commonly known rationalist model of morality which claims that moral reasoning produces moral judgments.24 This alternative model is called the Social Intuitionist Model (SIM) as it emphasizes the causal role of intuitions in combination with the recognition of the inf luence of the social context. SIM 
22 Haidt J. The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review 2001; 108(4): 814–34.; Haidt J and Bjorklund F. Social intuitionists answer six questions about moral psychology. In: Sinnott-Armstrong W (ed.). Moral psychology. Volume 2: the cognitive science of morality: intuition and diversity. London: MIT Press, 200823 Davis JD and Rusbult CE. Attitude alignment in close relationships. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 2001; 81(1): 65–8424 Kohlberg L. The psychology of moral development. The nature and validity of moral stages. San Francisco, CA: Harper & Row, 1984
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distinguishes four primary links and two secondary links in the psychological processes of morality that connect moral intuitions with moral judgments and moral reasoning (Figure 2). The first link is the intuitive judgment link (1). Moral judgments are made automatically, based on moral intuitions, like gut feelings and direct emotions, which automatically produces a moral judgment. The second link is the post hoc reasoning link (2). Moral reasoning appears not without effort, and follows after the moral judgment is made. Reasons are used to support and account for the moral judgments based on the intuitions. Links 3 and 4 are the steps people make to inf luence each other. The reasoned persuasion link (3) is the link that describes how people deliberately reason with each other to justify moral judgments to others and to persuade them to embrace their position. For example in the focus group, the case of Janice is at first brought in to illustrate that sometimes no other options are available than to use the seclusion room. The main argument of the nurses is that they have to guard safety at the ward. This argument induces agreement among the nurses, which in itself comes about more or less spontaneously.
Figure 2. The Social Intuitionist Model of moral judgement.25 
25 Haidt J. The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review 2001; 108(4): 814–34
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The fourth link is the social persuasion link (4). According to Haidt we also influence each other’s moral judgments by expressing our own moral judgments. People are social beings and are willing to adapt their moral orientations to match with each other. They aim at harmony and agreement between peers, which could have biasing effects on the mutually shared judgments: 
“Because people are highly attuned to the emergence of group norms, the model 
proposes that the mere fact that friends, allies, and acquaintances have made a moral 
judgment exerts a direct influence on others, even if no reasoned persuasion is used. 
Such social forces may elicit only outward conformity, but in many cases people’s 
privately held judgments are directly shaped by the judgments of others.”26 
The fifth and sixth links are rarer, because people do not often develop a critical stance toward their own judgments out of their own, but as it can happen, Haidt adds the links to the model called the reasoned judgment link (5) and the private reflection link (6). 
Moral judgments about seclusion are embedded in social processes 
In the case story we saw that the nurses of the closed ward experienced consensus about the need to use seclusion, but had no convincing post hoc reasoning to justify their judgments. Nor did the nurses feel a need to persuade each other rationally. They relied on their intuitions and what Haidt calls the social persuasion link. Only as participants in the focus group and invited by outsiders they started to account for their judgments ex post by moral reasoning. They explained that they already had tried many ways to prevent seclusion, but in the end could not avoid it. Their moral reasoning supported their moral judgments. Although they experienced moral stress and ambiguity using seclusion, their main moral intuition was that they really had no other option than to use seclusion. 
26 Ibid
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During the focus group the moral judgments of the nurses of the closed ward changed. Using the SIM framework we can explain the changes in judgments as their peer group was (deliberately) expanded with two external colleagues who confronted them with other moral judgments on how to deal with service users who express borderline personality disorders. The nurses explained that taking more risks was not possible within the policy of their institution. In a negative interpretation based on SIM one might regard referring to the institution’s policy as a confabulation. Asked to account for their judgments, the nurses gave post hoc reasons for their judgments like lawyers defending a client.27 From that perspective, the nurses just sheltered themselves behind the policy of the institution, without seriously searching for better ways to avoid the impasse. Yet, this interpretation does not do justice to the fact that the nurses did become more open to alternative options, and felt these to be better. In a more positive interpretation, which is still in line with SIM, one can conclude that the nurses developed a more critical stance towards their first moral judgments. They incorporated new argumentations in their moral judgments (link 3) and no longer took the policy of the institution for granted. This positive interpretation does more justice to the transitions in moral reasoning in the focus group. It also fits in with Haidt’s claim that moral reasoning can be effective in influencing people’s intuitions in case people are open towards each other and trust each other on their main aims: ‘If one can get the other person to see the issue in a new way, perhaps by reframing a problem to trigger new intuitions, then one can influence others with one’s words.’28 In that case people seriously look together for new and better views and practices. As the nurses in the focus group were a homogenous group we suppose the outsider nurses were not experienced as a threat, but trusted to jointly develop better solutions. Moreover, the nurses had brought in the case themselves, as they already felt uncomfortable with using seclusion in the case and expressed they wanted to find new solutions to promote good care, which indicates openness and willingness to reflect jointly on the impasse. 
27 Ibid28 Ibid 814–34
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Discussion and practical implications 
During the focus group, the nurses from the ward gradually changed their moral views on seclusion. Stimulated by the external nurses, they realized that playing on safety can lead to an escalation with service users like Janice. Consequently, they questioned the policy of their institution, and no longer believed that taking over responsibility from service users is the best way to provide good care. We can further explain this change and interpret it in a normative way by making use of dialogical ethics. Viewpoints are not rigid, but can change in dialogue as people are confronted with other perspectives and thus invited to reflect on and expand their views. Dialogical ethics supplements Haidts’ model in that it claims that people can morally learn from each other in dialogue.29 Perspectives of participants are bound by their specific view of a situation. In dialogue, a confrontation between perspectives can lead to the awareness that one’s view is not necessarily right. Such a conclusion has aspects of a breakdown, which will be frustrating, but also can be the starting point for learning. Confronted with diverging views, the participants can start looking for ways to merge their perspectives. Together people can develop a new position, which will be mutually shared.30 To bring perspectives in a dialogue implies that existing views are tested and that new views are developed, which go beyond the perspectives, which were present at the start. Dialogical ethics not only stresses the importance of the two social arrows of the SIM model drawn by Haidt: the one going from A’s judgement to B’s intuition (link 3), and the one going from A’s reasoning to B’s intuition (link 4) and vice versa. It also sheds new light on the SIM model by supplementing the model with a normative perspective; through dialogue people are able to learn and improve their moral views. By giving judgments and 
29 Abma TA, Widdershoven GAM, Frederiks BJM, Horen van RH, Wijmen van F and Curfs PLMG. Dialogical nursing ethics: the quality of freedom restrictions. Nurs. Ethics 2008; 15(6): 789–802; Widdershoven GAM and Abma TA. Hermeneutic ethics between practice and theory. In: Ashcroft RE, Dawson A, Draper H and McMillan JR (eds). Principles of health care ethics. Chichester: Wiley, 2007, p.215–2230 Widdershoven G and Van der Scheer L. Theory and methodology of empirical ethics: a pragmatic hermeneutic perspective. In: Widdershoven G, McMillan J, Hope T and Van der Scheer L (eds). Empirical ethics in psychiatry. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 23–37
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explaining them through reasoning, A may induce changes in B’s moral views that fit in a better way to the situation. This is what happened when the outsider nurses gave comments on the case, inducing the ward nurses to reconsider their values. In the focus group the conditions for dialogue were met. Participants were open, prepared to enter the dialogue on the issue they experienced. Eventually the interaction resulted in a breakdown of perspectives and participants adapted their moral judgments. Instead of focusing on controlling the dangerous behaviour, the main subject changed into handling borderline disorders. In the end the nurses came to realize that their approach did not contribute to the best care for Janice. They no longer considered the use of seclusion in Janice’s case as the right thing to do. In the focus group the nurses came to realize that in their moral judgments, they had been inf luenced by the closed culture of the institution. Awareness of this influence does not automatically result in changes. Nurses might not be empowered to put changes into practice; they will not directly change their working habits because of the focus group. On the other hand, the moral convictions they shared before the focus group did change. Seclusion could no longer be justified by referring to violent behaviour of the service user, since the nurses adopted a broader perspective on good care and adequate division of responsibilities. Awareness of broader perspectives and being open to new ideas is a starting point for practice improvement; the developments in the focus group can be seen as a first step in changing existing convictions and considering new values. In order to implement these moral understandings of seclusion in practice, the dialogue should be extended to all the stakeholders in the institution. Dialogues on good care like the one in the focus group meeting can be stimulated by organizing moral case deliberations. Moral case deliberation is grounded in dialogical ethics and builds on the social components of making moral judgements.31 Collaborative reflection through dialogue on the work floor then becomes a systematic tool to enhance and enrich moral understandings. 
31 Abma TA, Molewijk B and Widdershoven GAM. Good care in ongoing dialogues. responsive evaluation and moral deliberation. Health Care Analysis 2009; 17(3): 217–35; Abma TA and Widdershoven GAM. Moral deliberation in clinical psychiatric nursing practice. Nursing Ethics 2006; 13(5): 546–57
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Ian Stronach rightly states that professionals are under pressure of institutional rules, discourses and societal trends,32 like the priority given today to the public order and safety. We saw that in the case study and explained this psychologically with the help of the SIM model. This does not mean that we deny the role of broader sociological processes in our western societies. On the contrary, this study was from the very beginning intended to be critical towards such developments and their consequences for service users as well as care givers. As such it was normatively driven by the wish to reduce and prevent seclusion, and to enhance the goodness of care in psychiatry. Yet, instead of choosing for a critique from outside which might not be accepted and ignored, we deliberately chose to organize critique and dialogue in the psychiatric institutions and wards.33 This may be a slow process of cultural change, it does in fact lead to improvements. Not just in the ward described, but as seclusion reduction has become a national policy issue also more in general. The amount and duration of seclusions has dramatically decreased over the last few years in the Netherlands.34 
Conclusions 
The case story shows that social interactions have a major influence on nurses’ moral stance concerning seclusion. Moral reasoning and expressing moral judgments are part of a social process. Haidt considers moral truths as anthropocentric truths,35 
32 Stronach I. Shouting theatre in a crowded fire: ‘educational effectiveness’ as a cultural performance. Evaluation 1999; 5(2): 173–93; Stonach I, Corbin B, McNamara O, Stark S and Warne T. Towards an uncertain politics of professionalism: teacher and nurse identities in flux. J Education Policy 2002; 17(1): 109–3833 Abma TA, Baur VE, Molewijk B and Widdershoven GAM. Inter-ethics: towards an interactive and interdependent bioethics. Bioethics 2010; 25(5): 242–5534 Noorthoorn E, Janssen W, Smit A, Mann P, Van der Sande R, Nijman H, Widdershoven G, Landeweer E, Voskes Y, Abma T, Mulder N. Drie jaar Argus. Rapportage over toegepaste vrijheidsbeperkende maatregelen in 2007–2009 [Three years Argus. Report on used coercive measures during 2007–2009]. GGZ Nederland/ Kenniscentrum GGnet 201035 Haidt J and Bjorklund F. Social intuitionists answer six questions about moral psychology. In: Sinnott-Armstrong W (ed.). Moral psychology. Volume 2: the cognitive science of morality: intuition and diversity. London: MIT Press, 2008
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meaning that morality and moral justifications are made in practice and validated in practice. Haidt considers moral thinking as a complex, extended and iterative process that happens when people talk about moral issues.36 When people look at the situation from a new light, new intuitions are triggered.37 This is what happened in the focus group with the nurses of the closed ward. The nurses learned to see alternatives to prevent seclusion and foster good care. They began to realize that the moral margins of the institution were limiting their options. Haidt is not explicit in how social interaction can foster moral deliberation. He stresses that people can use confabulation, tending to defend their judgments as lawyers when asked to justify their behaviour. He also explains that intuitions can easily be manipulated, which proves that people can be misled. Finally, he admits that the question as to whether people can improve their moral deliberations remains unresolved.38 Intuitively we consider the new perspective developed in the case story as qualitatively better than the views the nurses shared before the focus group started, but Haidt does not help us to draw such a normative conclusion. Dialogical ethics may provide insights as to how people go through learning processes into richer and more balanced judgements. Thus, it may complement the SIM model, both in a descriptive and in a normative way.39 From a dialogical approach, social interaction can result in moral development, through a process of fusion of horizons. Through confrontation with other perspectives, participants can learn to see their situation in a new way. Dialogical ethics explains how people develop new and broader perspectives. By interpreting social processes in terms of moral learning, dialogical ethics combines a descriptive 
36 Haidt J. The emotional dog gets mistaken for a possum. Review of General Psychology 2004; 8(4): 283–9037 Haidt J. The emotional dog does learn new tricks. A reply to Pizarro and Bloom. Psychological Review 2003; 110(4): 197–838 Haidt J and Bjorklund F. Social intuitionists answer six questions about moral psychology. In: Sinnott-Armstrong W (ed.). Moral psychology. Volume 2: the cognitive science of morality: intuition and diversity. London: MIT Press, 200839 Widdershoven G, Abma T and Molewijk B. Empirical ethics as dialogical practice. Bioethics 2009; 23(4): 236–48; Widdershoven GAM and Abma TA. Hermeneutic ethics between practice and theory. In: Ashcroft RE, Dawson A, Draper H and McMillan JR (eds). Principles of health care ethics. Chichester: Wiley, 2007, p.215–22
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and a normative view on interaction. Dialogical ethics also provides support in changing practice. Moral case deliberation, which is based upon dialogical ethics, is a practical tool to systematically organize moral reflections on the work floor.40 For nursing this could be a way to reflect on how their practice contributes to good care. This requires openness and trust. The case story illustrated that nurses show such attitudes, even (or perhaps especially) if the circumstances are highly tensed and complicated. Such moral deliberations may help to relieve and channel the moral distress nurses encounter in closed psychiatric wards. 
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Introduction
In the Netherlands since 2000, the use of coercion in psychiatry has become contested. Public debates as well as scientific research1 illustrates that coercion often does not contribute to the beneficence and care of the patient. It may cause damages and diminish possibilities for recovery.2 Differences in use, frequencies and duration of coercion between mental health wards and hospitals have become an issue of public attention. Studies showed that in other countries, less coercion is used.3 Combined with media exposure after the death of a patient in an isolation cell, this has led to public concerns and political debates about the quality of care and safety of psychiatric patients.
In response to these concerns, in 2006 a national program was started to reduce coercion in psychiatry. Over the past years, many projects have been developed in mental healthcare institutions. These projects are characterised by a multi-stakeholder and bottom up approach. From the work floor, practitioners together with (ex) patients, family and other representatives, aimed to develop new insights and plans to reduce the use of coercion. The projects got a lot of attention, and participants put great effort in trying to realize the reduction of coercion. Yet, it was not easy to change working routines and structures on wards. Wards and mental health hospitals showed different success rates. Specific characteristics of wards and hospitals influenced the way in which the projects became embedded in practice. 
In a final conference of the national program in 2012, the projects aimed at reducing coercion4 were presented and evaluated. One of the main findings was that the 
1 T. Hoekstra, HGM. Lendemeijer, MGMJ Janssen (2004) Seclusion: The inside story. Journal 
of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing 11: 276-832 JC Taxis (2002) Ethics and praxis: Alternative strategies to physical restraint and seclusion in a psychiatric setting. Issues in Mental Health Nursing 23: 157-70 3 W.A. Janssen (2012) Argus: Assessment and Use of data in evaluating coercive measures in 
Dutch psychiatry. Thesis. VU University. Amsterdam 4 http://www.ggz-connect.nl/bericht/291/congres-6-jaar-terugdringen-dwang-en-drang, viewed on 21th January 2013
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projects had been reasonably successful. In the last five years that were measured, the total amount of seclusions was reduced with 3,4 per cent per year, while the duration of the use of seclusions was reduced with 10,2 per cent.5 However, although the amount of seclusions in general was reduced, the process of developing and implementing new interventions and working routines appeared to be different between wards and institutions. Given these differences, it was concluded that coercion reduction requires more than just a technical application of new protocols and instruments. Coercion is a moral issue; it touches on the normative professionalism of caregivers and requires a cultural change and reflection on underlying values and norms.
This thesis focuses on these moral dimensions of coercion, and aims to develop insights in the moral dynamics in the practice of coercion in psychiatry. There are several reasons why we look at moral aspects of these practices for understanding and stimulating processes of cultural change. Firstly, practices of coercion in psychiatry are characterized by moral challenges (dilemmas), and thus are morally laden. All decisions that are made about the use of coercion on patients are driven by values and norms. Practitioners have conflicting ideas, feelings and insecurities regarding the question: Is coercion the right thing to do within certain circumstances? Secondly, teams and organisations have their own specific cultural contexts that are embodied and expressed in shared values and norms. These cultures influences the willingness to change, the experienced options for change, and consequently whether and how new interventions or changes in cultures are accepted and considered as improvements. 
The moral dimensions of coercion studied in this thesis are not approached from an outside, ‘neutral’ perspective based on general theories and principles, which serve as a basis for judging practices. The studies are embedded in practice; therefore, this research strategy is deliberately chosen to do justice to the common morality within practices and to be able to understand, analyse, evaluate and stimulate 
5 On average, there was a reduction; the goals that were set by the government and branch organization to reduce 10 per cent a year, were not fully met.
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practices to improve. They contain data from several mental health institutions and are constructed in a qualitative and descriptive manner (chapter 2-4), as well as an interactive and responsive way (chapter 5-6). In this chapter, I will interpret and reflect on the studies, using the theoretical framework of Margaret Urban Walker.6 This framework is suitable especially when focusing on underlying values and norms in practices. With this analysis, I aim to develop more in-depth understandings of the results of the studies, to reflect on the research strategies and to develop recommendations for mental health care regarding how the use of coercion could be successfully reduced further in the future. 
This discussion-chapter is divided into four parts, focusing on four questions: (i) What are the main findings of the studies in this thesis? (ii) How can we understand these findings in the light of the theoretical framework of Walker? (iii) What can we learn from these findings about the role of responsive evaluation and the evaluator in facilitating and fostering dialogue in clinical practice? (iv) What recommendations can be formulated regarding further reduction of coercion in psychiatry and regarding future research on this subject?
Findings of the Studies
In this paragraph, the findings of the chapters in this thesis will be summarized. I will first examine the results of three qualitative-descriptive studies, which analysed and interpreted the meaning of coercion from a patient perspective (chapter 2), the values and norms of nurses regarding family interference (chapter 3) and the experience of practitioners concerning the coercion reduction project and the experienced changes in the use of coercion (chapter 4). Next, I will look into two responsive-interactive evaluation studies that aimed at stimulating and motivating practitioners to reflect on their underlying values and norms regarding the use of coercion (chapter 5-6). 
6 Margaret Urban Walker (2007) Moral Understandings. A Feminist study in Ethics. Second Edition. Oxford University Press
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A patient narrative
In an empirical-ethical evaluation study of the Dutch Act on Coercive Measures in Mental Hospitals7, the interviewed psychiatrists considered their primary responsibility to make the right diagnosis and to determine what kind of medication was necessary for recovery, i.e. repairing the dysfunctions of the brain. From this perspective, the use of forced medication was not seen as a bad thing, but as sometimes necessary. The paradigm of neuroscience presents a biomedical model of psychiatry that motivated a mechanical, reductionist perspective regarding psychiatric diseases8. In the study presented in chapter 2, the paradigm of neuroscience is contrasted with the narrative of an ex-patient focused on her experiences of recovery. 
The story of the ex-patient illustrated that in daily life, having a psychiatric disease and coping with it, are more complex than can be seen from the reductionist perspective of neuroscience. For recovery of a psychiatric illness, a humanistic approach in psychiatry is needed, and the use of coercion should be prevented as much as possible. The story presented in the chapter shows that for this patient, to endure coercion is detrimental and hampers or diminishes his/her chances of recovery. It expresses how coercion causes feelings of distrust and despair. It emphasizes the role of support, trust and recognition of important others for regaining strength again, which was not realised (on the contrary) with the use of coercion in this particular case. 
The study concludes that dealing with psychiatric diseases is more complex than the biomedical model of neuroscience suggests, and that one should include the social context of the patient in the recovery process. Finding the right medication that the 
7 Landeweer E, Abma T, Berghmans R, Janssen W, Dute J., Widdershoven G. (2007). 
Dwangtoepassingen binnen de instelling. Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport, Den Haag 8 This paper was originally written within the theme; ‘The impact of current in the neurosciences on the concept of psychiatric disease’ that was the subject of an interdisciplinary summer school organised in 2009 in Bonn. It is published in a special issue of the Journal Poiesis & Praxis.
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patient can trust, is a deliberative process in which recognition as a person, personal growth and taking responsibilities are important, instead of only considering the person as a patient. To develop a beneficial recovery model in clinical psychiatry, professionals should acknowledge that their role and identity are more complex than the biomedical perspective in diagnosing and subscribing medication supposes. Understanding and relating to the stories of patients cannot be ignored if one wants recovery and coping to be successful.9 
Nurses’ views on family involvement at psychiatric wards
In chapter 3, a study is presented on a mental health institution that is aimed to involve family members in patient care to create openings for reducing and preventing coercion. The practitioners of the wards acknowledged the importance of family involvement, but also regarded it as difficult and in conflict with privacy and confidentiality. Four narratives of nurses from various wards (resp. acute adult care, long stay adult care, elderly care and youth care) were presented based on interviews. All interviews focused on how the nurses viewed the values of privacy and confidentiality and how they actually involved family in the care process. 
The stories demonstrate how different normative understandings of nurses influence collaboration between nurses and family. Due to different habits, policies, working routines and characterizations of the wards, the involvement and participation of family varied. When the relationship with the patient is valued highest, like in the acute ward, family is considered as having a potential instrumental value to reach (short term) treatment goals. From that perspective, family is also considered as a possible threat, causing risks to the relationship between the practitioner and the patient. The narrative of the nurse from the closed ward for elderly patients 
9 Recently the Dutch branch of psychiatrists is starting to recognize the importance of patient participation more and more. In a new multidisciplinary guideline regarding schizophrenia for example, social participation and rehabilitation is explicitly emphasized. See: http://www.nvvp.net/publicaties/richtlijnen.
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illustrated that confidentiality and privacy of the patient were less relevant. Family functioned as spokesperson for the patient, to provide proxy consent. Not all wards saw family ties as instrumental. Two of the narratives present family as having an intrinsic value, and interpreted values of confidentiality and privacy of patients dependent on the intensity of family ties. 
In the discussion, these narratives are compared and analysed in the context of relational autonomy and family ethics. It is concluded that relations are not necessarily opposed to autonomy, but also can form a network in which autonomy of the patient can develop and flourish. Relational autonomy and family ethics can serve as a vehicle for making the triad between professionals, patient, and family in psychiatry work, hence doing justice to the actual dependencies experienced by patients in mental health care. 
Nurses’ experiences of change
Chapter 4 presents a study of a ward that was explicitly ambitious to reduce coercion. New working routines and strategies were developed and implemented, which contributed to the successful reduction of the use of coercion. At this ward, nurses participated in developing new views to prevent and further reduce the use of coercion. They experienced the need to reduce coercion as important and part of their job.
Acknowledgment of the need to reduce coercion and restraint motivated and fostered the implementation of new working routines and policies. In retrospect, the nurses realised that their roles and responsibilities towards the patient had changed due to the project. Before the project started, they used to regard themselves as guardians. They were accountable for the safety at their ward; and in order to protect safety, they tried to retain control over the situation as much as possible. The project motivated the nurses to regard their role in a different ways, and look for ways to get in contact with patients, for example by welcoming a patient at the ward and reducing daily procedures in the ward. 
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The transition process was not linear. It met barriers and difficulties. Because the practitioners were ambitious to reduce coercion, they initially created risky situations resulting in an increase in coercion. They waited too long to intervene, which caused dangerous situations and led to more severe coercive interventions, which is what they actually wanted to prevent. As the staff felt responsible for not fully meeting the ambition to totally prevent coercion, moral stress was created. The nurses realised that other professionals had to be involved to be able to further reduce the use of coercion. To further reduce coercion, it would be necessary to improve cooperation with ambulatory care nurses, as they have knowledge of patients based on less problematic periods of illness. Although the nurses realized that ambulatory care could provide useful information about the patient and assist in supporting and making contact with the patient, improving cooperation appeared not to be easy. 
The study illustrates that the project to reduce coercion motivated nurses to share responsibilities with patients and ambulatory care. Nurses were invited to redefine their roles, and to develop a deeper inter-subjective understanding of core values of their profession. This process stimulated new ideas and created openings for new interventions and collaborations. Therefore, the study concludes that attitudes and cultural identity of staff may change relationships between practitioners and patients towards more equality, and from guardians to co-workers with the patients. This process is not linear and shows uncertainties, but can be successful if teams are open to change and have confidence in developing new relationships. 
Exploring perspectives
In chapter 5, a mental hospital is described in which the practitioners of the closed wards were not willing to talk with the researchers about their practices of coercion. The aim of this responsive-interactive evaluation research was to start and stimulate dialogue between stakeholders. Yet, the standard tools of the researcher, for example asking questions, interviewing and conducting participant observation did not result in a context of trust and openness, which is needed to reflect and deliberate on the urgency to reduce coercion with the practitioners. 
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The researchers realised that to sensitize practitioners and to motivate them to join moral deliberation and reflection, they would have to find a way to make the participants feel sufficiently comfortable to open up regarding their motives and values. In observing meetings and dialogues between practitioners, the researchers noticed football was one of the subjects people liked to talk about. The football metaphor was used in a focus group to invite practitioners to reflect on their practice, and become aware of their strategies. They were asked what kind of strategy they preferred in football, a defensive or an offensive style of playing. Next, they were invited to compare their working routines with the preferred football strategies. 
They realised that they favoured the offensive and collaborative strategies in football, but that their own practice was actually quite defensive and individually oriented. This stimulated practitioners to openly reflect on underlying values and norms about the meaning of ‘safety’ on their wards. 
By creating small, first openings to deliberation about values and working routines, the metaphor served as a vehicle to start moral deliberations and to overcome rigid views. So, creative tools like the use of metaphors can be useful for research to create openings for dialogue. 
Broadening perspectives
The responsive-interactive evaluation study presented in chapter 6 took place in the same hospital that was investigated in chapter 5; although it describes a different research intervention focused on the moral attitudes of nurses. In the hospital, the nurses were critical and defensive regarding the aim of the project to reduce their rate of coercion. They felt offended, since they were already trying to do their job well. The nurses were convinced that they did everything they could to prevent coercion. Thus, they felt that any further reduction of coercion would jeopardize the safety of the ward. They were not prepared to implement and develop new interventions. There was no room to experiment with alternatives for coercion. Every change in working routines was considered a risk to be avoided. Part of the responsive research was to sensitize practitioners to help to create openings for dialogue and reflection on 
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change. The strategy used was to invite two peers from other hospitals, who knew about the difficulties and context of the wards as they worked in similar situations. They were asked to discuss options and possibilities for alternatives regarding coercion within a focus group.
In the focus group meeting, examples of interactions with patients were exchanged in which the prevention of the use of coercion was experienced as difficult. The peers responded with respectful understanding, but also presented examples of alternative strategies to relate to patients. This motivated the nurses of the hospital to reflect on their own practice. Before the focus group meeting, the nurses did not want to question their decisions in using seclusions. They were convinced they followed the right strategy. In the setting of the focus group, they were challenged to explain and account for their decisions, which forced them to account for (implicit) values that normally were not discussed. They realised they were not flexible in meeting the needs of patients. Safety was interpreted in a rigid way, in taking no risks at all, which was not always in the patient(s) best interests. 
The study concludes that bringing in new perspectives in a dialogue can foster moral development, as it did in this focus group meeting. This illustrates that social interactions have influence on nurses’ moral attitudes concerning seclusions. Moral reasoning and expressing moral judgments are part of a social process. Within a group dialogue, participants can learn to see alternatives to prevent seclusion and foster good care. This can create awareness of the influence of the (closed) culture within an organisation on interactions and the use of coercion. 
New Patterns of Moral Understandings
In this section, I will reflect on the findings of the studies using the theoretical framework of Walker. I will analyse how moral responsibilities are experienced, what is expected of whom regarding the use of coercion, and also how moral responsibilities changed due to the reduction project. First, the theoretical premises of Walker’s moral epistemology are presented in more detail.
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Walker formulated several working hypotheses or premises that are the starting points of her moral epistemology. Her first and most important premise is that; 
“Morality itself consists and develops within practices, not through theories”.10 Following from this, she emphasizes that morality is complex and differs between different social orders and positions. Morality is a process of a continuous search to develop mutual consensus. The authority or force of moral claims springs from these practices. Yet, because there are many practices and different social positions in which people express different values, roles and relations, as well as moral principles, these claims are not fixed. 
This means morality is relational, context sensitive, dynamic and always under 
negotiation. Differences in perspectives exist between persons, within and between practices, and moreover, practices themselves can change. Sometimes practices may change by choice, for instance when there is a need for different expectations or organisations, or when we realise some things are wrong.  “… [That] is because 
we have found our way to another actual human practice of responsibility that 
condemns these others”.11 Sometimes, relations or power locations within practices alter, because situations and matters of fact change; for example, when people become ill and are not the same person (identity) as they used to be.12 
Secondly, Walker considers the practices of responsibility as the arena in which morality is expressed and negotiated.13 This is the space in which we ‘show who 
we are, what we care about, and reveal who has standing to judge and blame us’. Morality becomes visible in how we express and make sense of responsibilities of our own and of others in terms of identities, relationships and values. In this process, we 
10 Margaret Urban Walker (2007)  Moral Understandings. A Feminist study in Ethics. Second Edition. Oxford University Press, p.1511 Ibid, p.1612 Minke Goldsteen, Tineke Abma, Barth Oeseburg, Marian Verkerk, Frans Verhey and Guy Widdershoven (2007) What is it to be a daughter? Identities under pressure in dementia care. Bioethics, vol 21, nr.1, pp 1-12 13 Margaret Urban Walker (2007) Moral Understandings. A Feminist study in Ethics. Second Edition. Oxford University Press, p.16
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constantly construct, reconstruct and reshape our morality. We express our moral understandings in what we consider important and wish to account for, in how we conceive and determine own responsibilities and expect and deflect responsibilities towards others. 
Thirdly, Walker claims that moral understandings are induced by and interwoven within their social contexts.14 Our moral identities are intertwined with our social roles. Morality cannot be separated from the contexts in which morality comes to expression. We experience our responsibilities from within our own perspectives, past understandings, experiences and expectations. Because we differ in social roles and status, there are various different ranges of moral accounts. Walker emphasizes that we all are unique participants in the moral practice, occupying different positions with different responsibilities, authority and accountability. 
Fourthly, Walker concludes and emphasizes that moral theorizing should not be about developing ideal principles or pure abstract core of norms, as this way of applying moral theory does not do justice to real moral lives.15 Morality is not perfect; it is under constant (re)construction. To understand and foster moral practices, moral theorizing needs to acknowledge that moral constructions are complex and are interwoven with all kinds of social influences. Therefore, moral epistemology needs to include many kinds of information about all social practices and how interactions between people are conducted. 
So, morality is seen as an on-going negotiation, a process in which normative expectations are expressed and presented for validation, reflection or reconsideration. What used to be an acceptable practice might at a later moment be criticized and in need of justification or even alteration. Theories are attempts to understand these practices, but are also part of these practices. To investigate whether changes in practice can be considered as improvements, Walker proposes a methodology 
14 Ibid, p.1715 Ibid, p.19
General Discussion
149
which differs from traditional approaches in moral philosophy: We have to look closely at what is going on in practice; to unravel the complexities, how concrete issues are experienced from different positions and power locations, and reflect on this. According to Walker, to find out about morality is to follow the ‘trail of responsibilities’.16 
“In the ways we assign, accept, or deflect responsibilities, we express our 
understandings of our own and others’ identities, relationships, and values.”17
Decisions to use coercion in psychiatry involve complex normative expectations of different participants that are characterized by uncertainties and ambiguities. Often, these decisions relate to situations in which there is a shortage on background information as well as doubts and contradicting opinions; for instance, concerning the question whether coercion is proportional and necessary. To comprehend the (implicit) influences and (various) aspects that play a role in this practice, we will analyse how responsibilities are expressed and experienced in this context. The findings of the studies are viewed in terms of (changes in) moral understandings and moral responsibilities, related to different identities, relationships and values involved with. I focused on how values in practice are constructed, what concrete normative expectations of the different stakeholders are, and how relations between the participants are defined. Thus, I will attend to the complexities participants experience regarding the use of coercion. 
A plea for new assignments of responsibilities
The study in chapter 2 pleas for an alternative assignment of responsibilities; this plea is expressed in the story of Jolijn Santegoeds. She argues for a relationship between practitioner and patient that is characterised by trust, support and recognition. In this way, the ultimate aim of care, i.e. recovery of the illness of the patient, can be 
16 Ibid, p.1717 Ibid, p.16
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constructed in a more truthful and effective manner. Following the moral framework of Walker, this appeal implies a different construction of identities, relationships and values between the participants in the context of coercion in psychiatry. 
The biomedical model of mental illness explains recovery in terms of neurological functions: the aim is to restore the chemical and physiological dysfunctions of the brain. This interpretation of recovery is dominant in mental health care. Following this model, psychiatric diseases are regarded as temporal disturbances of neural functioning in the brain, which can and should be repaired with the use of appropriate medication. The patient is seen as a biological actor who is (temporally) restrained by chemical processes in the brain. This implies that care workers are expected to use their expertise to find the proper medication. They are regarded as the experts in that area (identity). The relationship between patient and care workers is seen as asymmetrical. The practitioners determine the care process, thus they are responsible for assessing the right diagnosis and to determine what kind of medication is necessary for recovery. The story of Jolijn suggests another interpretation of the value of recovery. Treatment should not primary focus on dysfunctions of the brain. Recovery is relevant for patients in terms of coping, friendship and belonging. This interpretation of the value of recovery implies another definition of the relationship between patient and practitioner, namely, a relationship characterised by trust, support and recognition. This implies that the patient should not (only) be seen as a patient, but primarily be seen as a person, with specific needs regarding their personal life. The relationship should be more equal, and attend to mutual expectations. This requires more acknowledgement and empowerment for patients regarding their process of recovery. 
The dominant narrative of the biomedical model claims authority for the practitioner. The story of Jolijn considers and argues for an identity of the patient as participant and claims shared authority. A patient should receive trust and acknowledgment to mutually determine the best assignment of responsibilities regarding the recovery process. Jolijn describes that at the moment she received more responsibilities 
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regarding her life, her trust in care workers grew and the relationship was improved, which fostered her recovery. 
The moral epistemology of Walker implies that every change in existing patterns of responsibilities has an impact on identities, relationship and values of people that are part of a certain practice. The alternative assignment of responsibilities that is suggested in this study argues for a reconsideration of the identities of stakeholders, their relationships and dominant values. It pleas for a more equal division of power, in which patients get more autonomy and control over their care process. The patient has to be treated as a person, and not as an object of illness, and share in responsibilities and authority regarding the conceptualisation and concretisation of recovery as it contributes to and fosters recovery. Joan Tronto, moral philosopher and care ethicist, points at consent of patients in health care as granting of authority.18 She argues that the relationship between care providers and care receivers is always characterised by power imbalance and it requires a certain level of trust of the care receiver to consent to care. The narrative from this study illustrates that in the setting of psychiatry; also an act of trust is required from the care provider towards the care receiver. 
Different moral understandings regarding family involvement
Narratives play an important role in expressing values as well as in negotiating about the assignment of responsibilities. People use narratives to present and explain moral issues, but also to confirm, justify or dismiss certain practices or actions. Narratives not only function as instruments to communicate facts and events, they also express moral judgments. This negotiation through narratives is a continuous process in which responsibilities are confirmed or alternative assignments of responsibilities are suggested within existing patterns. 
18 Joan C. Tronto (2009) Consent as a grant of authority. A care ethics reading of informed consent. In: Hilde Lindemann, Marian Verkerk, Margaret Urban Walker (eds) Naturalized 
Bioethics. Toward responsible knowing and practice. Cambridge University Press. 
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According to Walker, a story is the basic form of representation of moral problems.19 In this way, people express and communicate what they consider important within concrete situations. 
“Analogies and narratives are the patterns through which intuitions and perceptions 
are invoked to justify judgments, as well as dispute or repudiate them.” 20
The study of chapter 3 presents narratives of nurses illustrating their views on the values of privacy and confidentiality in the context of how family was actually involved in the process of care. The narratives give insights on how responsibilities are constructed within teams. They illustrate to what extent family is considered valuable in the care process of the patient and how it has influenced their relationship and cooperation with family. If family is considered instrumentally valuable (seeing their identity as a source of information or a supporter of the medical treatment plan), a good relationship between patient and family is not the central aim for nurses. Nurses assign their main responsibilities in that case towards the (short term) care of the individual patient. They internalise values like privacy and confidentiality in terms of individual autonomy of the patient. In the stories where family was considered intrinsically valuable, identities and responsibilities showed another pattern. Family was considered valuable in itself; hence, the way of valuing family steered towards a joint decision-making. Family was identified as a partner of the patient and the practitioners, and received specific responsibilities during the care of the patient (within a triad relationship).The way family is considered as valuable in the narratives (instrumental vs intrinsic) influenced what nurses expect from the family of the patient. When family was mainly valued as instrumental, nurses expected the family to give them relevant information. Therefore, they were not involved in shared decision making about weighing and planning treatment options for the care of the patient. 
19 Margaret Urban Walker (2007) Moral Understandings. A Feminist study in Ethics. Second Edition. Oxford University Press, p. 7520 Ibid, p.77
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This study illustrates how certain values that are central within teams (from the perspective of nurses) are connected with what is expected from others, and how these are expressed in the responsibilities, which are assigned to them. The narratives of the nurses in this study illustrate that social context (the different care setting and team culture) and positions (identities) influences how values are understood and how relationships between stakeholders are constructed. How family is valued and what is expected from them influences how cooperation is regarded. It is not common to involve family within all the wards or give them shared responsibilities within the care process. Yet, the differences between the narratives offer an opening to compare and reconsider common moral understandings. A next step would be to discuss with the nurses their differences, and reflect on options to involve family in the care process of the patient. 
Changes in moral understandings
In the study described in chapter 4, the nurses reported that they really experienced their responsibilities differently, compared to the old days. Two cases were analysed in which the nurses experienced changes in the patterns of their responsibilities. The first case illustrates how nurses were enabled to develop new views and ideas on prevention of coercion through processes of dialogue and cooperation with ambulatory colleagues. They recognized the value of close working relations with other colleagues to meet the needs of the patient. The identity of the nurses shifted from ‘problem solvers’ to ‘partners’ sharing expertise regarding the treatment of a patient. The second case implies a new view on the role of nursing in dealing with risks. The nurses experienced, in retrospect, important changes in their responsibilities toward patients and in the way they relate to patients. At first, the primary responsibility of nurses was seen (by themselves) as guarding safety at the wards (as an end goal), but this changed towards the responsibility for the care of patients in which safety was considered an important condition (as means) that had to be tailored to the individual needs of the patients. 
These new moral understandings of responsibilities were no longer organised in a strategic way, in conducting rules and protocols to keep control and assure safety at 
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the ward, but nurses realised that engaging with patients and sharing responsibilities (with other colleagues as well as with individual patients) created better ways to assess risks and anticipate on possible dangerous situations. This fostered mutual trust, and contributed to the care process. This new relationship meant taking some (calculated) risks in dealing with uncertainties. They had to give up some control. An example described in the chapter is that the nurses decided to open the kitchen during the day so that patients could get something to eat whenever they wanted. This resulted in a positive effect, although at first, nurses were worried that patients might eat all the food at once, or make a mess of the kitchen. Hence, the new relationship with patients is characterised by a more shared understanding of responsibilities: 
“Before the project started, the professional-patient relationship was based on 
mutual distrust. Nurses distrusted patients because of the psychiatric illness 
that resulted in danger. Patients did not trust nurses either because of the use 
of coercion and restraint. Both parties felt their safety was under threat. Slowly, 
patients were regarded as potential partners (moral subjects) in developing a shared 
understanding of responsibilities. These altered identities mean that the relationship 
between patient and professional is transformed towards a far better rapport. By 
developing a more equal relationship, patients are offered partnership, trust, and 
mutual responsibility in developing a recovery process.21”
The nurses developed a more flexible and person-centred approach to patients. Patients were trusted and got their own responsibilities. While previously patients had to prove they were worthy of trust, it was now assumed they could handle responsibilities. Related to these changes, the nurses experienced a shift in their dominant values. Instead of safety in terms of control, their care for the patient became their core value. Before, nurses used to regard and describe themselves as guardians, and felt a main responsibility for safety and control, which justified their 
21 Elleke G.M. Landeweer, Tineke A. Abma, Guy A.M. Widdershoven (2010) The Essence of Psychiatric Nursing. Redefining Nurses’ Identity Through Moral Dialogue About Reducing the Use of Coercion and Restraint. Advances in Nursing Science. Vol. 33. No. 4, pp E39-40 
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use of coercion and restraint.  This identity shifted to the role of co-worker. The core value of care was now focused on the wellbeing and comfort of the patient, through empowerment, a motivational approach, and giving more control to patients (like free use of the kitchen). 
These new moral understandings value the use of coercion differently. Coercion is no longer considered or accepted as a normal practice. If coercion is used now, it is seen as a failure of the team of nurses that needs to be stopped as soon as possible and evaluated to be able to prevent coercion in similar situations. 
An important shift in these new moral understandings is that responsibilities regarding the use and prevention of coercion are now constructed within shared understandings with other colleagues and patients. Yet, to let go or alter responsibilities that are experienced as assigned to certain roles or identities creates new insecurities. It is a process that requires an on-going negotiation and balancing. What has changed at this ward is that patients are invited to participate in these processes, and take responsibility for their own care process. This study illustrates that it has become more common to include patients in these moral negotiations. Yet, other stakeholders might or should also be involved. What about ambulatory care workers, family or important others of the patient or other parties? Again, involving others will affect everybody’s relationships, core values and identities.  
Fostering dialogue on moral responsibilities
Practices of coercion are characterized by insecurity and complexity concerning what kinds of (calculated) risks are acceptable. An important responsibility of practitioners in the wards is that they have to keep situations safe. Yet, safety is not clear-cut and it has subjective elements. How safety is experienced and operationalized e.g. in working routines to keep things under control, differs between wards and hospitals. The wards of the hospital that were involved in the studies in chapter 5 and 6 were not willing to change their common work routines. They were critical and defensive regarding the aim of the reduction projects to reduce the amount of coercion; they felt criticized for not doing their jobs well enough. Practitioners of this hospital 
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emphasized they never used coercion unnecessarily, and expressed that sometimes, crisis situations emerged in which they were forced to use coercion to keep things safe. Their responsibilities in these situations were so clear to them that they did not understand or felt the need to explain or discuss their motives. In the studies, this was indicated as a closed culture.
In one of the studies, this closed culture of practitioners and the inhibition to change moral perspectives is explained with the use of moral psychology of Jonathan Haidt. According to Haidt, moral judgments are not the direct result of a rational individual’s moral reasoning, but are constructed under an influence of moral emotions and intuitions. Haidt emphasizes that social and relational aspects determine attitudes and moral decisions. People are highly attuned to existing group norms, other people’s moral judgments, and to moral reasoning. Based on psychological experiments, Haidt concludes that social forces influence people’s direct and private judgments.22 People aim at harmony and agreement between peers.  This explains why people in teams might find it difficult to critically reflect on each other’s moral attitudes. In terms of Walker, the moral psychology of Haidt could be reformulated in that people tend to confirm to existing moral understandings of responsibilities. Haidt explains that changes in common patterns of responsibilities within a practice might involve reluctance or resistance if critical reflection is not part of the culture within the teams. 
Within this closed culture, the nurses experienced safety not only as an important condition, but they experienced it as their primary objective. In terms of identity, relationships and values; nurses considered safety as their core value and defined their identity as guardians, to maintain control and safety at the ward for patients and others. The patient had to confirm to the rules and daily routines of the ward. The nurses did not feel the urgency to change their assigned responsibilities and relationship with patients. The use of coercion was justified in line with their 
22 J. Haidt (2001) The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review: 108 (4): 814-34
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assignments. If a situation of danger emerged, they had to intervene in terms of control, as they were responsible for a safe climate on the ward. They did not feel any room to deviate from standard protocols within their ward, or to take (unnecessary) risks and share some of their responsibilities with patients. 
Given this distribution of responsibilities at this mental health care hospital, the researchers aimed to create openings to sensitize practitioners to reflect on their attitudes regarding options to reduce coercion. With the use of a metaphor, we aimed to create a tool to open practitioners in presenting hidden values and motives (chapter 5). Practitioners were invited to reflect on football strategies and compare them with their working strategies. The metaphor helped to illuminate contradictions in the experienced responsibilities.23 The defensive strategy at the wards did not correspond with the more offensive strategy they saw as necessary in football. They became aware that sometimes ‘responsible risks’ had to be taken in order to win, that is, to be truly successful in the care for a patient. These changes require an alternative distribution of responsibilities in which the meaning and operationalization of safety is more equally constructed.
Another method to create openings was to invite external peers in a focus group meeting. In the meeting, another distribution of responsibilities was suggested by external peers, also including responsibilities for patients. In the dialogue, it became clear that nurses at the ward were not prepared to share and assign responsibilities to patients regarding safety. Consequently, they used coercion more often than their external peers did in similar situations. The focus group meeting invited the nurses to consider a new distribution of responsibilities, in which safety could be operationalized without the use of coercion. 
The dialogue contributed to an open perspective, and helped the nurses to reconsider the distribution of responsibilities. While at first, participants were reluctant, in the 
23 In the next paragraph this process is referred to as critical reflection, which is one of tasks for moral philosophers that is defined by Walker. 
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focus group meeting values and responsibilities were made explicit and compared. This stimulated a process of awareness regarding implicit values and inconsistencies. Questions like; are we still satisfied with our distribution of responsibilities? Do we truly fulfil our duties towards patients when the value of safety is translated in conducting rules and protocols?
The studies illustrate that a dialogue about alternative assignments of responsibilities is possible, but also meets with several barriers. Changes require a context of trust. Social interactions influence moral attitudes of practitioners, and new perspectives foster new insights. 
Conclusions
What conclusions derive from analysing the studies in terms of the moral epistemology of Walker? First, the analysis illustrates that to reduce coercion and improve care; changes are needed in the distribution of responsibilities between various stakeholders regarding values, identities and relationships within practices. In the study of chapter 2, changes in moral understandings were proposed, while in the study of chapter 4, experiences of changes in practice are documented. Based on the analyses of these studies, we conclude that it is beneficial to share responsibilities with patients. A rigid conceptualisation of safety operationalized in guarding rules and keeping patients under control does not contribute to an open climate in which coercion can be reduced. 
A second conclusion is that changes in assignments of responsibilities cannot be enforced top down without causing resistance and practical difficulties, especially when it is not clear for stakeholders at the work floor what these changes might entail in practice. Joint reflection and shared contemplation on goals and acceptable risks are needed. Chapter 4 exemplifies that practitioners on the work floor embrace new 
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responsibilities by experimenting with new interventions (learning while doing)24. The value of new assignments of responsibilities is constructed and embedded within their practices, and does not (primary) spring from top down authorities.  Chapters 5 and 6 provide examples of difficulties in changing moral understandings when teams are not open to change.
A third insight from the analysis is that changing in the distribution of responsibilities implies accepting certain risks. To share responsibilities with patients and other stakeholders, such as family or ambulatory care workers, produces insecurities. This leads to new questions and dilemmas. For example: To what extent can patients handle responsibilities regarding safety? Who is accountable if things go wrong? What can be expected of colleagues or important others in sharing responsibilities? Besides, the value of new distributions of responsibilities is not immediately self-evident for all stakeholders. So, changes that are recognized and acknowledged as valuable by some stakeholders require further consideration and experimentation in practice.
Finally, despite the willingness and the felt urgency to reduce coercion, processes to implement new and alternative assignments of responsibilities take time and require on-going reflection. New (temporary) moral challenges, insecurities and dilemmas in practice might jeopardize motivation for participating in on-going reflections to improve assignments of responsibilities. The studies show that these dynamics cannot be fully steered in advance, but require attention for chances and openings. 
The analysis shows that the changes in moral understandings may be fostered through research, elucidating the responsibilities experienced by different stakeholders and facilitating a dialogue between stakeholders. In the next paragraph, the role of research in these dynamic processes will be discussed. 
24 Tineke A. Abma (2007) Situated learning in Communities of Practice. Evaluation of Coercion in psychiatry as a case. Evaluation. Vol 13 (1), 32-47
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The Role and Responsibility of the Researcher
What can we learn from the findings about the role of responsive evaluation and the evaluator in facilitating and fostering dialogue in clinical practices? Which research methods are best suited to actually foster new moral understandings? To answer these questions, I will reflect on the studies and the methods used. Firstly, I will relate the theoretical underpinnings and methodology of the studies to the various tasks Walker assigns to ‘moral research’. Secondly, I will reflect on the different methods used in the studies, and discuss in which way they contributed to new moral understandings. Finally, I will look into the moral responsibilities of the evaluator in facilitating and fostering dialogue in practices and address the question whether and to what extent it is justified to use (normative) interventions to influence moral practices. 
Theoretical underpinnings and methodology of the studies
The studies presented in this thesis share a specific research approach. They did not aim to develop an external moral justification of coercion, for example by formulating good reasons to reduce coercion in general. They focused on how common moralities develop within concrete practices of coercion and how learning within moral practices can be fostered. The studies aimed to get an in-depth understanding of the processes of morality in practice, to show how values and norms are understood, integrated and embedded within practices, and to investigate how reflectivity and dialogue can be stimulated. 
The methodology of the studies is grounded in responsive evaluation.25 This research approach served various goals. First, the studies had a qualitative- descriptive goal aimed at mapping and describing the processes of change to develop insights in these processes. Second, the studies had an evaluative and interpretative goal, which is aimed at evaluating the coercion reduction projects together with stakeholders. They 
25 This methodology is described in the introduction chapter of this thesis.
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assisted the projects by signalling pitfalls and barriers and helping participants to find ways to overcome them. Third, the studies had an interactive- normative goal to help develop alternative practices. 
Walker understands moral research as the study of common moralities within social practices, in descriptive as well as normative sense. The goals of the responsive methodology are in line with Walker’s views on the tasks of moral research, described in the introduction of this thesis (chapter 1). Firstly, moral research has a descriptive task to unravel the patterns of responsibilities expressed in values, identities and relationships within specific practices. The aim is to examine which moral norms are actually leading in concrete practices, within what social structures they are sustained, and in which practices of responsibility they result. This means to map who assigns and deflects which responsibilities from which perspective (reflective analysis). This task of research uses data of factual (empirical) studies to create a complete sense of morality in social lives. Secondly, moral research has the task to examine whether specific moral understandings are intelligible for the persons involved in those practices (critical reflection). This task examines whether the accounts are transparent and coherent to the participants against the background of certain standards of shared intelligibility. Thirdly, moral research aims to reflect on current patterns of practices from a normative perspective. This task, which is referred to as normative reflection, aims to see if a specific practice is the best way to live for human beings in a specific historical situation. It compares certain ways to live with other ways we know or we can imagine. It does not presuppose an ideal, or an abstract concept of morality regarding an ultimate good way to live, but assumes that in certain situations or instances, some ways to live are better than others. 
In the next paragraph, I will ref lect on the research methods used during the studies, and investigate how they contributed to or steered towards new moral understandings in line with the tasks of moral research according to Walker. 
162
Chapter 7
Various narrative methods for dealing with moral understandings 
Making alternative views explicit by using counter storiesIn Chapter 2, a narrative was presented that served as an alternative to the dominant distribution of responsibilities. The story showed the consequences of the dominant distribution of responsibilities (reflective analysis), and highlighted incoherencies from within (critical ref lection). It showed that the value of recovery as expressed in the common distribution of responsibilities, which focuses on finding the right medication, is inconsistent with the experience of the storyteller as patient who needs trust, consensus, motivation and empowerment. The main message of this study is not to illuminate incoherencies, but to stimulate 
normative reflection. The story pleas for another interpretation of the value of recovery, and argues that practitioners should reconsider their interpretation of recovery. 
According to Walker, alternative stories are instruments, which can create and stimulate openings to reconsider certain visions and power locations. This is specifically the role of counter stories. Hilde Nelson Lindemann defines a counter story as: – “a story that resists an oppressive identity and attempts to replace 
it with one that commands respect”26. Counter stories can be used to visualize that some practices (and their master stories) are missing or ignoring morally relevant details. A counter story illustrates incoherencies in the master stories by reconstructing the narrative and filling in the moral details that are considered important from a specific perspective (identity). The use of counter stories is a way to restore the identity of a person or stakeholder group that has been suppressed or ignored in moral practices. The story in chapter 2 for example, showed that the dominant values reduces the identity of the patient to the illness and ignores the person behind the psychiatric disease, who also could take on 
26 Hilde Lindemann Nelson (2001) Damaged identities. Narrative repair. Cornell University Press. Ithaca and London, p. 6 
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responsibilities. In this way, the patient is damaged, as he/ she is not recognised as a moral agent.27 
A counter story is a way to stimulate ref lection on dominant distributions of responsibilities (in terms of values, identities and relations) and to consider a person or stakeholder group as a relevant participant in the process of assigning responsibilities. It questions dominant perspectives, and restores and empowers identities of persons that have been damaged or undervalued. The use of counter stories can be considered as a part of normative reflection: it presents an alternative practice, another distribution of responsibilities and can stimulate a dialogue on the goals of the dominant practice. 
By presenting a counter story, the researcher takes a normative stance in the debate in a specific way. The normative standpoint is not externally constructed; thus, it springs from the context, referring to embedded experiences of participants in practice, and illuminating different alternative views. The researcher proposes to see the dominant practice differently and aims to broaden perspectives regarding moral understandings and also foster reflection and debate on the best way to construct moral understandings. Hence, using a counter story combines critical reflection and normative reflection. 
Reflective analysis through thick descriptionThe second study (chapter 3) aimed to gain more in-depth understanding of the perception of the values of confidentiality and privacy as well as the involvement of family in different wards (teams of nurses). The method that was used can be considered as thick descriptions28. Thick descriptions focus on specifying details 
27 Landeweer, E, T. Abma, J. Santegoeds, G. Widdershoven (2009) Psychiatry in the age of neuroscience: the impact on clinical practice and the lives of patients. Poiesis & Praxis. 6, p. 5328 Clifford Geertz (1973) Thick Descriptions: Toward a interpretive theory of culture. In: 
The interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays. New York. Basic Books 3-30 
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of the context: local interpretations, meanings and truths. They make explicit how participants experience, interpret and value their cultural contexts. This method is in line with the reflective analysis as it “aimed to find out what 
moral norms are actually like, how they inhere in and are reproduced by interactions 
between people, and how moral orders are concretely embodied in social ones”.29 Yet, this method can also be considered as critical reflection, since thick descriptions shed light on moral understandings and could illuminate incoherencies. Next, it would be a logical follow-up for the study in chapter 3 to reflect normatively on the differences between practices with stakeholders and on what might be the ‘best’ way to live.
The study of chapter 4 can also be considered as reflective analysis with the use of thick descriptions. Together with practitioners, processes of change were described, interpreted and analysed in terms of new distributions of responsibilities. The thick descriptions illustrated both the successes and the difficulties, experienced by nurses; hence, they helped the nurses to give words to their experiences and understandings of change. The study gave depth and validated the new distributions of responsibilities; that is new values, identities and relations that were constructed. It also clarified new challenges, and showed that implementing new working routines takes time and is in need of constant reflection and balancing to deal with new challenges in assigning responsibilities. 
The role of moral research in constructing thick descriptions in these studies is twofold. On the one hand, the research served the aim of assisting stakeholders to develop insights on how moral values and norms are produced and embodied within interactions. On the other hand, it assisted practitioners in analysing and consolidating experienced changes in responsibilities. Both roles of thick descriptions meet the aim of fostering openings for critical and normative reflection, thereby creating transparency and awareness of new challenges, and openings to reflect on how practices could be improved. 
29 Margaret Urban Walker (2007) Moral Understandings. A Feminist study in Ethics. Second Edition. Oxford University Press, p.11
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Stimulating practitioners to (re) consider moral understandings by using a metaphorTo stimulate practitioners to discuss their ways of working and to foster critical and normative reflection, we made use of a metaphor in the study of chapter 5. A metaphor can be defined as a figure of speech, which suggests an analogous relationship by replacing one idea with another. It can serve as a powerful instrument to deepen understandings of processes, generating new insights and challenging old perceptions.30 Metaphors can also be used to elucidate implicit or hidden assumptions and motives.31 Therefore, in this study, the metaphor of football was deliberately used as a vehicle to help practitioners to understand their defensive attitude and start moral negotiations. Using a metaphor and comparing different practices, functioned as a way to make implicit assumptions and interests explicit, and also to illuminate inconsistencies and challenge old perceptions. 
The use of the football metaphor in this study was an example of fostering critical reflection as well as normative reflection. It provided critical reflection in that, it created transparency and enlightened inconsistencies. Yet, it also was an instance of normative reflection, because the choice of the football metaphor was inspired by the knowledge, that the participants considered a defensive football strategy as less beneficial then an offensive strategy. The aim of discussing about football was to open the dialogue on how to reduce the use of coercion at the wards and implement more offensive strategies at the work floor.
The use of heterogeneous focus groups to stimulate normative reflectionThe aim of the study in chapter 6 was to stimulate critical as well as normative reflection. During this study, we actually constructed a normative intervention. We invited peer nurses from other hospitals to join a focus group and bring in new narratives around coercion. The confrontation between perspectives was meant to stimulate and persuade the nurses of the ward to become open to change the 
30 Jacque Carpenter (2008) Metaphors in qualitative research: Shedding light or casting shadows? Research in Nursing & Health. Vol 31, issue 3, 274-28231 Pieter Vroon en Douwe Draaisma (1985) De mens als metafoor. Over vergelijkingen van 
mens en machine in filosofie en psychologie. Ambo. Baarn.
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distribution of responsibilities and to reflect on how to prevent and reduce coercion. New viewpoints, different perceptions and moral understandings were brought to the table, which enabled participants to compare practices within their contexts and consider alternative strategies. Again, the aim of the intervention was normative, in that the outside nurses were invited for the purpose of changing current practices. 
Normative interventions and their justifications
When a researcher enters the field of study, he or she has a certain impact within that field.32 A researcher focuses on a specific subject, which makes participants aware of it. Therefore, our studies evaluating projects to reduce the use of coercion made participants aware of their special status. They became aware of the urgency and importance to reduce coercion. While the evaluator strives towards validity and credibility in constructing her findings33, within her role as researcher, she automatically enters the field and inf luence interactions. In these studies, the evaluator aimed to develop insights and understandings of the practice of coercion, so as to be able to assist participants to develop alternative better practices. Besides this normative dimension of qualitative evaluation research, by giving feedback and advice, the studies also performed deliberate normative interventions. Especially the studies in chapter 5 and 6 encouraged participants to reflect on their moral understandings, and to consider whether other practices might be better. We intervened in the projects deliberately, aiming to develop an iterative learning process. Therefore, the aspect of these studies brings us to the question of how and on which grounds such normative interventions can be accepted. 
The characteristic of doing responsive evaluation research is focused not primarily on the content of moral positions, but on the procedures, thereby creating the conditions for moral learning. In responsive evaluation research as described in chapter 1, the role and responsibility of the responsive evaluator is to assist and 
32 This is also referred to as the Hawthorne effect. 33 These criteria are explained in the introduction of the thesis (chapter 1)
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stimulate participants within their practices to reflect and contemplate on their goals and aims. In order to be responsive to the subjects and context of research as a researcher, it is important not to impose normative opinions and values regarding the moral stances of participants.  Researchers have to guard (responsively) that all relevant stakeholder perspectives and perceptions, including counter stories, are equally involved. Finally, participants themselves have to determine through mutual processes of moral understandings, what is morally best at a certain moment in a certain situation.
One way to stimulate moral learning is to highlight missing moral aspects, like we did by presenting a counter story on coercion and recovery. In addition, moral research helps to develop transparency and knowledge on moral understandings by creating thick descriptions (as a first step to stimulate critical and normative reflection and consolidate improvements). Finally, moral research can actually stimulate practitioners to reconsider their moral understandings and reflect on their embodied moral norms. Together, these approaches can shed light on implicit moral aspects and interests within the practices. They can foster dialogue on hidden inconsistencies and contradictions within the practices, and also facilitate reflections on alternative distributions of responsibilities. Hence, by this way, moral research contributes to practices by opening moral spaces. To quote Walker; 
“When voices break through and are heard from places of strategically and 
systematically imposed silence, a moral-social order is already shifting. To open the 
space to hear those voices is to be ready to put moral understandings to the test”.34 
When it comes to moral research, we have to acknowledge that an objective and neutral perspective on moral understandings is neither realistic, nor desirable. Researchers will have their own views and pre-understandings regarding the normative adequacy of the practices they investigate. Yet, the researcher does not 
34 Margaret Urban Walker (2007) Moral Understandings. A Feminist study in Ethics. Second Edition. Oxford University Press, p.264
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impose this view, but uses it to challenge moral stances, as ultimately the researcher does not determine the validity of moral judgments. Moral justification springs from the mutual recognition of all the participants of moral practices; from a shared acknowledgement that certain values and norms are justified within a certain context above others. Whether changes are moral improvements can therefore not be justified from an objective, neutral research point of view, but can only be investigated within a process of responsive consideration. 
What does this imply in carrying out moral research? As moral researchers, we interact with moral practices; and are participants in the process of understanding and changing moral life. Therefore, in this process, we have responsibilities assigned by ourselves as well as others. The role of our moral research can therefore be seen as ‘putting pressure on the credibility of certain moral understandings’.35 This ‘putting pressure’ has normative motives. First, it aims to give a voice to persons who are disempowered or oppressed within the moral discourse. Next, it intends to create transparency and to sensitize practitioners to acknowledge the urgency to reconsider existing moral understandings about the use of coercion. 
Justifying normative interventions and establishing moral improvements is part of an interactive process of reflection and deliberation within practices and with participants. It is an on-going search for equilibrium. Thus, we cannot conclude on moral improvements from a specific neutral standard, nor can we conclude that we have reached the end of our moral goals. The fact that this process is never definite is, to quote Walker, ‘not a defect but a virtue’.36 By shedding light on implicit aspects and fostering dialogue on moral understandings regarding the use of coercion, we contributed to moral improvements, although these are always preliminary, in development, and never finished. 
35 Ibid, p.263 36 Ibid, p.112
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Recommendations
From the studies and the discussion, several recommendations can be formulated for the practice of psychiatry and the practice of moral research. 
Recommendations for practice 
In psychiatry, participants wish to avoid coercive actions but do not always experience (moral) options to do so, given the current leading distribution of responsibilities. To change moral responsibilities between participants is not easy. We have learned that these changes need a breeding ground from within, and require apart from motivation and a sense of urgency, also braveness and patience. Also, risks as well as new moral issues need to be dealt with in a balanced and thoughtful way. Therefore, reflection and dialogue in these practices are crucial. Awareness regarding implicit and contradicting values is needed to be able to (re)consider whether existing moral understandings still meet with or strive towards the central goals of care. Transparency and openness are important sources for reflection, thereby enabling stakeholders to compare and balance their motives in an on-going search. 
In practice, several interventions can be used to stimulate and foster a breeding ground for reflection, openness and transparency. Firstly, thick descriptions may stimulate critical (self) reflection, by inviting practitioners to consider why they are doing what they are doing and compare different perceptions and constructions. Secondly, counter stories can be brought to the fore as they invite practitioners to take a stance, make their implicit –taken for granted-motives and interests explicit, and mirror them against other (counter) perspectives. A third intervention to invite participants to reflect on their moral stances is to discuss their moral understandings with outsider peers and compare their differences between practices to (re)consider their core values and motives. The studies illustrate that in conducting qualitative responsive evaluation, research focusing on moral understandings is effective and fosters a breeding ground for improvement from within. Therefore, it is recommended to foster moral reflection in projects that are morally tense.
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The studies presented in this thesis created moral spaces for reflection and dialogue on moral understandings, using interviews, focus groups and dialogue meetings. Another way to organize ref lection systematically is to organise moral case deliberation meetings.37 These reflection meetings support practices to create moral spaces in which time, and a platform is created to discuss if the moral focus of participants is still in balance or in need of reconstruction. 
In the Netherlands, several projects have been started at closed wards with the view to foster feedback from an outside perspective. Recently, a pilot study was finished, in which six mental health institutions were monitored and supported by research to develop insights on how and under what conditions patient advocacy persons can foster the legal status of patients at closed wards.38 The results demonstrated that the observations and feedback of patient advocacy persons offers chances for teams to reflect by pointing to blind spots. In addition, exchange programs for professionals, for example nurses of closed wards, have been organized in a mental health institution, which constitute two nurses of three closed wards exchanging their working places for a month. This resulted in a broadening of perspectives regarding working routines and interactions with colleagues and patients, and has led to a dialogue on improving collaboration within and between the wards. 
Recommendations for research
We concluded that the role and responsibility of moral research is to stimulate and create spaces for (re)considering central values and norms within practice. We have argued that research is helpful in fostering reflection and dialogue on core values within practices as well as in evaluating the processes of change. Yet, further research is desirable regarding how moral openings can be sustained in the long run. A next 
37 Abma TA, Molewijk B, Widdershoven GAM. Good care in ongoing dialogues. Responsive evaluation and moral deliberation. Health Care Analysis 2009; 17 (3): 217-3538 H. Leyerzaph, E. Landeweer & T. Abma (2013). Randvoorwaarden voor een 
monitorende rol door de stichting PVP. Eindrapportage. VUMC afdeling Metamedica/ onderzoeksinstituut Emgo+
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step for moral research would be to focus on the threats practices have to deal with, and to consider strategies on how to mitigate such threats. Reluctance within teams can cause a challenge for projects that aim for a change in the central moral understandings; but also, traumatic events might motivate practitioners to fall back to old and familiar routines without reflection or consideration. These dynamics deserve further attention in research on how to prevent rebounds and demotivation regarding reflection and dialogue. 
Moral research, as a practice of its own, also needs to be sensitive to the development of implicit norms and blind spots. Moral researchers need to (re)consider their own responsibilities, reflect on their own presuppositions, and rethink the role of theory in carrying out research within a practice. They need to consider their role and responsibility regarding the participants of research, what mutual expectations are and how to find common grounds in relation with the research subjects. 
In psychiatric practice and in moral research, views and perspectives on what is good differ. Patients, nurses and psychiatrists do not always agree on whether or not coercion can be reduced. Moral researchers will believe in their methods and interventions, but also have to be open for hesitations and doubts of participants in practice about their contribution to the process of practice improvement. In practice, and in research, which aims to improve practice, opposing views are unavoidable, and a definite truth is unattainable. This is, however, not a cause for despair, but rather a stimulus for further development of moral understandings: 
“Imperfect understandings, conflicting judgments, or incomprehension are obvious 
problems for moral equilibrium. They can be occasions for personal breaches, social 
fractures, and individual or group violence. But they are also opportunities to rethink 
understandings and search for mediating ideas or reconciling procedures within or 
between communities.” 39
39 Margaret Urban Walker (2007) Moral Understandings. A Feminist study in Ethics. Second Edition. Oxford University Press, p. 78
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Summary
While the use of coercion is allowed in psychiatry under certain strict circumstances i.e. to avert dangerous behaviour that is caused by a mental illness for protection of others or of the patient himself or herself, coercion has a large impact on patients as well as practitioners. Therefore, prevention and reduction of the use of coercion and restraint are important policy goals. In the last decade, reduction of seclusion has got a lot of attention in Dutch mental health care. Patient and family groups as well as professionals and others, have argued for the need for transitions in organisation, culture and routines around coercion. Comparative international studies showed that the use of seclusion is more common in the Netherlands than in other countries; patients are locked up in seclusion rooms more often and longer. Bottom up as well as top down, a sense of urgency developed regarding the need for change and improvement. This resulted in funding by the government for projects in psychiatric institutions to reduce coercion in general, and seclusion more specifically. Our research group was invited by several mental health care institutions to monitor and evaluate projects to reduce coercion. The studies were primarily process evaluations. Research questions included: What are successes, what needs further improvement, what kind of barriers are experienced (from different angles) and how could these barriers be dealt with. The responsive research methodology aimed to facilitate dialogue and shared ownership regarding aims and successes of the projects. The qualitative studies were based on participation and interaction with participants, and developed a specific focus on moral issues related to coercion and restraint in psychiatry. They aimed to map the common morality within practices, to develop openings for responsive analysis and to stimulate dialogue on moral improvements. This thesis consists of five published articles on the moral dynamics within institutions that started projects to reduce the use of coercion and restraint and improve the quality of care. The articles show which moral perspectives regarding coercion and reduction of coercion were leading, what kind of (moral) changes developed, how barriers were experienced and how they were dealt with. The aim 
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of the studies was to develop insights on moral dynamics within practices of coercion and restraint and to foster improvements through mutual dialogue and reflection on central values. The theoretical framework of this thesis is based on the view that moral knowledge is socially constructed in processes of negotiation between stakeholders. Practices are regarded as inherently moral, requiring moral work from participants that can be supported by research interventions. An important source of inspiration is the moral epistemology of Margaret Walker. She emphasizes that morality and moral judgments cannot be detached from social backgrounds, and cannot be singled out from specific (personal) contexts and experiences.  Morality develops in interactions between people. Through dialogue and participating in social settings, people learn from and through each other what is morally important and why, and what they may expect from each other. Often these are implicit processes which people are not aware of; yet, the choices that are made and the way people interact, reflect what is considered valuable. Dominant values and visions regarding attribution of responsibilities might express tensions. Stakeholders might have different ideas and motives. Practices can be improved, by fostering insight in mutual perspectives and willingness to recognize different viewpoints as valid. This thesis makes different views on responsibilities around coercion explicit and describes interventions aimed to stimulate processes of reflection and change.
Chapter 2 introduces a critical view regarding the biomedical model of psychiatric diseases aimed at pharmaceutical solutions. This model implies a neurobiological view on recovery (i.e. repairing the dysfunctions of the brain) that can justify the use of coercion on these grounds. In this article, we discuss whether neurosciences and new psychopharmacological solutions really support patients who suffer from mental illnesses. To answer this question, we focus on the perspective of patients and their experiences with psychiatric (coercive) treatments. The analysis of an ex-patient’s story shows that beside appropriate medication, other issues are important for recovery from a mental illness. In daily life, issues such as coping, rehabilitation and social support are of major importance for a patient suffering from psychiatric disease. A patient’s recovery is dependent, not only upon the process of finding the appropriate medication and trust between the psychiatrist and the patient, but also 
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upon relational aspects, such as being recognised as a person, belonging, accepting responsibilities, developing friendships and trusting others. These findings lead to the conclusion that dealing with psychiatric diseases is more complex than the biomedical model of neuroscience suggests, and that the social context of the patient should be included in the recovery process. During the analysis and writing of the article, the storyteller and ex-patient, Jolijn Santegoeds, was closely involved. Therefore, she became co-author of this article. 
Chapter 3 illuminates the perspectives of nurses. It discusses the relations between patients, family and professionals in psychiatry. The central question of the chapter is how nurses deal with family and important others of patients, and how they value the concepts of privacy and confidentiality. This question came up in projects to reduce coercion, in which the need was experienced to involve family more actively in reducing and preventing coercion. Privacy and confidentiality were experienced as barriers in this process. In this chapter four narratives of nurses about their experiences with family of patients are presented. The nurses all worked at different wards in the same mental health institution. The stories illustrate differences in how family is involved and is considered important in relation to the care and treatment of the patient. Some nurses value family mainly as instrumental. Family is considered as source of information to optimize care. Others express an intrinsic value for family i.e. family as valuable on its own. If family is considered as intrinsically valuable, the concepts of privacy and confidentiality are not experienced as insurmountable barriers and more options to collaborate regarding the prevention and reduction of coercion are considered. 
Chapter 4 describes and analyses the moral changes during a project to reduce coercion at a closed inpatient ward of a psychiatric hospital. An important finding of this study was that nurses reported that their roles had changed. In retrospect they attributed this change to the emergence of reflection, openness and dialogue. During the project, a dialogical process came forth within the mental health institution to engage nurses to think about their practice in general and coercion more in particular. As a result, the relationship between patients and nurses and among professionals (nurses and ambulatory workers) fundamentally changed.  The new focus was on mutual understanding, collaboration, contact and trust. Before, dealing with risks was only a concern of the nurses at the ward. Gradually, ambulatory care workers 
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were seen as possible partners, who can help to develop a better, mutually shared perspective on safety-issues. Regarding the relationship between patients and nurses, patients are now approached and involved as partners in care. While formerly the practice of nursing was organized around the value of safety and guarding control on the ward, now the essence of nursing is defined in terms of sharing responsibilities with others. Nowadays the nurses see their identity as that of being a co-worker. Nurses at the ward recognised that, in taking responsibility for safety at the ward, they need not take the role of guardians. Sharing responsibilities with patients and with ambulatory nurses provides new opportunities to reduce coercion and foster good care. 
Chapter 5 reports on a study about the interaction between ‘theory’ and ‘practice’ in clinical ethics support services and empirical ethics. Moral researchers use theories to understand and analyse moral practices and processes. Theoretical notions assist practitioners to understand their situation and make them aware of moral dynamics in their practice. From practical findings and empirical data, new theoretical concepts can be developed. This is illustrated in this study by an example from the evaluation research of one of the projects to reduce coercion and restraint. Within a psychiatric hospital, practitioners experienced difficulties and reluctance to imagine how they could reduce the amount of seclusions at the closed inpatient ward. The common method to interview stakeholders and organize focus groups did not naturally result in a mutual conversation on opportunities for improvements. The researchers needed to look for alternative and creative options to seduce practitioners to reflect on the urgency to reduce coercion. As the practitioners showed great interest in football strategies, the researchers invited them to compare their working routines with their preferred strategies in football. The use of this metaphor put their practice in a new light, and stimulated them to change. It created openings to discuss their common practice and reflect on underlying values regarding the use of coercion and their views regarding the meaning of  ‘safety’. This example showed that empirical ethics need creative tools and concepts to come up with analogies and comparisons that break free from daily routines and working methods. In Chapter 6, another intervention is described which can stimulate moral deliberations on the use of coercion. The study focuses on the significance of introducing external perspectives in a context where nurses do not automatically 
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experience an urgency to change their common practices. From the start of the project to reduce coercion at this hospital, nurses were critical about the possibilities to reduce coercion. They felt criticized for not doing their jobs well enough. They emphasized they did not use coercion unless it was absolutely necessary. The evaluation study aimed to motivate them to reflect on the necessity of the use of coercion from concrete cases. Two nurses working within another hospital were invited to share their experiences in a focus group meeting. These external colleagues had much experience with reducing coercion at their wards.  The group discussed cases in which at first, prevention of coercion seemed not possible. The input of external nurses helped the nurses at the ward to develop new insights on how they experienced safety and created openings for reflection and change. In the chapter, this process is analysed with the use of the moral psychology of Jonathan Haidt. The reluctance towards the project that initially existed is explained as a result of group thinking and the influence of group norms. People look for harmony and recognition of their moral decisions, and are not used to look critically at their own practices. We conclude that social processes play an important role in moral deliberations, and that bringing in new perspectives in the dialogue can foster moral development. In Chapter 7, the studies presented in the chapters are summarized and the central research questions of this thesis are answered. First, the main findings of the studies are recapitulated. After that, the studies are viewed in light of the moral epistemology of Margaret Walker. The findings are analysed in terms of moral understandings and moral responsibilities. This analysis leads to the conclusion that critical reflection regarding the assignment of responsibilities between stakeholders is required to reduce the use of coercion and improve the quality of care. Improving care entails a shift in the relationship between practitioners and patients, a change in identities, and new views regarding dominant values in practice. A second conclusion is that changes in assignments of responsibilities cannot be enforced top down without causing resistance and practical difficulties, especially when it is not clear for stakeholders at the work floor what these changes might entail for their practice. Joint reflection and shared deliberation on goals and acceptable risks are needed. A third insight from the analysis is that changes in the distribution of responsibilities imply accepting certain risks and (temporary) experiencing a situation of uncertainty. Changes take time and require on-going reflection. New 
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dilemmas and challenges will rise. Responsive research may provide support by elucidating the responsibilities experienced by different stakeholders and facilitating a dialogue between stakeholders regarding barriers and opportunities. Next, the role and responsibility of the researcher is discussed. Again the moral theory of Walker is used as reference point. Walker distinguishes different tasks for moral research. These tasks are related to the methods that have been used in the studies; i.e. constructing ‘counter stories’, ‘thick descriptions’, fostering reflections and dialogue using a metaphor as well as using external perspectives in a focus group meeting. These different methods all contributed to fostering transparency and creating openings for moral (re)considerations. They helped illuminating implicit motives and values within practices. The researcher aimed to give a voice to persons who were disempowered or oppressed within the dominant moral discourse and questioned existing moral positions responsively. The contribution of the researcher does not include providing moral justifications of concrete practices or designing new assignments of responsibilities. Moral decisions are mutually constructed in interactive processes of reflection and dialogue between stakeholders. Research contributes to the moral dynamics in psychiatry by fostering reflection and dialogue in the process of reducing coercion and restraint. 
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Samenvatting
Dwangtoepassingen in de psychiatrie, in het bijzonder het opsluiten van een patiënt in een separeerruimte, is een praktijk die onderhevig is aan kritiek. Hoewel het gebruik van dwang is toegestaan omwille van bescherming en afwending van gevaar(lijk gedrag) van een patiënt als gevolg van een psychiatrische stoornis, is de impact daarvan voor de patiënt en ook de zorgverleners zeer groot. Het voorkomen en verminderen van dwangtoepassingen wordt dan ook van groot belang geacht. In de afgelopen tien jaar kwam het belang om dwangtoepassingen verder terug te dringen in Nederland hoog op de agenda van de geestelijke gezondheidszorg te staan. Vanuit de cliënten- en familiebeweging, maar ook vanuit de beroepsgroepen en derden, zoals onderzoekers, kwamen geluiden dat het anders zou moeten. Nederland bleek in vergelijking met andere landen veel gebruik te maken van separeerruimtes; patiënten worden in Nederland vaker en langer opgesloten. Men wilde op zoek naar nieuwe manieren van werken op gesloten afdelingen om  separaties te vermijden. In een groot aantal instellingen werd gestart met dwangreductieprojecten, gestimuleerd met jaarlijkse subsidies van de overheid. Onze onderzoeksgroep werd door diverse ggz-instellingen gevraagd om dwangreductieprojecten te ondersteunen, te monitoren en te evalueren. De onderzoeken waren primair procesevaluaties. Centraal stonden vragen als: Wat gaat goed, wat kan beter, welke knelpunten worden ervaren (vanuit verschillende perspectieven) en hoe zijn die weg te nemen? De responsieve onderzoeksmethodologie was gericht op het creëren van dialoog over en gedeeld eigenaarschap van de doelen en successen van de projecten. De kwalitatieve studies werden gekenmerkt door participatie in en interactie met de praktijk, met speciale aandacht voor de morele vragen rond dwangtoepassing. Het onderzoek richtte zich op het in kaart brengen van de gangbare moraal in praktijken, het ontwikkelen van openingen voor responsieve analyse en het stimuleren van dialogen over morele verbetermogelijkheden. 
Dit proefschrift bestaat uit een vijftal gepubliceerde artikelen die licht werpen op de morele dynamiek in de praktijk rond dwang en drang en in de dwangreductieprojecten 
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die beogen deze praktijk te verbeteren. De projecten hadden een expliciet normatief doel; het verminderen van dwang. Er werd een breed gedragen urgentie gevoeld om dwang terug te dringen en de kwaliteit van zorg te verbeteren. Desondanks bleek het een uitdaging om de cultuur op gesloten afdelingen te veranderen. In dit proefschrift is onderzocht welke perspectieven op dwang en dwangreductie werden gehanteerd, welke veranderingen zich voltrokken, hoe weerstanden werden geduid en wat nodig was om ze weg te nemen. Het doel van de studies was het ontwikkelen van inzicht in de morele dynamiek van praktijken rond dwang en drang en bij te dragen aan verbeteringen door middel van gezamenlijke dialoog over en reflectie op centrale waarden en normen. Het theoretische kader dat hierbij werd gehanteerd, gaat ervan uit dat morele kennis sociaal gesitueerd is en zich ontwikkelt door interactie tussen en leerprocessen van betrokken partijen. Wat goed is om te doen, staat niet vooraf vast, maar krijgt vorm in sociale praktijken. Een belangrijke inspiratiebron voor dit proefschrift is de morele epistemologie van Margaret Walker. Zij benadrukt dat waarden en normen betekenis krijgen in concrete praktijken en in relaties  tussen mensen en partijen. In interacties en in sociale settingen leren mensen van elkaar wat belangrijk is, dat wil zeggen welke waarden en normen centraal staan, en wat men van elkaar mag verwachten. Vaak gaat het daarbij om impliciete, onbewuste processen. De keuzes die worden gemaakt en de wijzen waarop mensen met elkaar omgaan, weerspiegelen wat belangrijk gevonden wordt zonder dat men zich daarvan voortdurend bewust is. Heersende waarden en visies op onderlinge verantwoordelijkheden kunnen spanningen vertonen. Betrokken partijen hebben vaak verschillende visies en belangen. Verandering vereist inzicht in verschillen en openheid voor de waarde van gezichtspunten van anderen. Pas als er ruimte ontstaat voor kritiek, kunnen openingen gevonden worden om heersende gewoontes, routines en structuren te onderzoeken en te veranderen. In dit proefschrift wordt onderzocht welke visies op verantwoordelijkheden spelen in de praktijk rond dwang in de psychiatrie en hoe die in beweging kunnen worden gebracht in dwangreductieprojecten.
Hoofdstuk 2 introduceert een kritische reactie op het neurowetenschappelijke model in de psychiatrie gericht op medicamenteuze oplossingen. Dit model dat uitgaat van een neurobiologische visie op herstel, kan dwangtoepassingen op die 
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gronden rechtvaardigen. Vanuit patiëntenperspectief wordt de vraag gesteld of dit model patiënten voldoende ondersteunt in termen van coping en herstel. In dit hoofdstuk worden de ervaringen van een ex-patiënte met separatie beschreven en geanalyseerd. Haar geschiedenis in de psychiatrie laat zien dat het ondergaan van dwangtoepassingen haar niet hielp om grip te krijgen op haar leven. Dwang leidt tot wantrouwen, terwijl een vertrouwensrelatie cruciaal is voor het samen zoeken naar passende hulp en eventuele medicatie. Het gezien worden als persoon, serieus genomen worden en vertrouwen krijgen (in plaats van het moeten verdienen), zijn in haar verhaal bepalend voor het grip krijgen op het eigen leven. Dit leidt tot de conclusie dat coping en herstel in de psychiatrie complexer zijn dan het neurowetenschappelijke model suggereert. De sociale en relationele context waarin personen verkeren, heeft invloed op het proces van herstel. Tijdens het schrijfproces heeft de betrokken ex-patiënt, Jolijn Santegoeds, actief geparticipeerd. Zij heeft geholpen met het duiden en analyseren van het verhaal dat in een interview met haar werd opgetekend. 
Hoofdstuk 3 belicht het perspectief van verpleegkundigen. Centraal staat de vraag hoe verpleegkundigen omgaan met familie en naasten van psychiatrische patiënten en welke waarde zij daarbij hechten aan privacy en vertrouwelijkheid. Deze vraag kwam voort uit de in dwangreductieprojecten gevoelde behoefte om familie actiever te betrekken bij het voorkomen en verminderen van dwangtoepassingen, en de ervaring dat men daarbij tegen knelpunten aan liep. Uitgangspunt zijn de verhalen van vier verpleegkundigen over hun contact met familie en naasten van patiënten. De verpleegkundigen werkten op verschillende afdelingen binnen eenzelfde ggz-instelling. De verhalen laten zien dat er verschillen bestaan in de waarde die men hecht aan de rol en de betrokkenheid van familie in de zorg voor de patiënt. Dit loopt uiteen van een instrumentele rol, waarbij familie vooral wordt gezien als bron van informatie om de zorg voor de patiënt te optimaliseren, tot een intrinsieke rol, waarbij familie als waardevol op zich wordt beschouwd. Indien familie van intrinsiek van belang wordt geacht, zien verpleegkundigen de waarden van privacy en vertrouwelijkheid niet als onoverkomelijke barrières en is er meer ruimte om samen te werken aan dwangreductie. 
Hoofdstuk 4 beschrijft en analyseert de morele veranderingen als gevolg van een dwangreductieproject op een gesloten opnameafdeling van een ggz-instelling. Terugkijkend op de veranderingen ten gevolge van het project, zagen 
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verpleegkundigen veranderingen in hun rol en verantwoordelijkheid ten aanzien van patiënten. Voorafgaand aan het project was hun rol op de afdeling hoofdzakelijk dat van bewakers die de veiligheid dienden te garanderen. Door middel van controle en beheersing, bijvoorbeeld door het stellen van algemene huisregels en randvoorwaarden, werd hieraan invulling gegeven. Het project motiveerde verpleegkundigen om anders naar hun verantwoordelijkheden te kijken. Er werd gezocht naar manieren om contact te maken met patiënten, afdelingsregels werden verminderd en er kwam aandacht hoe de individuele patiënt op zijn of haar gemak te kunnen stellen. Dit veranderingsproces waarin verpleegkundigen op een nieuwe manier naar de invulling van hun verantwoordelijkheden gingen kijken, verliep niet vlekkeloos. In eerste instantie nam men in het streven dwangtoepassing tegen te gaan veel risico. Door lang te wachten met ingrijpen, ontstonden er juist situaties van onveiligheid. Men werd zich ervan bewust dat een nieuwe manier van werken nodig was, waarin verantwoordelijkheden niet bij voorbaat werden overgenomen van patiënten en een intensievere samenwerking werd opgezocht met ambulante behandelaren. In dit hoofdstuk worden deze nieuwe samenwerkingsrelaties beschreven. In de analyse worden de veranderingsprocessen in verband gebracht met morele veranderingen. De verpleegkundigen werden door het project uitgenodigd en uitgedaagd om hun professionele kernwaarden verder te ontwikkelen. Hierdoor herdefinieerden zij hun rol uiteindelijk van ‘bewakers’ naar ‘partners’ van de patiënt. 
Hoofdstuk 5 gaat in op de interactie tussen ‘theoretische analyse’ en ‘morele praktijk’ in de context van morele praktijkondersteuning en empirische ethiek. Onderzoekers gebruiken theorieën om morele praktijken te begrijpen en processen te analyseren. Theoretische noties kunnen helpen om bepaalde processen inzichtelijk maken voor de betrokkenen in de praktijk en betrokkenen bewust te maken van de morele dimensies in hun praktijk. Hieruit kunnen tevens nieuwe theoretische concepten worden ontwikkeld, doordat vanuit empirische bevindingen theoretische kaders op hun bruikbaarheid kunnen worden getoetst en eventueel heroverwogen. Ter illustratie wordt in dit hoofdstuk een voorbeeld beschreven uit het evaluatieonderzoek in een van de dwangreductieprojecten. Voor de hulpverleners van de betreffende ggz-instelling was het moeilijk voorstelbaar dat op hun afdeling dwangtoepassingen verminderd zouden kunnen worden. De standaard methodiek van interviewen van betrokkenen en organiseren van focusgroepen met 
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stakeholders leidde niet automatisch tot een gezamenlijk gesprek over verbeteringen. Dit noodzaakte de onderzoekers om op zoek te gaan naar alternatieve en creatieve ingangen om betrokkenen te verleiden tot het ref lecteren op de noodzaak en relevantie om dwangtoepassingen te verminderen en te voorkomen. Aangezien voetbal een belangrijk en laagdrempelig gespreksonderwerp was in de wandelgangen, werd aan betrokkenen gevraagd hun praktijk te vergelijken met verschillende voetbal strategieën. Het gebruik van deze metafoor bood een ingang om werkroutines en structuren te bespreken en creëerde openingen om te reflecteren over onderliggende waarden en normen in de context van dwangtoepassingen. Voor de theoretische ontwikkeling betekent dit voorbeeld dat metaforen in taal en communicatie van belang kunnen zijn en een plek verdienen in de theoretische kaders van empirische ethiek. 
Hoofdstuk 6 gaat verder in op interventies ter verandering van de bestaande praktijk van dwangtoepassing. De studie beschrijft de waarde van het introduceren van een extern perspectief in een situatie waarin de gangbare wijze van werken als vanzelfsprekend wordt beschouwd. Vanaf het begin stonden de verpleegkundigen binnen deze studie kritisch ten aanzien van het dwangreductieproject. Zij voelden zich aangesproken, alsof zij hun werk niet naar behoren zouden uitvoeren. Zij benadrukten dat zij geen onnodige dwang op hun afdelingen toepasten. Een doel van het onderzoek was om betrokkenen te verleiden hierover verder in gesprek te gaan. Om de verpleegkundigen hiertoe uit te nodigen werden twee collega-verpleegkundigen van andere instellingen uitgenodigd in een focusgroep bijeenkomst. Deze verpleegkundigen hadden veel ervaring met het terugdringen van dwangtoepassingen. In de focusgroep werd gesproken over  situaties waarin dwang onvermijdelijk leek. Dit gaf inzicht in de waarde die door de verpleegkundigen werd gehecht aan veiligheid en bood openingen tot verandering. In het hoofdstuk wordt dit proces geanalyseerd met behulp van morele psychologie van Jonathan Haidt. De weerstand die in eerste instantie bestond ten aanzien van het project kan worden verklaard vanuit groepsdenken en de invloed van groepsnormen. Mensen zoeken harmonie en bevestiging van hun morele beslissingen en ervaren een drempel om een meer kritisch perspectief in te nemen. Door de aanwezigheid van externe collega’s ontstonden (laagdrempelige) openingen om morele beslissingen meer kritisch te onderzoeken en over de mogelijkheden om dwang te verminderen te reflecteren. 
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In Hoofdstuk 7 wordt teruggekeken op de verschillende studies en worden de centrale onderzoeksvragen beantwoord. Nadat de belangrijkste bevindingen van de studies worden samengevat, wordt dieper ingegaan op de betekenis van deze onderzoeken in het licht van het theoretische kader van Margaret Walker. De bevindingen worden geanalyseerd in termen van verantwoordelijkheidstoedelingen. Uit de analyse volgt dat het verminderen van dwang en het verbeteren van kwaliteit van zorg veranderingen vereist in de verantwoordelijkheidstoedelingen tussen de betrokkenen. Dit impliceert een verschuiving in de relatie tussen hulpverleners en patiënten, een verandering in rollen en identiteiten van betrokkenen en een nieuwe visie op leidende waarden in de praktijk. Daarnaast volgt uit de studies dat verbeteringen niet zonder meer van bovenaf opgelegd kunnen worden. Veranderingen in identiteiten, relaties en waarden moeten door de betrokkenen in de praktijk (h)erkend worden als verbeteringen. Veranderingen kunnen wel worden gestimuleerd door het faciliteren van reflectie en dialoog. Tegelijk impliceert elke verandering ook een bepaalde mate van risico en (tijdelijke) onzekerheid. Dit betekent dat veranderingen tijd kosten en voortdurend aandacht verdienen. Er ontstaan nieuwe dilemma’s en uitdagingen. Responsief onderzoek kan hierbij ondersteuning bieden, door inzicht te bieden in de veranderingsprocessen en dialoog te faciliteren over mogelijkheden en knelpunten die men tegen komt. In dit hoofdstuk wordt vervolgens ingegaan op de vraag wat de bevindingen betekenen voor de rol en verantwoordelijkheid van onderzoekers in het faciliteren en stimuleren van dialoog en reflectie in de praktijk. Opnieuw wordt hierbij de theorie van Walker als uitgangspunt gehanteerd. Walker onderscheidt verschillende taken voor moreel onderzoek. Deze taken worden gerelateerd aan de methoden die in de studies werden toegepast; het formuleren van een ‘counter story’, het construeren van ‘thick descriptions’, het stimuleren van reflectie aan de hand van een metafoor, en het inbrengen van perspectieven en ervaringen van ‘buitenstaanders’. Geconcludeerd wordt dat deze verschillende methodes bijdragen aan het creëren van transparantie en openingen voor morele (her)overwegingen. Ze brengen impliciete, onderbelichte motieven en waarden in praktijken boven tafel. Naast reflectieve analyse dient de onderzoeker betrokkenen uit te dagen om in gesprek te gaan over hun motieven en waarden in de praktijk. Daarbij dient de onderzoeker aandacht te hebben voor personen en perspectieven die minder gehoord worden 
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in het morele discours en de gangbare morele posities responsief te bevragen. Het moreel rechtvaardigen van bestaande praktijken dan wel het ontwerpen van nieuwe verantwoordelijkheidstoedelingen behoort echter niet tot het domein van de onderzoeker. Morele rechtvaardigingen komen gezamenlijk tot stand in interactieve processen van reflectie door en deliberatie met de betrokkenen. De zoektocht naar een moreel evenwicht kan door de onderzoeker gestimuleerd en gevoed worden. Het gaat om een voortdurend proces van afstemmen waarin door het belichten van blinde vlekken en onderbelichte belangen, de reflectie en dialoog verrijkt wordt en voorwaarden worden gecreëerd voor morele verbeteringen. 
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Grote dank gaat allereerst uit naar mijn hoofdpromotor prof.dr. Guy Widdershoven. Guy, dank je wel voor je inspiratie en betrokkenheid. De snelheid waarmee jij reageert en inhoudelijk feedback geeft, is indrukwekkend. Naast promotor en leidinggevende, was jij ook als een coach voor mij. In de wat turbulentere tijden op persoonlijk vlak, hield je mij scherp en stimuleerde je mij om de focus vast te houden en mijzelf verder te ontwikkelen. Dank je wel voor de kansen die je mij gaf om mijzelf te ontplooien in de wetenschap en voor de plek op de afdeling. Veel dank gaat ook uit naar prof.dr. Tineke Abma, mijn tweede promotor. Tineke, ik ben eveneens onder de indruk van jouw energie, en vooral ook van jouw creativiteit en scherpe analyses. Ik heb veel van jou geleerd over hoe empirisch onderzoek uit te voeren, hoe data te verzamelen en deze te analyseren. Daarnaast zie ik jou ook als voorbeeld hoe ambitie in de wetenschap kan worden gecombineerd met vrouwelijkheid en een vleugje feminisme. In een latere fase sloot dr. Bert Molewijk aan als co-promotor. Bert, dank je wel voor je hulp als inspirator en ‘stok achter de deur’. Je vrolijkheid en positieve inslag was precies datgene wat ik nodig had om de laatste hobbels van mijn proefschrift te kunnen nemen. Naast je expertise in empirische ethiek en je hulp om structuur in mijn teksten te scheppen, wil ik je ook bedanken voor je gezelschap tijdens mijn verblijf in Olso. En wat een leuke kinderen heb jij!
Ook ben ik het veld erkentelijk voor haar openhartigheid en gastvrijheid. Elke keer verbaast het me hoe eerlijk en open mensen zich laten interviewen en onderzoek 
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van belang achten. Ondanks dat er ook op sommige momenten weerstanden waren, bleek dat geen barrière om mee te werken aan de onderzoeken. 
Veel inspiratie en steun vond ik bij mijn collega’s van de afdeling. Het is fijn om niet alleen voor de uitdaging te staan om voldoende tijd te vinden om aan je publicaties te schrijven als je tegelijkertijd ook aan projecten werkt, nieuwe tracht te vinden en onderwijs verzorgt. Af en toe mopperden we hier dan ook over onder het genot van een biertje in de kroeg, maar altijd kwamen we ook tot de conclusie dat we toch wel erg leuk werk hadden. Dit deden we al in de tijd van ‘Maastricht’, waar ik direct moet denken aan de vele avonden met Christi en Annelien in café Tembe. In Amsterdam vonden de goede gesprekken gelukkig zijn voortgang, waarbij de kroeg af en toe werd ingeruild voor de sushi bar. Mijn dank gaat uit naar alle directe collega’s; onder andere Margreet, Minne, Tamara, Deborah, Marloes, Frouk, Andrea, Suzanne en alle anderen. Er zijn echter twee collega’s die ik graag afzonderlijk wil bedanken. Allereerst Patricia, voor haar zorg en oprechte geïnteresseerdheid in ieders leven. Heel bijzonder hoe je altijd klaar staat voor iedereen op de afdeling! Daarnaast wil ik Yolande bedanken, mijn paranimf, voor haar goede humeur en strijdbaarheid. Al lange tijd werken wij samen en ondanks of dankzij onze verschillende karakters en achtergronden, vullen we elkaar altijd goed aan. Ik hoop dat we dat nog lang zullen voortzetten.Sinds dit jaar werk ik met ‘nieuwe’ collega’s in een interessant onderzoeksproject over eigen kracht en sociale veerkracht in de psychiatrie. Gert, dank je wel voor de mogelijkheid om me in dit onderwerp, dat zo mooi aansluit bij mijn eerdere werk, te kunnen verdiepen. Marjolein en Ellen, wat fijn om samen te kunnen sparren en lief en leed te delen in deze opstartfase. Ik ben zeer benieuwd naar wat wij voor spannende onderzoeksresultaten gaan vinden.
In mijn persoonlijke leven zijn er eveneens vele mensen die ik dankbaar ben en zonder hun steun zou ik dit proefschrift niet hebben kunnen afronden. Ilse, ‘mijn hartsvriendin’, wil ik bedanken voor haar scherpe humor en analyses, en haar nuchtere, eerlijke kritiek voor als ik (weer) eens uit de bocht vloog. Wat ben ik blij met onze vriendschap en wat fijn dat je mijn paranimf wilt zijn! Daarnaast zijn er vele vrienden en vriendinnen die allen intensief hebben meegeleefd, die geduldig 
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hebben geluisterd naar strubbelingen in de afronding van dit proefschrift en mij af en toe meenamen voor een dansje op een festival of naar de kroeg: Rianne, Esther, Naanana, Aafke, Mylene, Renée, Marc, Jeroen, Rogier en alle aanhang. Het voelt heel goed zoveel lieve mensen te mogen kennen. Last but not least, natuurlijk mijn familie. Pappa en mamma, bedankt voor jullie onvoorwaardelijke steun in alles, en in het bijzonder het meeleven met dit spannende avontuur. Dit geldt ook voor mijn zus en haar fantastische gezin: Jolein, je bent meer dan een zus voor mij. Bedankt voor het ontwerpen van de voorkant van dit proefschrift.
Tot slot, mijn filosofische interesse begon in mijn puberteit met het lezen van het bekende jaren-zeventig boek ‘Zen en de kunst van het motoronderhoud’ van Robert Pirsig. Toen vond ik dat werk inspirerend en motiveerde mij om mijzelf verder in de filosofie te verdiepen. Twee jaar geleden kwam het motorrijden opnieuw op mijn pad. Na een reis door Vietnam achter op een motor, besloot ik zelf lessen te gaan nemen. Nu, zelf in het bezit van een motor, blijkt de motor-filosofie opnieuw inspirerend. Het subtiele verschil tussen kijken en zien, het vooruitkijken (naar de horizon) en tegelijk alert blijven en reageren op alles wat je onderweg tegenkomt, is een mooie metafoor voor de inhoud van dit proefschrift.
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